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INTRODUCTION
Though understood in various ways, American liberalism was sufficiently well-focused to have been the dominant
viewpoint of American politics in the years following World
James Q. Wilson said that liberalism was America's

War II.

"ruling philosophy" throughout this period.

1

Robert Booth

Fowler examined the assertion, commonly made in the 1950s,
that we had reached the end of ideology, and concluded that
this belief reflected not the decline, but the pre-eminence,
of liberalism.

The vehemence which met a challenge to the

prevailing orthodoxy, such as the 1964 Goldwater presidential
campaign, hardly suggests a political order indifferent to
ideology.

2

The era of liberal hegemony is now clearly over, or
it has at least been suspended indefinitely.
have seen a series of electoral

Recent years

developments-~George

McGovern's landslide defeat in 1972, the passage of Proposition 13 and other tax cutting measures in the late 1970s, and
1 James Q. Wilson, "Liberalism and Purpose," Commentary
May 1972, p. 74.
2

Robert Booth Fowler, Believing Skeptics: American
Political Intellectuals, 1945-1964 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 291-294.

1

2

the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980--suggesting that there
is scarcely any popular enthusiasm for adding on to the
existing structure of liberal programs, and some sentiment
for rescinding policies that have been in place for many
years.

A number of observers agree that American liberalism

is confused and unable to explain itself.

James Nuechterlein

says that liberalism is suffering from a crisis, the existence
and severity of which "almost no one on the political spec3
trum, including liberals, would dispute."
Of American
political attitudes in the mid-seventies, John Frederick
Martin writes:
Most people, liberals included, considered the government
incapable of solving social problems and were tired of
its trying--tired of federal coercion, and tired of civil
rights. They went on to new battles, so swiftly changing
their views and so utterly dismissing liberal ideas that
the liberals of the 1960s appeared, only ten years later,
as curious relics of a distant past.4
By the end of the 1970s, liberals were on the defensive,
responding to ideas generated by others rather than advancing
new proposals based on their own principles.

The Democratic

alternative to Ronald Reagan's 1981 tax plan, for example,
would have been slightly more beneficial to the "middle class,"
3

James A. Nuechterlein, "The People vs. The Interests,"
Commentary, March 1975, pp. 66-67.
4

John Frederick Martin, Civil Rights and the Crisis of
Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976 (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1979), p. 243.

3

which the Democratic bill took to mean anyone earning
$50,000 a year or less--the ninety-fifth percentile in the
American income distribution.

And the Democratic proposals

on depreciation and corporate taxes were considered the
better deal by many businessmen.

5

Many liberals seemed

unsure whether their traditional agenda was even defensible.
As the New Republic editorialized, "The voters' impression
that the liberal regime of government is partly responsible
for our present dilemma, and that liberals have little to
6
say about how we should get out of it, is justified."
The severity of liberalism's present distress makes
it somewhat easier and a good deal more important to achieve
a clear understanding of modern American liberalism.

The

role of liberalism in American politics in the immediate
future is unclear:

the possibilities include the continuing

decline and sterility of liberalism, the return of traditional liberalism to a leading position in American politics,
or some sort of reformulation of the liberal approach to
government.

To be prepared to understand these developments

requires some sense of how American liberals understood the
country's situation and their own during the years of their
preeminence and subsequent decline.

It may be also that

5

Daniel Seligman, "The Search For a Liberal Agenda,"
Fortune, 24 August 1981, p. 63.
6

"In Defer.se of Good Intentions,:
13 December 1980, p. 5.

New Republic,

4

liberalism is somewhat easier to understand now that its
premises are being reevaluated, and many thoughtful people
feel an historical and intellectual remoteness from the
liberalism of the fifties and sixties.

This longer perspec-

tive should make the contours of liberalism easier to discern.
There is a small body of literature devoted to the
analysis of modern American liberalism, including some works
that make important contributions to understanding particular
aspects of liberalism.

None of these studies attempt the

project here contemplated, however--the study of liberalism
as a system of ideas about American public policy.
The best study of modern American liberalism is
Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism by John Frederick
Martin.

Martin studies how the civil rights issue changed

the politics of the Democratic Party from 1945 to 1976.

He

argues that while Franklin Roosevelt had placated Southern
whites so all factions of the Democratic Party

would support

the New Deal, Harry Truman set the party on an irreversible
course towards the full acceptance of all the claims of the
civil rights movement.

By the mid-sixties the Democrats had

recognized that their coalition could no longer include
Southern racists and blacks, and chose to reject the former-the only electoral votes Barry Goldwater won from outside
Arizona came from the Deep South.

At just the point when

5

liberal Democrats wanted to consider the problem of race
solved and turn to the problem of poverty, the two came
together in an explosive mixture.

The efforts to help the

blacks of the northern ghetto, whose problems made Jim Crow
seem no less evil but much simpler, shattered the fragile
consensus that had backed the liberal vision of racial and
economic justice.

Though their intentions were only decent,

and their assessment of the nation's needs was plausible,
liberals were run over by history, says Martin, and have yet
to recover.
Where Martin concentrates on liberal politics,
Theodore J. Lowi's study, The End of Liberalism, is about the
governmental practice of liberalism. 7
to be disordered and destructive:
ning with bargaining." 8

He finds its approach

"Liberalism replaces plan-

Most of the legislation passed by

Congress does not actually decide anything; instead, the
legislature confers broad discretionary power on federal
agencies and departments, who must then issue rules that
accomodate the demands of an array of interest-groups.
Lowi scores the sunny belief that pluralism can save us from
political pain--the inclusion of all interested parties does
not necessarily solve our problems, and the excessive faith
in pluralism as a governing procedure may keep us from ever
7

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism:
Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York:
1979).
8

Ibid., p. 68.

The Second
Norton,

6

confronting our real political needs.

A third book covers another aspect of modern American
liberalism.

Beyond the New Deal, by Alonzo Hamby, examines

the relationship between liberals and President Harry
Truman. 9

The years from 1945 through 1953 were crucial to

American liberalism.

Liberals had to define themselves with-

out reference to Franklin Roosevelt, and there was a fight
for the soul of the liberal movement between opponents and
supporters of Truman's Cold War policies.

Hamby's account

of the emergence of "vital center liberalism" is detailed
and comprehensive, though not deeply analytical.
James A. Nuechterlein has written several insightful
essays on modern American liberalism.

The most detailed is

"Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar
Liberalism," a study of Schlesinger's political writings as
representative of the thought of modern American liberalism.

10

This article is the scholarly work closest to this dissertation, though the subject matter is broader, focusing on
liberalism's

position on civil rights, macroeconomics, and

foreign policy issues, as well as the welfare state, and
narrower in the method, using just one source as an indicator
9

Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S
Truman and American Liberali-s~m~(~N~e~w~~Y~o-r~k~:~-C~o~l~um~b-1~-a~U~n~i~v~e~rsity Press, 1973).

10

James A. Nuechterlein, "Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar Liberalism," Review of
Polites 39 (January 1977): 3-40.

7

of liberal thinking.

According to Nuechterlein, Schlesinger

began with a reasonably clear answer to liberalism's problem
in the late 1940s:

how to claim and defend the middle ground

between Henry Wallace and the National Association of Manufacturers.

But liberalism, as reflected in Schlesinger's

writings, slowly unraveled when confronted with a prosperous
consumer society, Vietnam, civil rights, urban riots, and
white backlash.

Nuechterlein's conclusion, that liberals

wanted the best of several worlds, and were incapable of
making necessary choices, is elaborated in his essays, "The
People vs. The Interests," and "The Liberal World Confronts
the Reagan Era."

11

Other intellectual histories constitute a helpful
introduction to the dissertation.
very general:

Some of these works are

these include The Politics of Affluence:

Ideology in the United States since World War II, by James
P. Young, and Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals, 1945-1964, by Robert Booth Fowler.

Both books are

concerned with wider topics than American liberalism.

The

Evolution of Liberalism, by Harry K. Girvetz, attempts to
establish the relationship between eighteenth and twentieth
century liberalism, but is more scholarly and dispassionate
11

'
James A. Nuechterlein, "The People vs The Interests"
Commentary, March 1975, pp. 66 73; James A. Nuechterlein,
"The Liberal World Confronts the Reagan Era," American
Spectator, February 1982, pp. 20-23.

8

in treating the former.

The Decline of American Liberalism,

by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., and Rendezvous with Destiny, by
Eric Goldman, trace American liberalism from the nineteenth
century through the New Deal, providing valuable historical
grounding, but leaving off where the dissertation will

.

beg1n.

12
Those works concerned with liberalism in more recent

years concentrate on the practice rather than the theory.
Two important analyses of the Great Society are The Great
Society:

Lessons for the Future, edited by Robert M. Solow

and Eli Ginzberg, and The Promise of Greatness, by Sar A.
Levitan and Robert Taggert.

These books carefully examine

the formulation, funding, and implementation of the major
social welfare programs of the sixties.

Between the lines

one can glean some insights into the ideology that justified
these programs.

Two other books speak at greater length,

but less cautiously, about liberalism and the Great Society.
They are On Fighting Poverty:

Perspectives From Experience,

edited by James L. Sundquist, and The Great Society Reader:
The Failure of American Liberalism, edited by Marvin E.
Gettleman and David Mermelstein.

12

Finally, The Cost of Good

James P. Young, The Politics of Affluence:
Ideology
in the United States Since World War II (San Fransicso:
Chandler, 1968); Fowler, Believing Skeptics; Harry K. Girvetz,
The Evolution of Liberalism (London: Collier, 1963); Arthur A.
Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism (New York:
Atheneum, 1967); Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952).

9

Intentions:

New York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-

1975, by Charles R. Morris, derives some important lessons
:
13
about liberalism from its implementation in one major c1ty.
The other sort of writing about liberalism dispenses
with the study of its history, in thought or action.

Pro-

ceeding on the assumption that the content of the liberal
program is sufficiently clear, these essays go on to examine
some of its hidden implications.

Joseph Cropsey's essay,

"Liberalism and Conservatism," is the most notable of these.
Cropsey argues that liberalism takes classical and Christian
notions of virtue and charity, and tries to make them modern
by applying them in an egalitarian and positivistic way,
resulting in a political viewpoint that is theoretically
confused but politically popular.
vein would include:

Other good works in this

Peter Clecak, Crooked Paths:

Reflections

on Socialism, Conservatism, and the Welfare State; Arnold S.
Kaufman, The Radical Liberal:

New Man in American Politics;

Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left; David
Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel;" Michael Walzer, "In

13

Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, ed., The Great
Society: Lessons for the Future (New York: Basic Books,
1974); SarA. Levitan and Robert Taggert, The Promise of
Greatness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); James
L. Sundquist, ed., On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives From
Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Marvin E. Gettleman and David Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader:
The Failure of American Liberalism (New York:
Random House,
1967); Charles R. Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions: New
York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-1975 (New York:
Norton, 1980).

10
Defense of Equality;" Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the
People;" and James Q. Wilson, "Liberalism and Purpose." 14
Helpful though this body of literature may be

t~

the

understanding of modern American liberalism, it leaves a gap
which this dissertation will occupy, though not fill.

Between

critical works that do not examine the actual words and deeds
of liberalism, and historical works that do not go beyond
chronicling the evolution of liberalism, there is a need for
a critical intellectual history of modern American liberalism,
in which evaluation is tied directly to evidence of liberals'
goals and perceptions.
To provide such an intellectual history requires
carefully delimiting what will be studied and how.

Liberalism

addresses itself to all kinds of questions of public policy
as well as, more broadly, social and cultural issues.

A

study of liberalism with respect to all these matters would
be, if it were possible at all, a very long book indeed.

In

the interests of brevity and cohesion, this dissertation will
14

Joseph Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism," in
Left, Right, and Center, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 42-59; Peter Clecak, Crooked Paths:
Reflections on Socialism, Conservatism, and the Welfare State
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977); ArnoldS. Kaufman, The
Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics (New York:
Atherton Press, 1968); Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the
American Left (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); David
Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," Public Interest 39
(Spring 1975): 3-30; Michael Walzer, "In Defense of Equality,"
The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left, ed. Lewis
A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York: Quadrangle, 1974), pp.
107-123; Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the People," Commentary, August 1973, pp 25-32; Wilson, "Liberalism and
Purpose."

ll
concentrate on the welfare state.

It seems fair to regard

liberalism as being most clearly distinguished by its attitude
towards the welfare state.

The liberal of 1945 probably would

differ from the liberal of 1983 on U.S. foreign policy, or
the management of the economy, or race relations.

But it is

a safe guess that both would feel that government, especially
the federal government, should do more to help people secure
adequate incomes, housing, health care and education.

It is

in the advocacy of the welfare state also that liberals have
most clearly and consistently differed with their conservative opposition.

To study liberalism with respect to the

welfare state, then, is to study it with respect to the one
issue that can best reveal the character of modern liberalism.
The selection of the best sources to use for a study
of liberalism is even more important and difficult than the
selection of a topic around which to organize such a study.
American liberalism is far from being a tightly organized
body of opinion, and there is nothing resembling an official
liberal spokesman.

In view of the width and variety of

American liberalism, a comprehensive history of it is probably
impossible:

to include every source that any student of the

subject might regard as reflecting liberalism would be to
include many sources that many knowledgeable authorities
regard as unrelated to liberalism.

This dissertation will

rely on some of the sources most widely and plausibly

12
regarded as having articulated mainstream liberal ideas.

The

political writings of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. are one source
we will rely on as indicative of liberal thought.

Schlesinger

has been called a "weather vane of which way the wind is
blowing in liberal circles," and "perhaps the most representative figure of mid-twentieth century liberalism •••. "

15

His "enormous journalistic output, both learned and popular"
covers the period from 1945, and reflects how liberalism
.
16
reacte d to and a ff ecte d pos t war Am er1ca.

A second and third

source will be the magazines, Nation and New Republic.

Robert

Lekachman relied on these two sources when writing an informal
history of postwar liberalism, as did Hamby in his book on
Truman and liberals.

17

Though the Americans for Democratic

Action has been more concerned with realizing than clarifying
the liberal agenda, its published and archival material
provides some additional insights into liberal thinking since

1945.

Though never powerful in its own right, the ADA

reflected "vital center" liberalism better than any other

. t.1on. 18
organ1za
15

John Rosenberg, "If FDR Were Alive Today ••• " Nation,
15 April 1978, p. 420; Henry Fairlie, review of Robert Kennedy
and His Times, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New Republic,
9 September 1978, p. 30.

16

John Taft, :'The Once and Future Mandarin," New
Republic, 26 November 1977, p. 18.

17
Robert Lekachman, "Fashions in Liberalism," Nation,
20 September 1965, pp. 62-66; Hamby, p. 603.
18
Hamby, p. 508.

13

An interpretation of the writings of just one man
will always be open to doubts:

has too much emphasis been

given to one unrepresentative article, or a false connection
been drawn between two very different works?

These problems

are much greater when the body of writing to be examined
includes thirty-five years' publication of two weekly
journals, involving several editors, dozens of editorialists,
and hundreds of authors of reviews and articles.
greater magnitude of the problem does not

Yet the

change its

nature; the interpreter must still attempt to read his
material carefully, thoroughly, and with an open mind,
drawing the most plausible conclusions he can, knowing that
equally judicious readers may arrive at different interpretations.

This dissertation must, and will endeavor to, be

particularly careful about assuming a single purpose or viewpoint is shared by the many thinkers to be examined, the sort
of assumption that is usually safe in the study of a single
author.

On the other hand, our familiarity with the subject

matter of this dissertation makes it easier to assess its
conclusions than those of intellectual histories treating
more remote or obscure subjects.

Our common sense knowledge

of modern liberalism is not a perfect standard for assessing
scholarly interpretations of the subject--if it were, scholarly
interpretations would be unnecessary--but it does provide a
useful way to guard against strained or slanted readings of
liberals' opinions.

14
The selection of 1945 as a starting point for this
study is more than the use of an obvious benchmark.

The

death of Franklin Roosevelt removed a galvanizing figure who,
through political skill and personal magnetism, had allowed
American liberalism to survive its internal disorder.
According to Nation's eulogy of FDR:
Throughout the last twelve years the progressive political
movement in this country hLs slowly crystallized around
Mr. Roosevelt.
It has not developed--or had a chance to
develop--an independent program or national leadership •••.
In the President and the New Deal lay the strength of the
whole progressive movement--and its we~kness.
In the
degree to which American progressivism has been dependent on the President, it must experience a readjustment
of values, a process of reintegration, before it can
face adequately the new demands which will be made upon
1•t • 19
Though the full meaning of liberalism will become
clearer in the body of the dissertation, it would be useful
to anchor the discussion to a provisional definition.

Two

compatible but not identical definitions can provide a good
beginning.

According to Arnold Kaufman:

Liberals believe that a good society is one in which
each person possesses the resources of materials, mind,
and spirit, as well as the opportunities to carve out a
career in conformity to that person's own nature and
reasoned choice.20
Robert Lekachman's definition is less precise but more indicative of the soul of liberalism:
19

Freda Kirchwey, "End of an Era," Nation, 21 April
1945, p. 430.
20

Kaufman, p. 6.

15

Liberalism is even more an attitude than it is a program.
Liberals are critical of injustice, suspicious of vested
interests, friendly to change, hopeful of peaceful improvement and convinced that reasoned argument ultimately
overcomes selfish opposition.21
·
That the attitude described by Lekachman should operate on
the goals outlined by Kaufman by favoring a welfare state,
in which the government undertakes such tasks as redistributing income, guaranteeing economic security, and assuring decent housing, health care, and education for all
citizens, would seem wholly reasonable.

22

A more detailed

description of liberals' premises that lead them to the
welfare state, the goals they seek in it, the methods they
are willing and unwilling to employ, and how their views of
the welfare state distinguish them from others on the American political spectrum will be the concern of the ensuing
chapters.
21
22

Lekachman, p. 62.
Clark, p. 69.

CHAPTER ONE
LIBERALISM'S PREMISES
Liberalism is, generically, the creed of all those
who insist that a good society give ample scope to human
liberty.

Modern American liberals, in the narrower sense in

which we shall be using the term, are members of this larger
club, advocates of freedom under law.

But devotion to

liberty is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition
for being a liberal in America; Arthur Schlesinger acknowledges that conservatives are, in the broad sense, liberal
about the basic shape of American society, too.

To ascertain

the distinctive features of liberalism we will begin by
attempting to understand the premises of liberalism, to see
the fundamental facts of American political life as they have
been seen by prominent liberals.

1

I

If adherence to liberty is not enough to distinguish
liberals from conservatives, there is the desire among
liberals to dissociate themselves from the least attractive
1

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Liberalism," Saturday
Review, 8 June 1957, pp. 11-12.

16

17
aspects usually ascribed to conservatism--an excessive fear
of change that is the companion of a slavish and unreasoning
reliance on old ways and ideas.

Their writings would suggest

that liberals are more comfortable with a picture of themselves as the party of the future than the party of the past.
Liberals would rather challenge Americans than comfort them.
According to Schlesinger:
[Liberalism] must oppose the drift into the homogenized
society.
It must fight spiritual unemployment as it
once fought economic unemployment.
It must concern itself with the quality of popular culture and the character of lives to be lived in our abundant society. 2
Even as America needs, for her own well-being, to be challenged, America cannot fulfill her mission among the nations
of the world by boasting smugly of past accomplishments.

We

must come to grips with the "revolutionary thrust of our
time [and] the human longings which animate it" by reviving
our original mission as a bearer of hope to the oppressed.

3

This liberal belief in the importance of noble
aspirations and invigorating challenges found its clearest
expression in the way liberals reacted to John Kennedy's
presidency.

Though later reassessments may have judged

Kennedy's foreign policy as too aggressive and his domestic
policies as too timid, liberals reacted favorably at the time
2
3

Ibid., p. 37.

Adlai E. Stevenson, "The Mission of Liberalism,"
New Republic, 24 September 1956, p. 11.

18
to the way Kennedy addressed a nation that had grown selfsatisfied during the fifties.

Arthur Schlesinger, who

switched to John Kennedy in 1960 rather than support Adla·i
Stevenson for president a third time, said that Kennedy carried forward and completed a change in liberal politics
begun by Stevenson.

When Stevenson was nominated in 1952,

a liberal politician was more likely to tell voters about
benefits than to demand exertions.
Stevenson changed all that. His lofty conception of
politics, his conviction that affluence was not enough
for the good life, his impatience with liberal cliches,
his contempt for conservative complacency, his summons
to the young, his demand for new ideas, his respect for
the people who had them, his belief that history afforded
no easy answers, his call for strong public leadership-all this ~et the tone for a new era in Democratic
politics.
By 1960 Kennedy was talking in the "Stevenson idiom" by
stressing "peril, uncertainty, sacrifice, purpose."

5

The

New Republic expressed the hope that Kennedy's distinctive
contribution would survive him:

"We are counting on a rising

market for quality; on the persistence of that creative
dedication, disciplined by social responsibility, that is
represented by the Peace Corps and the civil rights movement."6
4

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John
F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1965),
p. 23.

6

"The New Republic After Half A Century,"
Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 16.

New

19

Arthur Schlesinger in particular was beguiled by the
idea that good politics should be a source of excitement.
Anticipating the end of a long conservative decade, he wrote:
The '60s will probably be spirited, articulate, inventive, incoherent, turbulent, with energy shooting off
wildy in all directions. Above all there will be a
sense of motion, of leadership, of hope.
When this happens, America will be herself again.
she will deal affirmatively and imaginatively with her
problems •••• 7
Schlesinger seemed proudest of the way in which the Kennedy
administration appealed to the young people of America,
stirring their best instincts and making governmental service
and political activity respectable again.

8

All of this uplifting and inspiring tells us very
little about what it is that liberals are challenging us to
do.

But it would be wrong to regard liberal enthusiasm as

nothing more than an ingredient for achieving liberal goals.
Liberals believe they represent the better angels of the
American national character--though America occasionally
forsakes liberalism, she always returns and becomes herself
again.

Liberals like to think they are on the side of both

history and the people.

This was the source of their

optimism in the forties and fifties, fed by cheering election

7Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Hope
(Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 93.
8

schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 740.

20

results.

The 1948 election, the first test of New Deal

liberalism without FDR, was particularly important.

"Re-

action is repudiated," said the New Republic after Truinan's
victory.

"The New Deal is again empowered to carry forward

the promise of American life."

9

Truman's election, said the

ADA, showed a liberal-labor coalition so strong "it could
remake America."

10

There was a similar sense of the re-

affirmation of the relation between liberalism and America
after Barry Goldwater's defeat in 1964.

In some ways, though,

the 1952 election may have been the most encouraging--not
because liberals won, but because the first Republican president since Hoover found it necessary to accept the New Deal
as a fact of American political life beyond rescinding.

11

Some liberals have expressed the hope that the
altruism embodied in liberalism will be reflected in ideas
and sentiments widely held, rather than just in Americans'
behavior in the voting booth.

Irving Sarnoff, for example,

writing in New Republic, voices the belief that more generous
welfare programs "might provide the youth of this country
9

"Damn the Torpedos!" New Republic, 15 November 1948,

pg. 1.
10
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Forces in Key Role," ADA World, 10 November 1948, p. 1.
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with living institutions which would represent a buffer
against the prevailing values of the marketplace.

If

children could grow up believing that it is considered
socially legitimate for them seriously to work toward group
ends rather than individual ones (while not, thereby, losing
'individuality'), much of the competitiveness which now
seems to promote cases of delinquency might be reduced."

12

Even Arthur Schlesinger, who, as we shall see, likes to
regard himself as among the least sentimental of liberals,
asserted, without any supporting evidence, that America's
turn from conservatism to liberalism in the early sixties
corresponded to a decline of narrow self-interest as a
political force.
program.

"Farmers dislike the excesses of the farm

Workers begin to wonder whether higher wages are

the answer to every thing.

Businessmen know that everything

else in society cannot be sacrificed to their own profits." 13
There are dangers in this close identification of
personal good will and liberal politics.

It tends towards

the conclusion that liberal programs must have improbable
levels of public support to succeed.

A New Republic article

favoring a national housing program said that "every town,
12

Irving Sarnoff, "Bad Boys, Bad Times," New Republic,
18 January 1960, p. 14.
13

schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 91.
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metropolitan area and rural region in this country should
have an energetic citizens' housing and planning organization,
representing a cross-section of popular interests and professional knowledge, intimately acquainted with the operations

.
of 1 oca 1 agenc1es,
••• "14

This close identification between

liberalism and personal decency can also lead to an excessively politicized understanding of the way Americans behave.
When Congress weakened World War II price controls in 1946,
Nation said that the battle against excessive prices and
profits could still be won "if consumers retain the price
consciousness they have shown ••.• and refuse, individually
and collectively, to submit to profiteering."

15

This is not

the most plausible explanation of people's reluctance to
buy high-priced goods.

A suffocating embrace by liberals

of admirable, but not extraordinary, personal conduct,
raises the danger that liberalism, like socialism, would
take up too many evenings.
Arthur Schlesinger is the most prominent liberal
critic of the excessive optimism and sentimentality of
of certain liberals.

Schlesinger tried hard to popularize

a corrective sobriety, based on the political philosophy of
Reinhold Niebuhr.

He approvingly quotes Niebuhr's

14

catherine Bauer, "The Middle Class Needs Houses
Too, New Republic, 29 August 1949, p. 19.

15
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"The Shape of Things," Nation, 3 August 1946,
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characterization of the "prevailing liberal climate" in
1936:

"Appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood

are bound to be efficacious in the end.

If they have not

been so to date we must have more appeals to love, justice,
good-will and brotherhood."

16

From the perspective of 1956,

Schlesinger viewed such wooly-mindedness as a problem surmounted but a continuing temptation for liberalism.

He was

sterner in The Vital Center in 1949, when liberalism's future
was in greater doubt:
We must grow up now and forsake the millenial dream. We
will not arise one morning to find all need for further
strain and struggle ended, while we work two hours a
day and spend our leisure eating milk and honey. Given
human imperfection, society will continue imperfect.
Problems will always torment us, because all important
problems are insoluble; that is why they are important.
The good comes from the continuing struggle to try and
solve them, not from the vain hope of their solution.l7
Following Niebuhr, Schlesinger makes respect for
human fallibility the basis of liberalism.

Schlesinger says

that liberals must confront the pressing problems of an
industrialized society without losing sight of liberalism's
much older commitment to the limited state, due process,
gradualism, and empiricism.

To think only of the good things

that might be accomplished if enough power were given to
16

schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 102.

17
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center:
The Politics of Freedom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949),
p. 254.
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good people is to ignore the corrupting effects of power and
the impossibility of guaranteeing the rectitude of those
. ld 1' t . 18
who w1e
Despite Schlesinger's efforts, caution, pessimism,
a keen sense of human fallibility--these attitudes still
seem more appropriate to the conservative than the liberal
outlook.

Eleanor Roosevelt, not Reinhold Niebuhr, seems to

embody the spirit of liberalism.

Even Schlesinger himself,

as we have seen, was susceptible to the bAlief that a certain
style of national leadership could elicit dramatic changes
in popular attitudes, human fallibility not withstanding.
Of course, liberals have not expressed much optimism during
their decline over the last fifteen years.

But whether this

is only a temporary reaction to unfortunate circumstances,
whether liberalism will again be filled with hope and
enthusiasm when it sees its face reflected in America, must
await the reascendence of liberalism.

19

II
In addition to trying to inculcate a certain pessimism
in liberalism, Schlesinger has tried hard, and more successfully, to displace any excessively refined theorizing with

18 Ib1'd., p. 156.

S ee a 1 so p. 166 •

19
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with an uncomplicated pragmatism.
I say that the liberal is the pragmatist. The liberal's
greatest danger is not to understand this about himself
and to conceive himself instead as the rationalist •••.
The tradition of American liberalism has been skeptical
and empirical.
It has thus made successfully the transition from the classical liberalism of laissez-faire
economics to the social liberalism of the welfare state-from Adam Smith to Keynes, from Jefferson to Franklin
Roosevelt. 20
Liberals like Schlesinger have turned the absence of a
detailed theoretical approach to politics into one of the New
Deal's greatest virtues.

Because of its pragmatism the New

Deal was able to urgently attack the problems of the Depression, without waiting to resolve trivial abstractions.
While theoretical constraints had paralyzed both capitalists
and socialists in the 1930s, New Dealers simply pressed ahead
with their experiments, trusting that American democracy was
sensible enough to steer away from difficulties without the
aid of refined public philosophies. 21
It is not surprising that John Dewey, the foremost
defender of pragmatism, has been praised in the pages of
Nation and New Republic.

"Dewey, as much as any living man

or woman, has laid the foundations for a dwelling place for
liberalism and rationalism."
20

22

Dewey's insistence that growth

schlesinger, "Liberalism," p. 12.
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14 January 1950, p. 33; Schlesinger, The Politics of Hope,
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was the ultimate goal of good ethics and good politics
appealed to liberals who felt "the need to supplement the
narrow, self-centered individualism of the past with a new
social conception of individuality consonant with the industrial conditions under which we live."

23

It has been through pragmatism, some liberals have
argued, that American liberalism has been able to adhere to
the principles of Jefferson during the rapid industrialization that transformed Jefferson's America.

Laissez-faire

probably is the way to promote life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in an agrarian society, but an industrial,
urban society requires new methods to realize these goals.
If it is to retain the flexibility to pursue its goals,
liberalism can never be too closely identified with a particular agenda or ideology.

The liberal's overriding commit-

ment to freedom and welfare will lead him to do battle
against various sorts of entrenched power in various circumstances, whether aristocrats, capitalists, dictators, or
bureaucrats.

24

Schlesinger has extolled pragmatism as a distinctively American outlook essential to the nation's historical
23

Y. H. Krikorian, "The Ethics of Naturalism," New
Republic, 17 October 1949, p. 34. See also Max J. Skidmore,
American Political Thought (New York: St. Martin's, 1978),
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attainments.

According to Schlesinger:

Through American history ideas have served as a
means of releasing economic initiative and then as -a
means of chastening economic arrogance; as a means of
stimulating private energy and then as a means of asserting public responsibility ••.. What has mattered has been
the philosophical flexibility, the intellectual resilience of the people--the capacity to face new problems
relatively unencumbered by the cults and cliches of the
past •••• The ability to change one's mind turns out, on
last analysis, to be the secret of American economic
growth, without which resources, population, climate,
and.th~ other favoring factors would have been of no
ava1l. 5
America's ability to see its situation clearly, unscreened
by an ideology, has permitted this country to accomplish
great things, even under the duress of war and internal
conflict.

26
Schlesinger has gone so far as to say that prag-

matism is the central issue in the political struggles of our
times.

The"world civil war," he wrote, is "between dogmatism

and pragmatism; between the theological society and the
experimental society, between ideology and democracy." 27
In this view the Cold War became a struggle between rigidity
and flexibility, and liberals had to defend the pragmatic
vital center from extremist ideologues to the left and right.
"25

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Ideas and Economic
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Freedom implies humility, not absolutism; it implies not
the tyranny of the one but the tolerance of the many.
Against the monotholic world the American intellectual
tradition affirms the pluralistic world. Against ~he
world of coercion, it affirms the world of choice. 8
The rejection of tolerance, pluralism, and choice
leads to dogmatism, and dogmatism, according to this argument,
ultimately leads to totalitarianism.

Totalitarianism appeals

to many because it offers confidence and clarity to those who
find the modern world frightening and confusing.

The prag-

matic liberal is both humble, in his refusal to pretend to
have answers to the ultiamte political questions, and brave,
willing to keep trying to ameliDrate the political situation
in the absence of neat, definitive political precepts.
Pragmatism is the liberal's response to the limitations
imposed by modern epistemology.

Through pragmatism the

liberal seeks to turn a deficiency, the inability to discern
first principles, into the virtue of measured restraint.
"The ADA embodies the spirit of tolerance and humility which
is deeply rooted in the American liberal tradition.
rejected the

We have

false assumption that men must ultimately set-

tle their differences over the barricades." 29
Given the gravity of America's crisis in 1933, the
28
29

Ibid., p. 538.

Address of Wilson W. Wyatt, ADA National Chairman,
to ADA First National Convention. ADA Press Release, 21
February 1948. ADA papers, Series 4, number 9. See also
Schlesinger, The Vital Center, p. 50.

29
New Deal could hardly await the clarification of theoretical
subtleties; pragmatism was as good a justification for liberal
policies as any.

But the subsequent efforts, such as

Schlesinger's, to make a virtue of this necessity are suspect.
In the first place, even John Dewey seems to have had misgivings about the limitless flexibility admired by Schlesinger.
"Experimental method is not just messing around, nor doing
a little of this and a little of that in the hope that things
will improve," he wrote.

"Just as in the physical sciences,

it implies a coherent body or ideas, a theory that gives
direction to the effort."

30

Arthur Bester, in the New

Republic, argued that Dewey believed that the implications
of modern totalitarianism for liberals were just the opposite
of what Schlesinger supposed.

According to Bester, Dewey's

pragmatism was helpful for liberalism until about 1930.
When there was a widespread consensus as to what ought to be
done, pragmatism solved the problem of how to do it--experimentally.

But the rise of Fascism and Communism confronted

liberal democracy with brutal enemies; the assumption that
all reasonable men shared the same moral outlook would no
longer suffice.

Dewey became less of a pragmatist but more

of a liberal under these circumstances, Bester argues,
praising democracy in terms of inalienable rights rather
30
p. 420.

Quoted in Rosenberg, "If FDR Were Alive Today ••• "

30
than its latitude for social experiment.

31

Dewey's pragmatism has been well described as "less
a philosophy than a method of doing without one."

32

That

Schlesinger, among others, wants liberalism to be even more
theoretically ungoverned that Dewey was willing to tolerate
is hardly reassuring.

Such a posture renders liberalism

confusing and pointless.

Writing in Nation, Michael D.

Reagan said of the liberal approach to politics:
Each problem is taken by itself, without relating it
to other problems and without any atte~pt to assess the
extent to which some basic characteristic of our society
may lie behind a whole range of problems. The solution
is invariably a new federal grant-in-aid program--piecemeal tinkering with both the federal structure and the
economy •••• Lacking any theory of what causes social dislocations in America, the liberals are unable to suggest
basic reforms that might diminish the rate at which new
problems similar to the old ones arise.33
Without a unifying vision, liberal pragmatism becomes nothing
more than ad hoc experimentation.

34

That pragmatism causes liberal intellectuals to confuse
and mislead one another is not a mjor worry.

But to the extent

that intellectuals can make certain kinds of policies attractive or at least palatable by making them defensible, pragmatism has undermined the possibility of achieving stable and
31
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durable liberal policy-making.

Schlesinger inadvertently

revealed this weakness in a biting attack on Jimmy Carter in
1979.

He compared Carter's caution unfavorably to FDR; who

called for "bold, persistent experimentation," whose motto was
"Above all, try something."

Schlesinger says that liberals

must approach the key problems of the eighties--energy and
inflation--with the same boldness.

He advocates selective

wage and price controls and gasoline rationing, not as permanent solutions, but "as necessary ways to buy time for that
process of social invention, innovation and experimentation
that is the indespensible preliminary to lasting solutions."

35

The success of price controls and gas rationing is
to be doubted, but this is the least of the problems with
Schlesinger's analysis.

What is particularly distressing is

that he seems absolutely opaque to the possibility that
flexible, even erratic, government policies have contributed
to the problems of inflation and energy.

There is no place

in Schlesinger's analysis for the idea that imprudent monetary and fiscal policies might cause or exacerbate inflation,
or for the thought that policy experimentation may have discouraged energy production and sheltered consumers from the
realistic pricing system that can encourage energy conservation.

"Above all, try something," is good advice in a
35

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Who Needs Grover
Cleveland?" New Republic, 7 July 1979, p. 15.
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shipwreck; this does not make it a sound principle of navigation, and it is hard to imagine a worse attitude for avoiding or riding out storms.
There is the danger that under liberal pragmatism
the government would occasionally solve a problem through
blind luck, but will usually succeed only in transforming,
perpetuating, and complicating problems.

Arthur Schlesinger's

political thinking on this point is less persuasive than that
of James Madison, who summarized the evils of excessively
mutable policies in Federalist #62.

According to Madison,

democracy is undermined if its laws cannot be understood,
anticipated, or followed.

Public instability favors the

sharp insider over theindustrious citizen who lacks the time
or opportunity to react to numerous and complex new policies.
Frequent policy changes add to the risks facing every enterprise--incessant revisions of the rules discourage people from
playing at all.

It might be said that the more bold, persis-

tent experimentation there is in the public sector, the less
there will be in the private sector.

Worst of all, a govern-

ment characterized by numerous and rapid changes in public
policy will forfeit the public's trust and respect.

36

Stability is important for good government, but not
equivalent to it.
36

It will sometimes be necessary to improvise

The Federalist Papers (New York:
Library, 1961), pp. 381-382.
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to secure vital goals.

But a philosophy of government that

casually tolerates--even celebrates--instability is seriously
deficient.

There ought to be a place in liberal thought for

an appreciation of government stability akin to Madison's.
That such a thought does not show up in the writings of the
most prominent modern liberals results from one of two things.
Either liberal intellectuals are remiss, and have failed to
acknowledge that stability is not only compatible with but
essential to liberalism's larger purposes, or liberalism is
itself deficient, inherently antagonistic to the idea that
wise policy makers must resist the temptation to make every
change that seems momentarily desirable.
III
Liberals are democrats, and the roots of modern
liberalism show a determination to trust and empower the
people.

The populists and the progressives of the early

twentieth century both wanted the people to have more power
vis-a-vis the trusts and tycoons.

It was more difficult to

be a liberal and a democrat during the 1920s; in prosperity
the people were more tolerant of the giant economic interests
and less interested in reform.

The Depression made it pos-

sible for liberals to re-embrace the people.

The underlying

purpose of the New Deal, according to Schlesinger, was ''to
use democratic means somehow or other to give the plain

34
people a better break in a darkly confusing world."

37

The

liberal intellectual, in his view of the common man, traveled
a long way from Babbitt to The Grapes of Wrath.

38

It is reasonable to believe that upon entering the
postwar era, liberals would have liked to have kept the same
warm regard for democracy.

39

But the robust economy of the

forties and fifties complicated this relationship.

Schlesin-

ger explained Adlai Stevenson's defeat in 1952 by saying
that, "Having been enabled by Democratic administrations to
live like Republicans, the new suburbanites ended up voting
like Republicans."

4

°

Furthermore, the powerful New Deal

coalition forged in the Depression was less amicable as the
new issues of the sixties were debated.

Schlesinger defended

Robert Kennedy in 1968 as the one candidate who could appeal
to all the elements of the old coalition--ethnic minorities,
37
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blue collar workers, and intellectuals.

41

But Schlesinger

never explained what, beyond Kennedy's personality, would
hold this coalition together.

Schlesinger's hopes that

George McGovern would perform the same feat in 1972 were
. 1 aus1'bl e. 42
even more 1mp
The 1970s brought further strains on the liberals'
efforts to retain the democratic spirit of the New Deal,
strains which finally proved intolerable.

The overwhelming

passage of the Proposition 13 tax cuts in California in 1978,
despite warnings of how the tax reduction would gut social
services, was the most shocking event.

Carey McWilliams,

editorializing in the Nation, tried to be as kind to the
California middle class as he could.

Of course the decision

to cut property taxes was a mistake, he said, but middleclass homeowners had legitimate grievances; McWilliams suggested that liberals should direct the ire of the middle
class from the welfare state to giant corporations and the
Pentagon.

43

Liberal politicians, who had to respect the tax
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revolt, may have been impressed by McWilliams's argument.
But most liberal intellectuals were not so willing to excuse
or accomodate the middle class, judging by the vehemence of
two other articles.

According to the New Republic's edi-

torial on the passage of Proposition 13, the motives of the
tax cutter were elemental:

"Launch the lifeboat--I'm aboard.

Everybody else can swim to shore."

44

Peter Connely wrote an

article in Nation where he criticized those liberals, like
McWilliams, who tried to make the best of the new tax cuts.
He said that the tax cut movement was animated by "the ugliest
kind of ressentiment and barely concealed racism," that it
reflected "an America one thought blessedly gone, a country
of raw economic greed, unmodulated by the precarious though
real moral accomplishments of U.S. society during the past
thirty years."

45

The reaction to Ronald Reagan's nomination and
election was even less restrained.

Some liberals have lost

all patience with a country capable of choosing such a leader.
One article noted that Reagan had grown up in small midwestern towns, "just the sort of places responsible for one
of the raging themes of American literature, the
44
45
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soul-murdering complacency of our provinces, .•• The best and
brightest fled all our Galesburgs and Dixons, if they could,
but the candidate was not among them."

46

Another article

called the 1980 election a "degradation ceremony" in which
"the Americans, a sanctimonious tribe, elected a bunch of
thugs to plunder both the public purse and the nation's
image."

47
Beneath this steady deterioration of the relation-

ship between liberals and the American demos one finds
certain tangible grievances.

In the 1930s, the first steps

in creating a welfare state were popular,

~nd

liberals may

have been set up for later disillusions by the experience of
doing well, politically, by doing good.

Political victories

in the postwar era were less frequent and less decisive;
some liberals reacted to being rejected by the middle class
by blaming middle-class stinginess for the difficulties of
the welfare state.

The middle class was accused of being

opposed to programs to aid the poor because the disappearance of the poor would render the social status of those
above them tenuous.

The Nation said that there was no lie

denigrating the poor so outrageous that large numbers of
middle-class Americans would not believe it.

Welfare reform

46
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38

was hopeless under these circumstances, because shabby treatment of the poor was a manifestation of basic public attitudes, not a departure from them.

48

There is also evidence that postwar liberals felt
estranged from the middle class on cultrual, one might almost
say aesthetic, grounds, as well as for political reasons. An
article in Nation in 1956 denies that there is any religiosity
reflected in suburban church attendance:

the churches that

draw large numbers carefully avoid those Christian teachings
that would challenge the smugness, vapidity, and materialism
of the middle class. 49

Christopher Jencks, writing in the

New Republic, concedes that programs for the poor should
impart middle-class virtues "such as they are," but only
with the understanding that these "virtues" are helpful
devices for getting ahead in a middle class country, but have
no intrinsic value for leading a satisfying life.

50

Among

the questions raised by such attitudes is what sort of life
48
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the welfare state is supposed to elevate the poor to.

A

New Republic article rejects programs that would "assimilate
the blacks on the same materialist basis that the labor movement has been assimilated," anticipating that "in a few
decades blacks will be beating up on students."

51

Presumably,

the poor should acquire middle-class living standards without
discarding any of their proletarian attitudes or bohemian
folkways.

Whether, or how, this is possible is not discussed

in the writings of modern liberals.
The tone of the liberal critique of the American
people turned from petulant to strident in the violence of
the late sixties.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote, "We are today

the most fightening people on this planet."

52

According to

one of the editorials in the Nation, "We not only love violence but the more killing we can do, at a distance and with
a minimum of risk, the better we like it." 53

Though

the

provocations were severe, particularly for Schlesinger when
John and Robert Kennedy were killed, the descent of liberal
analysis into moralism, "the tendency to reduce political
51
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issues to moral terms and to arrange and comprehend those
terms in such polarized fashion as to preclude complexity of
analysis," is one of the least admirable developments of
54
.
l"b
Amer1can
1 era 1"1sm.
It might be supposed that the violence in ghettos
and campuses would also have been condemned as frightening.
In fact, the liberal reaction to violence by those who had
been rejected by the American middle class, such as blacks,
or who had rejected that class, like student leftists, was
milder, even sympathetic.

Student revolts, said Schlesinger,

were caused by the rigidity of university bureaucracies.
"Both Berkeley and Columbia will be wiser and better universities as a result of the student revolts."

55

An assessment

of the Black Panthers in the Nation can be fairly described
as sycophantic:
The Black Panther Party is, by any definition a
revolutionary group, one which is attempting to find-and to a surprising extent has succeeded in finding-revolutionary political theories which are applicable to
the condition of black people in America today, particularly in urban America.
Its synthesis of Mao and Malcolm,
Fanon and Lenin (with the important addition of Cleaver's
and Newton's own contributions) is no street hoodlum's
hodgepodge but a careful winnowing of political thought.
54
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Their analysis of the role of the police in white repression is accurate and brilliant.56
Many liberals' reaction to the backlash against
crime, riots, and demonstrations was as hysterical as the
analysis of the riots and demonstrations was dispassionate
and soothing.

The Nation's reasoning was that the enormous

gap between our races and classes guaranteed a revolution.
By the sixties the black revolution was already underway;
it could elicit either a good or a bad revolution among
whites.

It was possible that whites would react to the black

revolution by finally insisting on racial justice, and would
become determined to heal the wounds of racism at all costs.
But the more probable outcome was far uglier.

"Present odds

are on the Fascist revolution, although it too is in an early
and perhaps still reversible stage.

But as the radio com-

mentators used to say in the 1930s, it is later than you
think."

57

Schlesinger, too, glimpsed a police state on the

horizon when he contemplated those who would deal with crime
by hiring more policemen, placing fewer restrictions on their
actions, and putting tougher judges on the bench. 58
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Liberals can hardly he held completely responsible
for the decline in the relationship with the American people
that had been so close in the thirties.

The history of the

postwar era, particularly the 1960s, eroded many other,
stronger, political relationships.

Still, it is hard to

disagree with Nuechterlein's assessment that ''liberals made
the worst of a bad situation."

59

It should not be so dif-

ficult for liberals to accept that their program will be
more appealing to America sometimes than others, and to
defend and refine their agenda while waiting for the lean
years to pass.

The venom of liberal writings on the people

and the middle class in particular suggests two things.
First, liberals had an exaggerated idea of the depth of the
commitment America made to liberalism in the thirties, and
did not appreciate the extent to which it was based on a
coincidence of goals.

Because of this exaggeration, liberals

interpreted their season in political disfavor as the violation of a trust, and reacted with inordinate fury.

That

a great many Americans were unwilling to follow liberals
wherever they led, even to Black Panther meetings, should
have been even less surprising, yet it provoked still more
outrage.

Second, liberals have not thought clearly enough

about their own place in American democracy.
59
Neuchterlein, "Schlesinger," p.

Liberals do
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seem to know that they are not simply populists, enthusiastically endorsing whatever it is the people want to do at
any moment.

And it seems clear that their convictions are

not so inviolate that they would prefer being voices in the
wilderness to taking account of a broad shift in American
opinion.

But beyond these thoughts, liberals have not

wrestled with the question of how to navigate the wide
spectrum between being totally principled and totally
expedient.

There seems to be no agreement on which of their

goals are the more and less important, or on how to defend
their goals to a skeptical citizenry.

Until they have

thought deeply about these questions, liberals cannot make
the most persuasive defense of their position.

And without

their having made the effort to become more persuasive
rhetoricians, it is particularly objectionable when liberals
pass facile and demeaning judgments on their countrymen.

IV
We can fairly characterize the basic liberal view
of American government by saying that liberals favor a strong
federal government, and have generally looked to the presidency to be the dominant influence within the federal
government.

Arthur Schlesinger's pre-Watergate writings on

the presidency were confident and unequivocal in their preference for the executive.

"The American political system,

44
~hough

misconceived by some as made up of three coordinate

branches of equal powers, has worked best as a presidential
system.

Only strong Presidents have been able to overcome

the tendencies towards inertia inherent in a structure so
cunningly composed of checks and balances."

60

He tells us

later in the same collection of essays:
An adequate democratic theory will recognize that
democracy is not self-executing; that leadership is not
the enemy of self-government but the means by which it
can be made to work; and that Caeserism has been more
often produced by the failure of weak governments than
by the success of strong ones.61
For Schlesinger, like most liberals of his generation, FDR
was the model of the vigorous chief executive who made
American democracy work.

But Schlesinger had gone all the

way back to Andrew Jackson to find historical precedents for
Roosevelt's style of governing in his second book, The Age
of Jackson.

The theme of this work was that Jackson set

the model of the "militant democratic leader" to whom the
American people have always turned when conservative courts
and legislatures refuse to deal with economic crises. 62
Vietnam complicated the serene liberal appraisal of
the presidency, and Watergate demolished it.
60
61
62
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schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 9.
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Legacy of Andrew
Jackson, American Mercury, February 1947, pp. 170-172. See
also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston:
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himself is the best indicator of this process; his book
The Imperial Presidency was published in the middle of the
watergate crisis; and perfectly captured the deep misgivings
about the power of the executive branch of that time.

It

is clear that Schlesinger takes a more sober view of the
executive branch in this work.

He admits some personal

responsibility for the rise of "presidential mystique," and
goes so far as to say that FDR was "a flawed, willful, and,
with time, increasingly arbitrary man."

63

But beyond this,

Schlesinger's revised thesis about the presidency is quite
unclear.

He has not jettisoned his earlier views.

He still

regards the presidency as "the most effective instrumentality
of government for justice and progress," and warns that the
schemes of "presidential subordination could easily be pressed to the point of national folly."

64

This dilemma is pre-

sumably to be resolved by contending "not for a strong
Presidency in general, but for a strong Presidency within
the Constitution."

65

But at the same time, "The effective

means of controlling the Presidency lay less in law than in
politics."

66

There are no systems of constraints, legal or
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. ix, 409.
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political, that will guarantee a strong predisency for a
Franklin Roosevelt but a weak one for a Richard Nixon; the
tergiversations of The Imperial Presidency suggest that·many
liberals have not come to terms with this fact.

67

The importance of the presidency to liberals has a
psychological basis as well as a political one.

It is fair

to say that liberals have been conspicuous in the way they
have responded to bold and appealing leadership.

Schlesinger,

again, is most prominent as a believer in what might be
called the alchemy of leadership, the art of transforming
political situations by the force of personality.

Franklin

Roosevelt was, of course, the master, but Adlai Stevenson,
John Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy a11 shared this quality.
RFK in particular had Roosevelt's capacities to empathize
with others, and to illuminate tangled political conflicts,
according to Schlesinger.

68

Liberals' attraction to leader-

ship style would be unremarkable if it were merely in the
service of the liberal agenda, but it often seems a value
apart from, even opposed to, the liberal program.

Martin

points out that liberals overlooked Adlai Stevenson's
67

See also Edward Pessen, "The Arrogant Veto,"
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political caution and reluctance to antagonize the South on
civil rights.

He was forgiven because of his cerebral style,

sense of humor, and skill at the podium.

By contrast Harry

Truman was much less popular with liberals of his day, though
.
69
substantively he was much closer to them than was Stevenson.
The liberal sources used in this dissertation devote
very little attention to the role and powers of Congress, except as these are the obvious complement of their writings on
the presidency.

Liberals have devoted a little more attention

to the role of the judiciary, but their writings do not point
to a consensus view, notwithstanding that the judicial activism
of the Warren Court was routinely called "liberal."

It is note-

worthy that Alexander Bickel, prominent advocate of judicial
restraint, was a contributing editor of the New Republic, for
the last fifteen years of his life.

In its pages he argued

that "society at large ought to participate in the venture of
governing itself," and cannot do so when the courts practice
"the confident, single-minded imposition of solutions to problems of the first magnitude."
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Bickel's influence led others

at the magazine to argue for a limited role for the judges, as
in an editorial arguing that Roe v. Wade was a mistake, and
69
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that the abortion issue should have been left to the states.

71

At the Nation, however, Roe v. Wade was praised, and the
supreme Court was criticized for refusing to insist on the
reorganization of public school financing.

72

Similarly,

Joseph Raub, a leading figure in the ADA, found the whole
controversy over judicial activism pointless--judges were
policy makers, too, he said, and should have the same leeway as those in the executive and legislative branches.

73

Liberals are much less divided on the question of
federalism.

They have regularly favored assigning a govern-

ing function to the federal government that others believe
should be given to, or left with, the states.
lead to this conclusion.

Several paths

Some liberals argue that the federal

government is more efficient than states and localities.
Only the federal government can surmount economies of scale
to undertake the policy experimentation and analysis needed
for progress.

Local and even state governments cannot deal

with problems that transcend arbitrarily drawn boundary
71

"Abortion," New Republic, 10 February 1973, p. 9.
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lines, problems like pollution, mass transit, and industrial
development.

The record of the federal government compares

very favorably to the states•.

74

Other liberals argue that the federal government is
a more equitable source of policy in a modern economy.

For

one thing, federal revenues are derived largely from an
income tax that is at least nominally progressive
capable of being made more so.

and is

By contrast, state govern-

ments rely heavily on sales taxes, and local governments on
property taxes, both of

which are regressive.

The federal

government alone, then, is in a position to fund needed programs without burdening those who can least afford it.
Furthermore, it is only at the federal level that the influence of private interests on public policy is most diluted.
Mining interests will have less influence on the U.S. Congress
than on the West Virginia legislature, making a just and
prudent federal policy more likely. 75
The arguments for centralized policy-making on the
74
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grounds of efficiency and equity are plausible, but a third
argument is more ambitious but less compelling.

Speaking

directly to the enterprise of the welfare state, it claims
that the federal government is more benevolent than others.
A New Republic article claims that "local and state electorates" have repeatedly shown their aversion to paying for
a better school system.

Thus, "friends of education have

called for massive federal aid."

76

In the same vein, another

article charges that local school boards are not "manifestations of Jeffersonian democracy," but havens for "ambitious
politicians and irate taxpayers who would rather keep the
local property tax down than provide children with decent
education."

77

And if localities cannot be trusted to tax

themselves, they cannot be trusted either to spend tax
dollars collected by the federal government:

there is

scarcely a good word to be found for revenue sharing in the
writings of liberals.

78
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christopher Jencks, "Paying for Education--II,"
New Republic, 1 February 1964, p. 14.
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"Subsidies for Schools," New Republic, 8 February
1960, pp. 4-5.
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There is something odd about attacks on "state and
local electorates."

Such groups are presumably distinguish-

able from the "national electorate," yet it is undeniable that
electorates at all levels of American politics are comprised
of the same citizens.

Is it suggested that these citizens

change their politics between elections, or even when moving
from one part of the ballot to another?

I find no evidence

that any liberal has ever confronted this argument, but one
can discern that some liberals sense that added federal
power is in need of a broader justification.

This is to be

found by invoking the national interest as a reason for
turning to the national government:
We are a nation. Connecticut citizens do have an interest
in the quality of rivers in Massachusetts, of highways
in Wyoming, schools in Mississippi, and life in Harlem.
We cannot leave it wholly up to 50 state legislatures to
determine whether and h9w national resources are used
to meet national needs. ~
If the idea of a discernible state electorate can be clarified, the explanation may lie in the idea of the national
interest.

Perhaps truly national problems affect Americans

as Americans, and cause them to elect federal officials on
different criteria than they employ in thinking about state
and local matters, where their interests are more prosaic.
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This explanation, if it does in fact capture the
liberal outlook on the issue, still suffers from two difficulties.

First, liberals should define in greater detail

what they mean by the national interest.

It is not enough

to say that citizens in Connecticut have an interest in the
highways in Wyoming.

Presumably, the citizens of Wyoming

have an even deeper interest in them, as well as a better
idea of how to care for them.

Might it not be better for

the citizens of Wyoming to act on their more serious concern
for their highways through the state government, than for
the citizens of Connecticut to act on their concern through
the national government?

To put the same point another way,

is it sufficient to establish that a problem involves the
national interest if it can be shown that it transcends state
boundaries?

Is there any aspect of life in Wyoming--or

Harlem or Mississippi--that has no impact at all on residents of Connecticut, and is thereby an appropriate concern
of the state legislatures?

It is hard to escape the suspi-

cion in considering these questions that for many liberals
the liberal agenda is the national interest.
may be a defensible position.

This, too,

But it means that efforts to

justify the liberal agenda by appealing to the national
interest simply beg the question.
The second problem with the liberal preference for,
and justification of, a stronger federal government is its
anti-democratic implication.

Our nation of 230 million has
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537 elected federal officials.
for only five of them:

As a rule, a citizen can vote

President, Vice President, two Sena-

tors, and one Representative.

State and local officials are

far more numerous, both in the aggregate and in relation to
the voters.

To be sure, the importance and visibility of

federal officials may introduce a qualitative depth to their
relations with constitutients that compensates for the quantitative differences.

Still, it is not unreasonable to believe

that one reason liberals favor the federal government is that
it is insulated to some extent from democratic pressures,
because federal elected officials have some leeway vis-a-vis
their constituents, and because unelected federal officials-bureaucrats--have some leeway vis-a-vis the elected ones.
Acknowledging such a goal should not be destructive to
liberalism.

The Federalist Papers frankly admitted that the

Constitution had elements that restrained, delayed, and
moderated the forces of democracy; and the project of Madison
and Hamilton, far more ambitious than modern liberalism's
was not undone.

But liberals have made it difficult for

themselves to openly assume the position taken by Madison
and Hamilton.

For all the denigrating remarks about the

American people in recent years, there is no evidence of a
liberal reassessment of the idea of democracy.

To assert

frankly that the welfare state should be subject to the
mediated rather than the direct judgment of the American
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people would probably discomfit many liberals as an "elitist"
argument.

It is preferable to find other grounds for vindi-

cating federal authority than to admit there is a prospective conflict between liberal benevolence and liberal
populism.

v
A final aspect of the liberal attitude towards
American government needs to be considered.

Having examined

how liberals view the relationships between the people and
government, among the various levels of government, and among
the various branches of the federal government, it remains
to be seen how they understand the relationship between th3
public and private sector.
advocating "Big Government."

Liberals are often attacked for
One liberal response is that

it is a necessary counterweight to big business:
If the basic decisions are to be made either in a directors' boardroom or in a government agency, then the
political process permits us a measure of access, at
least, to a governmental agency. Big government, for
all its dangers, remains democracy's only effective
response to big business--especially when big business
behaves with such political rsrklessness as it has
behaved in the United States.
The giant corporation has gone far to escape the discipline
of the marketplace, through research, marketing, and diversification.

Thus disencumbered, corporate directors have great

leeway in their decision-making.
81

To relentlessly oppose

schlesinger, The Vital Center, p. 182.
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the growth of Big Government is to simply acquiesce to such
private power, and in all the social consequences of its use.
The expansion of government, liberals have agreed,

con~ronts

the semi-autonomous corporate sector with a democratic adversary.

82
Liberals find other merits in the public sector.

Schlesinger, perhaps as an historian of the New Deal, is
emphatic on this point.

Only by using an excessively

abstract notion of freedom, he says, can one sustain the
claim that the welfare state has incurred on liberty.

The

"freedom" to despoil the environment, discriminate against
minorities, and exploit labor are well ended.

Further, the

government has been more efficient in the pursuit of its
goals than it is given credit for.

The growth of government

has been accompanied by an increase in the number of technicians and experts working for the government, making possible
a steady improvement in the performance of the public sector.
In any case, large organizations, public and private, all
exhibit the deficiencies of bureaucracy, and it is hardly
fair to single out the government.
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It would be incorrect to leave the impression that
all liberals, or liberals generally, have been completely
sanguine about Big Government.

Some liberals, sensitive to

the charge that too much power has been concentrated in
Washingotn, try to turn the argument around.

Liberals have

been more adept at the conservative goal of decentralization
than conservatives, they claim.

Liberals have tried to return

power to the people, with New Deal programs like the TVA
and Great Society programs like community action, where
conservatives only seem to return power to those who are
already powerful.

84

Nonetheless, the possibility that federal

controls can ossify, that some government undertakings are
unproductive or even counterproductive, does not go unacknowledged.

Indiscriminate conservative attacks on the welfare

state are bound to be right at least occasionally. 85
The other conservative charge often made about Big
Government is that, in addition to jeapordizing liberty, its
profligacy will wreck the economy.

Liberals disagree.

Some

of them point out that throughout the economic miracle of
postwar West Germany, the proportion of its national income
84
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spent by government was larger than in the U.S. or in other
west European countries where the economy grew at a slower
pace.

86

Others argue that a nation as prosperous as America

can afford to achieve all the liberal goals, if only she
wills it:

"The truth is that this country can, within

extremely broad limits, afford anything it chooses, ••• The
real issue is how serious the Administration, Congress, and
the comfortable (and large) middle classes are about licking
poverty.''
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The liberal agenda, whatever its cost, is cheap

compared to the consequences of failing to address the
problems of the poor.

88

This argument, that poverty is a problem so severe
that the criteria of cost and performance must be relaxed,
was made with some frequency by liberals in the aftermath
of the Great Society, when there were many calls for limiting
the commitment to the welfare state.

"This country cannot

not afford the [elimination of poverty].

Whatever else may

be sacrificed, the money needed to tackle the grave social
problems of an increasingly complex society must be found." 89
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Of course, even by the late sixties a considerable sum had
already been spent in anti-poverty programs, and the results
were often dissapointing.

It has been argued by some liberals

that federal programs to help the poor faced such forbidding
problems that even minor gains cannot be dismissed.

If only

a few Job Corps trainees or Head Start students make gains,
this is still a valuable improvement over the tragic situa90
tion where no one emerges from the ghetto.
In addition to using social policies to alleviate
poverty, liberals have argued, for most of the postwar era,
that through macroeconomic policy the government can insure
the expansion of the economy and of the labor market that the
fight against poverty requires.

Such a view is nothing but

orthodox Keynesianism, and until the 1970s,
were among its most faithful adherents.

American liberals

Edwin L. Dale sum-

marized the liberal outlook with sweeping confidence in the
New Republic:
The way to achieve the best of all economic worlds
(rapid growth, full employment, stable prices, favorable
balance of payments, more investment, no recessions,
better living standards) is to spend as much government
money as possible, and make sure that the amount the
government spends rises rapidly each year.
The reason for this is not that government spending
90
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is inherently better than private spending, though that
may be true. The reason is that a very high level of
government spending, no matter where the money goes,
assures a very high level of demand. And a high level
of demand is the open sesame to everything else. 9 1
It is not surprising that those who can entertain
the possibility that public spending might be inherently
better than private spending do not emphasize the importance
of profits.

The argument more likely to be made by liberals

is that excessive profits are the cause of economic stagnation.

High profits either depress the wage level or inflate

the price level; both developments lead to an inadequate level
of aggregate demand, and, ultimately to a recesison.

There

are no circumstances, then, under which a higher tax on profits is a bad idea.

When inflation is a problem, higher

can yield a counter-inflationary budget surplus.

t~xes

When un-

employment is the concern, the base for a profits tax will
shrink, and the resulting deficit spending will stimulate
the economy.

It cannot be said with finality that liberals

are utterly indifferent to the importance of retained earnings in economic expansion.

But they say very little about

it, and a good deal more about how the government can make
better use of profits than the enterprises that have
91
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earned them.

92

There is another, more potent way in which liberal
economic analysis supports the liberal political agenda.
An article in the ADA World makes the point explicitly:
Greater equality in the distribution of income is not
merely a requirement of justice in a free society; it
is a necessary condition for the maintenance of full
production and full employment.93
The redistribution of income has a clear macroeconomic
rationale for those who see the regulation of aggregate
demand as the key to prosperity.

If more income went to

poor families, their tendency to spend a very high proportion of their income would increase the overall demand for
goods and services, ensuring stable and continuing economic
.
94
expans1on.
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CHAPTER TWO
LIBERALISM'S GOALS
I

Liberals' welfare state goals are at once obvious and
mystifying.

Liberals seek to do good.

President Roosevelt's

1944 State of the Union address is the most direct statement
of these intentions.

"We may not be content, no matter how

high the general standard of living may be," he said, "if
some fraction of our people--whether it be one-third or onefifth or one tenth--is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and
1
insecure."
To avoid this he proposed "a second Bill of
Rights," which included "the right to a useful and remunerative job," "the right to earn enough to provide adequate food
and clothing and recreation," "the right of every family to
a decent home; the right to adequate medical care and the
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; the right to
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; the right to a good education."2

But these simple, charitable impulses do not define
1

Eugene J. McCarthy, A Liberal Answer to the Conservative Challenge (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 40-41.
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a clear political program.

It is not easy to say what the

motivations or ultimate purposes of liberal charity are, or
how other goals can accomodate the welfare state and its
budget, or how strong the rights to economic security are,
or how they are related to other

ri~hts.

Liberal activists, writers, and intellectuals of
the postwar era have not tried to answer these questions.
Apparently, they have not felt that it was important to answer
them, for in the literature in which postwar liberalism
expresses itself, the wisdom of the Second Bill of Rights is
not questioned, and the only interesting pr,oblems raised in
connection with it are the political problems of getting it
enacted and funded.

As the ADA expressed itself on this

point:
ADA believes that every American has a right to public
protection from personal socio-economic catastrophe
resulting from sickness, disability, unemployment, or
age. These services must be given without harassment,
humiliation, or unwarranted restrictions.3
With these goals, the most important word for modern liberals
has been "more"--more government money for education, health,
housing, and income maintenance, more government programs to
help the disadvantaged.

Accordingly, liberals have banished

"less" or "enough" from the domestic policy vocabulary.
People who use such words about the welfare state don't
3
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realize that America's domestic crises could tear the nation
apart, or that admonitions to individuals to provide for themselves through private insurance or savings are cruel and
hollow, or that present levels of government parsimony demean
and deny needy Americans.

4

It is clear that the liberal agenda requires a prosperous economy--! know of no suggestion by any liberal that
a poor country can transform itself into a rich one by increased welfare state spending.

5

In the late 1940s, when the

influence of Keynes on American liberals was strongest, it
was assumed that prosperity required the liberal agenda.

We

have noted the happy discovery by liberals that their agenda
would strengthen aggregate demand and ensure prosperity.

When

the economy boomed in the 1950s, despite failure to enact
most of their programs, liberals had to reconsider their
position on the relation between social spending and prosperity.

Some liberals argued that in the new affluent society

prosperity could be more or less assumed, and that liberals
4
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see, for example, Leon Keyser1ing, "Eggheads and
Politics," New Republic, 27 October 1958, pp. 14-15.
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should insist that at any particular level of prosperity the
overall health of society was now better served by government provision of public goods than by the limitless increase
of consumer goods.

6

Others argued that liberals should con-

tinue to stress the prime importance of economic growth:
An increase of one percentage point in the national rate
of economic growth solves far more problems of human
misery, insofar as they stem from unemployment or low
income, than all the retraining programs, union resistance to automation, poverty programs, distressed-area
programs and the rest put together. This is not to
oppose the programs aimed at tackling special cases, but
to put them in perspective: All put together, they cannot accomplish nearly as much good as a difference
between $40 billion and $30 billion in the growth of the
Gross National Product.7
The distinction between advocates of growth and
advocates of redistribution did not amount to more than a
difference of emphasis within liberalism for most of the
postwar era.

There was nothing politically attractive about

criticizing economic growth, and to have moved very far in
the advocacy of economic growth as a substitute for the welfare state would have been to echo American conservatives.
Liberals tended, then, to advocate both an expanding pie
and a larger slice for the welfare state.

No single policy

combines both these emphases better than government guarantees
6

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 2nd
edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 152.
7

Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "The Big Gun on Poverty,"

New Republic, 7 August 1965, p. 14.
"Eggheads," pp. 13-17.

See also Keyserling,
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of full employment.

Liberals favored the Full Employment

Act of 1946, regretted Congress's deletions of provisions that
would have required government policies that guaranteed iull
employment, and favored efforts to reinstate such provisions
through the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill in the
seventies.

In both decades, many liberals answered questions

about the government's capacity to actually achieve full
employment by saying that the urgency of the goal justified
any risks in trying to attain it.

8

Other liberals have acknowledged that macroeconomic
policy is a clumsy tool for promoting full employment-guaranteeing private sector jobs for the least employable will
require levels of government stimulus that could unhinge the
economy.

For that reason, full employment policies are going

to require large programs of direct hiring by the government,
as in the New Deal's Works Progress Administration.
ever means, full employment is imperative.
other welfare problems are insoluble.

By what-

Without it, all

With it, liberals have

maintained, we can finally distinguish the victims of a malfunctioning economy from those who cannot lead decent lives
without direct income and services from the government. 9
8

Speed the Murray Bill!" Nation, 25 August 1945,
p. 169; "Wary of Welfare," New Republic, 5 June 1976, pp. 34. See also Dorothy R. Steffens, "The Promise of HumphreyHawkins," Nation, 21 January 1978, pp. 50-52.
9

christopher Jencks, "Johnson vs. Poverty," New
Republic, 28 March 1964, pp. 17-18; nAnd the Jobless," Nation,
22 February 1977, pp. 228-229; Rep. John Conyers, Jr., "The
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Virtually all liberals believe that the market
economy is incapable of generating full employment and economic
security; the government will have to act vigorously to correct its deficiencies.

But it is possible to distinguish

liberals who favor more government activity as a goal in
itself from others for whom a prominent, active public sector
is only a means to the goals of a gentler, more equitable
society.

Those whom we might call "left-wing liberals"

believe that the ultimate goal of liberalism should be a
planned economy.

In their view, capitalism's problems are

deeper than the business cycles or maldistribution of income.
Capitalism directs resources towards their greatest profit,
but a planned economy would direct them towards the greatest
needs.

More low-cost housing would be built because, despite

the smaller profit margin, the need for such housing is
greater.

Similarly, the search for a non-inflationary economic

policy to reduce unemployment (or, conversely, a policy to
fight inflation that does not create a recession) is hopeless.
The free market economy is incapable of performing so well,
these liberals argue.

Only mandatory, permanent, wage and

price controls can deliver a stable economy. 10
Real Problem is Poverty," Nation, 24 January 1976, p. 83;
John J. Corson, "Social Security Needs Modernizing," New
Republic, 8 May 1950, p. 12; Nick Katz, "The Politics of
Welfare Reform," New Republic, 14 May 1977, p. 19.
10

"State of the Union," New Republic, 10 January
1949, p. 3; Henry Wallace.
"Trust Busters and Planners,"
New Republic, 8 September 1947, pp. 14-15; Melville J. Ulmer,
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For the liberals who place so high a value on the
transformation of America's political economy, liberalism
itself makes sense only as a stage in that transformation,
not as a permanent structure of reformed capitalism.

As fast

as the political education of Americans will allow, they argue,
liberals must proceed from compensating for capitalism's
defects to replacing capitalism itself.

If they are to do

this, liberals must never lose track of the inevitable link
between their own sentiments and the socialist agenda.

In a

1974 article in Nation, Michael Harrington argued that the
policies preferred by liberals are "socialist in all respects
save one--they do not mention socialism.

They are for the

redistribution of wealth, for government intervention on
behalf of the poor, minorities and working people, and for
the extension of public ownership."ll
Other liberals are skeptical about being a way
station to socialism, both because they have misgivings about
socialism itself, and because of their aversion to ideological
rigidity.

Arthur Schlesinger may be regarded as representa-

tive of this viewpoint.

He insists that liberals must pursue

a mixed economy that is neither distinctly capitalist nor
"Jobs, Inflation, and Liberal Politics," New Republic, 20
March 1976, p. 8.
11

Michael Harrington, "Say What You Mean--Socialism," Nation, 25 May 1974, p. 649. See also George Soule,
"The Full Employment Bill," New Republic, 6 August 1945, pp.
154-156; I.F. Storle, "Will America Be Socialist?" Nation,
11 August 1945, pp. 124-125.
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socialist.

Schlesinger doubts that political freedom can

withstand the concentration of economic power.

And he

thinks that the administrative difficulties of a centrally
directed economy are excessive.

He feels that it is those

to his left who do not take the humane goals of liberalism
seriously enough, and seek institutional change for its own
sake.

12
These "centrist" liberals are unquestionably

skeptical about free markets, but they alRo acknowledge the
role a pricing system plays in the transmission of important economic information.

"Bureaucratic decisions can

never anticipate all the economic contingencies which a
free market holds in some kind of harmony ••.• We only know
that a completely free market lacks the self-regulating
power once ascribed to it and that too inclusive planning
destroys the flexibility which a health economy requires." 13
The solution is for the government to determine the economic
framework and secure the general level of performance, then
let the private sector determine the details within these
boundaries.

"The state should aim at establishing condi-

tions for economic decisions, not at making all the decisions
12 schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 3970. See also Schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 150-151; Robert
Lekachman, "Income and Welfare," review of The Ethics of
Redistribution, by Bertrand de Jouvenel, in Nation, 14 June
1952, p. 584
13 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Halfway to What?" p. 28.
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itself •••• it should expend its main strength (l) in
determining the broad level and conditions of economic activity through indirect means and (2) in making a success of
projects clearly its own responsibility."

14

In this formulation the welfare state will be a
continuing necessity; the private sector will never live
up to the standards a wise government will set for the
economy.

Consequently, the government must act, by one

means or another, to ensure that the deficiencies are made
up.

It must, for example, determine how many new houses

will be needed over a period of five or ten years, and
then stand ready to build whatever portion of that number
the construction industry does not.

Similarly, the federal

government should establish goals for economic expansion and
job creation, and then employ all those who cannot find
. b s 1n
. th e pr1va
. t e sec t or. 15
JO
Whatever the degree of enthusiasm they harbor for
the growth of government, liberals seem united in their
preference for higher taxes.

Infinitely higher?

The possi-

bility of excessive taxation is occasionally noted, but not
without a quick insistence that we are nowhere close to
such a problem.
14

As Keynsians, liberals have been sanguine

schi.~singer,

Vi tal Center,' pp. 182-183, 185.

15 "Ten Million New Homes, New Republic, 27 August
1945, p. 237; "Is It Full Employment?" New Republic, 18
February 1946, p. 240.
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about deficit spending which can be accomplished through
cutting taxes as well as increasing spending.
ably prefer the letter method.

They invari-

Because a democracy is not

an easy place to be identified as the inveterate advocates
of higher taxes, liberals' rhetoric on taxes is often preoccupied with "closing loopholes."

Though many of the

loopholes turn out, on examination, to be such boons to
the middle class as the deductibility of mortgage interest,
the impression meant to be left by this rhetorical slant
is that other people's taxes--wealthier people's taxes--are
the ones that will be raised.

16

Another unpleasant consequence of more government
activity is the debasement of the currency.

It was at one

time possible for liberals to speak evenly of accepting
higher inflation in order to reduce unemployment.

Their

confidence reflected the beliefs that inflation and unemployment were on a rigid seesaw, and that full employment was
the fundamental goal of domestic policy.

The experience in

the sixties and seventies of rising inflation, accompanied
by rising unemployment, drove the advocacy of inflation out
of liberals' rhetoric.

As early as 1970 one could read in

the New Republic that a

3!%

inflation rate was intolerable.

Solving inflation was another problem.
16

Except for those

Howe, "The Right Menace," p. 17; "Tax Reform,"
New Republic, 9 January 1961, pp. 11-12; Irving Kristol,
Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978),
pp. 202-210.
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who remained confident about wage and price controls, an
increasingly lonely group, it was hard to find liberals
willing to say anything about inflation; one of ADA's
officers called it "the black hole of liberal politics-touch it and you disappear."

17

II
Liberals are, then, proponents of charitable works
who are willing, and in some case eager, to see the government exercise more power and resources in the pursuit of
these goals, and who are, or have been, willing to accept
higher taxes and inflation to attain these charitable purposes.

It remains to be seen whether modern liberals see

good works as a medial or ultimate goal.

We may begin by

noting that since most liberals are unwilling to trust
economic expansion alone to provide for the poor, assisting
the poor through a welfare state will entail some degree of
income redistribution:

the government must take money from

some and give it to others, and the donors will presumably,
as a rule, be wealthier than the recipients.

The relation-

ship between welfare and redistribution in liberal thought
is unclear, however.

It could be that redistribution is

17
navid Gelman et al, "Wanted: A Liberal
Newsweek, 30 March 1981, p. Sl; Edwin L. Dale, Jr.,
Case Against a Tax Increase," New Republic, 2 April
pp. 11-13; Melville Ulmer, "Economic Slowdown," New
28 February 1970, p. 11.

Agenda,"
"The
1966,
Republic,
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nothing more than a by-product of alleviating poverty, but
we need to consider as well the possibility that redistribution of income is a separate goal within liberal thinking,
one that is either a companion to liberals' welfare goals,
or the ultimate goal to which the welfare goals are directed.
We may begin by noting the contention made by some
liberals that economic inequality reinforces and perpetuates
the welfare problems liberals are determined to solve.
Christopher Jencks, for example, has argued that attempts
to improve public education for the poor founder on political
obstacles, obstacles created by the inequality of American
society.

Middle-class and upper-class parents don't want an

equal education for their children--they want a superior
education so their children will have an advantage in the
job market.

When these parents cannot prevent the poor from

getting a better education they try to retain their children's
comparative position by improving their education to a
corresponding degree.

Galbraith has argued, similarly,

that economic growth is particularly advantageous to the
upper classes, that it continuously strengthens the position of those who already wield decisive political and
economic power.

The goals of helping the poor cannot,

therefore, be reconciled with any thoughts of leaving the
relative positions of America's social classes undisturbed.
18christopher Jencks, "LBJ's School Program: A
Revolution. in American Education?" New Republic, 6 February
1965, pp. 17-18; "Galbraith and Schlesinger Reply·to Leon

18
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From this point of view, welfare programs that
aim only at alleviating poverty, as if that goal can be
accomplished without challenging the status of other classes
in society, are futile.
The basic idea of the "war on poverty" suggests
that the enemy is impersonal, a matter of "unfortunate"
circumstances like "ignorance" or "disease." But, in
fact, there are people and institutions who have a
vested interest in the continuation of poverty; employers
who pay substandard and marginal wages; agricultural
groups that refuse to pay living wages or to maintain
decent housing for migrant farm workers; racists who
understand the connection between maintaining the fiction of white supremacy and the reality of low wages.
Yet, since such groups exercise a strong political
influence in the society which is being called upon to
support the "war," they get unmentioned in the
propoganda.l9
For liberals who feel this way to conclude that the welfare
state is a sham that should be abandoned until we can really
solve the country's problems would be terribly self-defeating.
Instead, these liberals want to use the welfare state as the
initial stage of a social program that will become more
extensively and explicitly concerned with redistribution of
income.

Only when America has become a more equal society

can the underlying political and economic causes that create
the misery of the poor be removed; until those causes are
removed, the alleviation of poverty will be an endless and
Keyserling," New Republic, 10 November 1958, p. 15. See also
James Tobin, "It Can Be Done! Conquering Poverty in the U.S.
by 1976," New Republic, 3 June 1967, pp. 16-17.
19
Paul Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of
the Poor," Nation 29 September 1967, p. 197.
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and fruitless task.

20

Irving Kristol has been the most persistent critic
of modern American egalitarianism in recent years.

His

arguments, right or wrong, usually bring out the most
important questions at the bottom of the redistribution
controversy.

He asserts, for example, that inequality in

the distribution of income is much less severe than is
commonly supposed, or rather that the reasons for inequality
are much less sinister than ofter supposed.

The American

distribution of income is so "center-heavy" that those in
the 80th or even the 95th percentile live comfortably, but
not lavishly, he argues.

Because it is so lonely at the

top, efforts to redistribute income from the rich quickly
wind up imposing heavy taxes on those whom no one would
consider wealthy.

Furthermore, much of the variation in

income is attributable to causes most people would accept
as plausible and legitimate.

It is hardly unjust, Kristol

says, for people's earnings to gradually increase throughout their careers, and then diminish sharply in retirement.
But the interpretation of income distribution statistics
often fails to distinguish the poor from those who have
their careers ahead of them or substantial savings behind
them.

21
20
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Kristol offers two reasons why liberal egalitarians are so preoccupied with this limited and understandable
degree of inequality.

According to Kristol, liberals are

not that interested in equality or in the poor, but find the
issue of inequality appealing because it provides a basis
for venting other grievances they have.

One such grievance

is the moral rather than the material shortcomings of a
bourgeois society.

Liberals seek a more ennobling life

than the one geared to profit, leisure, and security.
Rather than elaborate a moral critique of modern society, a
difficult and hazardous task, liberals take up the cause of
the poor in a critique of the material conditions of
society that is both easier to make and to understand.

The

severity of this critique is unrelated to the real problems
of poverty and inequality, says Kristol.

Liberals who

define the problem of inequality in purely relative terms
guarantee that no redistributive policies could ever issue
in acceptable social arrangements.

"Is such a view pri-

marily interested in the material well-being of poor people
or the moral well-being of liberal reforwers?'' asks Kristo1. 22
The plausibility of the latter can be seen clearly in Sweden,
where rhetoric about inequality has become completely disconnected from the realities of inequality.

Kristol writes:

The demand for greater equality has less to do with
any specific inequities of bourgeois society than with
the fact that bourgeois society is seen as itself
22 Ibid., p. 217.
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inequitable because it is based on a deficient conception of the common good. The recent history of
Sweden is living proof of this proposition. The more
egalitarian Sweden becomes--and it is already about as
egalitarian as it is ever likely to be--the more enrages
are its intellectuals, the more guilt-ridden and uncertain are its upper-middle classes, the more alienated
are its college-educated youth. Though Swedish
politicians and journalists cannot bring themselves
to believe it, it should be obvious by now that there
are no reforms that are going to placate the egalitarian
impulse in Swedish society. Each reform only invigorates the impulse the more, because the impulse is not,
in the end, about equality at all but about the quality
of life in bourgeois society.23
The second of Kristol's explanations for egalitariansism is also unrelated to equality, at least as it pertains
to rich and poor.

Kristol says that, given the social

status of most liberal egalitarians, whose income and
importance is often incommensurate, in their own eyes, with
their education and talents, such people resent the power
of the corporate sector's managerial class.

From the

intellectual's point of view, these people are narrow and
unimaginative, working in careers that place a premium on
such qualities.

Whatever else the egalitarian agenda is

supposed to accomplish, Kristol says, it will surely effect
the transfer of resources, power, and prestige from the
private sector to the public sector.

It is in the public

sector that these egalitarians feel they have their only
real chance to do important things and be important people.
23

Ibid., pp. 179-180.
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The redistribution of wealth serves as a pretext for the
redistribution of power.

24

Liberals and other defenders of the liberal
agenda have argued that Kristol's argument is ad hominem,
and that neoconservatives generally have distorted the
liberal position for polemical advantage.

In his book on

the neoconservatives Peter Steinfels argues that their
argument turns on the contention that equality of opportunity is a wholly different concern from equality of
results.

In fact, he argues, the situation is more com-

plicated--the first concern of liberals is alleviating
poverty, but without placing some limits on the inequality
in American society, the poor will never have a fighting
chance.

Kristol and the other neoconservatives are far too

sanguine about the realization of equality of opportunity,
according to Steinfels.

Liberals have a more accurate

perception of the way in which America continues to resist
equality of opportunity, and appreciate that inequality may
only submit to more assertive egalitarian policies. 25
24
25

Ibid., pp. 183-184, 224.
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So egalitarianism is, from the liberal's perspective, a necessary component of liberalism if the overriding
goals of benevolent action are to be achieved.

But the

question of whether egalitarianism has the status of an
autonomous goal in liberal thought, worthy of pursuit for
its own sake,remains.
confused by this issue.

Liberals themselves are divided and
On the one hand, there is discern-

fort among liberals about being confined to the pursuit of
benevolence.

This feeling was well expressed at the first

ADA convention:
[We reject] the view that government's only responsibility is to prevent people from starving or freezing
to death. We believe it is the function of government
to lift the level of human existence.
It is the job of
government to widen the chance for development of
individual personalities.
It is not enough for society
to guarantee the physical survival of its inhabitants;
it must also gourish the dignity of and individual
human being. 2
At the same time, the pragmatist side of the liberal soul
is uncomfortable with the vague and expansive agenda suggested by such a critique.

Liberals who pride themselves on

realism, who feel that this quality distinguishes them from
left-wing ideologues, cannot easily embrace a program that
seeks to "lift the level of human existence".

As James

Nuechterlein points out, liberals are dissatisfied with the
tepid conclusions to which their analysis often points, but
26

wyatt address to First National ADA Convention,
ADA Papers, Series 4, number 9.
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are unsure how far they want to go beyond minimal welfare
§tate goals.

27

Liberals' mixed feelings about prosperity further
complicate the effort to understand liberals' goals.

At

the end of World War II, liberals insisted that a massive
depression, worse than the thirties', would be the consequence of peace.

This catastrophe could be avoided only be

a dramatic expansion of the New Deal.

Despite the repeated

failures to enact their desired welfare legislation, however,
the economy expanded steadily and strongly in the aftermath
of the war.

Liberals were ultimately forced to acknowledge,

with some sheepishness, that the patient had recovered while
ignoring the doctor's advice. 28
When the economy continued to soar in the fifties,
liberals were forced to abandon their argument that the
liberal agenda was necessary to avoid economic disaster.
The argument that replaced it said that prosperity now made
it possible for society to secure all the things liberals
wanted it to have.

27
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In an age of affluence we no longer ought to fear
making value-judgments rather than cost-judgments.
If
ballet is worth having, as we earlier decided public
libraries were worth having, go ahead and provide tor
ballet, even though there is not sufficient "demand"
to make it "economic." This attitude can obviously be
extended from ballet to beautifying the countryside, and
in a dozen other different directions. With all this
wealth we can afford to try.29
All of liberalism's designs for a better society came to
rest on the assumption of continued and growing prosperity.
"Rising prosperity was welfare capitalism's secular equivalent of grace."

30

But as heavily as they depended on prosperity,
liberals could not easily bring themselves to accept it.
Affluence ls an aborted, misdirected abundance; it
produces waste and trivia, poverty and disaffection;
it is dedicated to private wealth and public squalor.
The affluent tend to be mindless, shut off from reality,
lost in a surfeit of silly possessions and sillier
pursuits.3 1
So while liberalism needed prosperity, it feared it--prosperity corrupted popular tastes and made the people unreceptive to liberals' efforts to use our economic strength in
the service of public goals.

As Nuechterlein argues:

29

Harold Malmgren, "The Economy: A Case for Efficient Planning," New Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 47.
30
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A prosperous capitalist economy is one that, for
liberals, is always in danger of losing its political
and moral soul.
If capitalism works too.well, it dulls
the appetite for liberal reform.
It leaves people
content with diverse, non-public leadership and insufficiently critical of the moral workings of society.
From the liberal perspective, an America in (noninflationary) economic troubles is more likely to
recognize its enemies--the capitalist elite~-and less
inclined to demand the kind of redistributive and regulatory governmental activism that liberals identify
with social health.32
Arthur Schlesinger attempted to formualte an
approach that would allow liberalism to accomodate postwar
propserity, but neigher he nor any other liberal pursued it
seriously.

According to Schlesinger, New Deal liberalism

was concerned with "quantitative" issues--securing the necessities of life for all Americans.

In prosperous times, he

said, liberalism must become "qualitative," concerned with
such issues as "education, health, equal opportunity, [andl
community planning."

These will "determine the quality of

civilization," they will "make the difference between defeat
and opportunity, between frustration and fulfillment, in
the everyday lives of average persons."

33

How, precisely,

qualitative liberalism is to differ from what has gone before
is never made clearer than this.

If even health and educa-

tion are on its agenda, then the differences from older
32
33
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liberalism are subtle indeed.

Qualitative liberalism stands,

not as a clarification of liberalism, but only as further
evidence of liberalism's intellectual disarray.

Two things are clear about liberalism's goals.
First, liberals seek to do good works, to be efficacious
agents of benevolence in the modern economy.

Secondly,

liberals are not satisfied with just this goal; they seek
to do and be something more.
unclear, however.

This something more is quite

There is no consensus among liberal

intellectuals about the relationship between egalitarianism
and liberalism, or on the limits of the welfare state agenda.
Nor is it readily clear why many liberals feel it is necessary to go beyond altruism, especially when their efforts
to describe where are so incomplete.

One is entitled to

suspect that benevolence is an unsatisfactory goal because
it may readily be attained, especially in a prosperous
economy, and, once attained, will render liberals themselves
politically irrelevant.

A more demanding--and ambiguous--

agenda promises liberals a long future prodding America's
conscience.

It is not unfair to ask whether at least some

liberals are interested in doing good, as opposed to
accomplishing good, and would view the actual conquest of
poverty with mixed feelings.

CHAPTER THREE
RENDERING THE WELFARE STATE
Given the charitable goals of liberalism, how do
liberals understand the sort of social policies needed to
realize these goals?

The starting point for liberal think-

ing about public policy is that the government has a duty
to secure every citizen a decent standard of living.

"The

prevention of poverty, disease, and ignorance is as much
a responsibility of representative government as the prevention of crime."

1

The government must seek to assure

adequate levels of income, without requiring the poor to
liquidate their assets, and without making compliance with
demeaning and intrusive regulations the price of
. t ance. 2
ass1s

Liberals' writings leave little doubt that welfare
must ultimately be the responsibility of the government.

It

is impossible to devise private insurance or savings arrangements for something like health care that will be practical
1

"State of the Union," New Republic, 10 January
1949, p. 92.
2 Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "The
Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty," Nation,
2 May 1966, p. 511; Robert Theobald, "Abundance: Threat or
Promise," Nation, 11 May 1963, p. 403.
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for the improverished.

Similarly, private charity has a very

limited capacity to alleviate poverty.

Voluntary contri-

butions fail to materialize because individuals suspect·
that their generosity will not be matched by others,
rendering their sacrifice, however significant personally,
trivial compared to the social evils to be alleviated.
Only a welfare state relying on tax payments assures all
the citizens of a democracy that their contributions will
attain the critical mass required for really helping the
poor.

Liberals have also argued that excessive reliance on

private charity leads to a Balkanized welfare state where
efforts are hampered for the lack of central coordination
and clear priorities.

3

I

The assumption by the government of the central
role in securing minimally decent standards of living necessarily leaves government with many politically difficult
decisions about how to acquire and allocate the welfare
state's funds.

The position of modern liberalism on the

funding of the welfare state is relatively clear and
unequivocal.
3

The welfare state is best financed through
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revenues collected from a progressive income tax.

"Isn't

the burden of the country's aged population a burden upon
all of us?

And shouldn't we all carry the burden in pro-

portion to our ability to carry it?"

4

The first question

is already answered by the decision to include support for
the aged--or the sick, homeless, ill-educated, or jobless-in the list of welfare state responsibilities.

The second

rhetorical question reflects the liberal belief that the
more fortunate citizens have a social obligation to help
the poor.

Any scheme other than progressive taxation forces

the poor to share a large burden of their own assistance,
a foolish and self-defeating arrangement.

5

One does not have to be a Marxist, or attribute
Marxism to liberals, to suppose that if the guideline for
funding the welfare state is from each according to his
abilities, the allocative principle would be to each
according to his needs.

Certainly the general thrust of

liberal thought, with its stress on the plight and the
needs of the poor, is compatible with this principle.

And

it is possible to find liberals advocating specific programs or administrative procedures that go to extraordinary
lengths to locate and help the needy.
4
5

Both Nation and New

Linder, pp. 467-468.

"Social Security Redux," New Republic, 15 April
1978, p. 6; Keyserling, "Eggheads and Politics," p. 16.
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~epublic

criticized an Office of Economic Opportunity pro-

gram of low interest loans to needy entrepreneurs.

The

administration of the program was geared to helping businessmen with good credit records and

demonstrated management

ability--who nonetheless were extremely poor and could find
no other source of financing.

Both magazines suggested that

the government should take more risks in the interests of
realizing its social welfare goals.

6

As a rule, however, liberals have favored dispersing the welfare state's benefits to targeting them.
One reason why liberals prefer to make more people eligible
for welfare state benefits, rather than concentrating on
the neediest, is the administrative simplicity of a universal
or near-universal system.

Stringent eligibility criteria

can only be administred by a powerful and intrusive bureaucracy,
and may have the perverse effect of forcing people to be,
or seem, poorer than necessary in order to qualify for
benefits.

Though more inclusive programs have higher costs

initially, they are less disruptive and expensive in the long
run. 7
6

"Small Business Loans," New Republic, 24 September
1966, p. 9; Mark Levy, "Putting The Poor Out of Business,"
Nation, 12 June 1967, pp. 750-753. See also, "Not Enough,"
Nation, 4 January 1964, pp. 1-2.
7

David
Republic, 4 June
New RE~public, 14
for the Right to
15-16.

Sanford, "Care for the Not-So-Poor," New
1966. p.
T.R.B., "The V!ar on Poverty,"
March 1964, p. 2; Richard Lee Strout, "Paying
Life," New Republic, 23 November 1968, pp.

a;
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A second reason some liberals have given for
assisting relatively large numbers of people is that it is
shabby for the government to force people to prove they are
poor.

"The needs test, which amounts to a secular vow of

poverty, is such a demeaning requirement, psychologically,
that it could not have been better calculated to dissuade
the public from availing itself of the help offered."

8

The

needs test, or means test, reinforces the power of the upper
classes and the dependency of the poor, an apparent contravention of the purposes of the welfare state.
[Under the means test,] before aid could be gained, the
humble recipient must in effect file a pauper's statement, whereupon the kindly upper classes would permit
the government to bestow largese through tax funds. The
Social Security Act of 1935 knocked out the philosophy
of the means test and substituted the idea of social
insurance, with rich and poor alike paying basic taxes
and receiving basic protection against a natural human
hazard.~

The most important reason why liberals have favored
broadly allocative programs is the belief that such programs
will guarantee broad political support for the welfare state.
Liberals have acknowledged, obliquely, that helping the poor
may be politically unpopular.

When New

Rf~public

calls federal

8

Gerald Krefitz, "Health Care for the Aged (Progress
Report)," Nation, 4 February 1961, p. 100.
9

willard Shelton, "Portrait of a Conservative," New
Republic, 4 April 1949, p. 20. See also, "Consecrated Tory-Robert A. Taft: The Poor are Always With Us," New Republic,
5 May 1952.
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housing programs confined to the poor divisive, it is clear
that such a program would distinguish a small group of
beneficiaries from a large group of contributors.
resulting political calculus is straightforward.

The
"Presumably

those policies will win the public heart which are most
10
nearly universal in their promise of benefits."
There is
no reason to fear antagonizing doctors with a medical
insurance plan for the elderly; the beneficiaries number in
the millions and vote faithfully.

11

A clear example of this liberal belief that
expanding the list of welfare state beneficiaries would
deepen political support for the welfare state is the idea,
advanced by various liberals, that directing funds to the
working poor will alleviate tension between this group and
the non-working poor on welfare.

It is understandable, their

argument runs, that people who work in low-paying, disagreeable jobs should resent that welfare recipients have incomes
approaching their own.

But the working poor are the natural

allies of the welfare state; their claims for relief are
nearly as strong as those made by people who can't work at
all.

To end this unnecessary antagonism among America's
10

Robert Lekachman, "What Works, What Doesn't,
Nation, 11 May 1974, p. 591.
11

catherine Bauer, "The A!iddle Class Needs Houses
Too," pp. 19-20; "Wave of the Future," Nation, 9 April 1960,
p. 306.
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least-fortunate citizens, liberals have proposed schemes for
directing money to the near-poor.

A wage supplement plan,

or special tax and Social Security provisions, or George
McGovern's demogrant program, would have smoothed over these
bitter feelings, and oriented the thinking of a large bloc
of voters towards viewing themselves as beneficiaries of
12
redistribution rather than contributors to it.
The Social Security system presents liberals with
a particularly nasty dilemma.

There is no discernible liberal

support for the Social Security payroll tax.

It is regres-

sive, and the liberal approach to funding the welfare state
is more in harmony with funding Social Security through
general revenues raised through the progressive income tax.
But such a shift may have fearful consequences.

The Social

Security system has enjoyed remarkable popular support since
1935 because, under the payroll tax system, Americans had
strong and unapologetic claims to their benefits.

Social

Security recipients were not regarded as being on welfare,
and they did not regard themselves that way.

Congress was

not called upon to assess the claims of the elderly alongside
those of dozens of other needs in the budgetary process.

Any

shift to general revenue financing could dilute the proprietary claim that recipients now make, and presage the
12

Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "The
Poor Against Themselves, Nation, 25 November 1968, pp. 558562; Dennis Sugga:r.' "Still Forgotten: The v:orking Poor' II
Nation, 9 June 1969, pp. 724-726; Lekachman, "What Works,"
p. 591.
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introduction of a needs test into the Social Security system.
Distasteful as the payroll tax is, liberals are inclined
to view it as the lesser evil.

13

In the 1960s liberals, and the nation, rediscovered
poverty, and emphasized the precarious condition of those
whom economic growth could not rescue.

With attention focused

on special government programs for what were called the "hard
core" poor, some liberals began to voice misgivings about the
undiscriminating largesse of the welfare state.

According to

a Nation article, "Experience shows that the poor have good
reason to be apprehensive about programs formed in their name
by the powerful." 14

The government has become very effective

at providing benefits for organized interest groups, such as
labor, but does not respond to the unorganized poor.

A New

Republic article charges that whether or not a person is
eligible for government benefits seems to be randomly determined.

There is no intuitively plausible guideline determining

whether or how much money is paid out, and as a result the
poor resent and fear the whole welfare system.
13

"Revising Social Security," New Republic, 24
June 1972, p. 9; "State of the Union," New Republic, 10 January 1949, pp. 11-12; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal,
pp. 308-309; Merton C. Bernstein, "What Future for Social
Security?" New Republic, 9 January 1965, pp. 10-11; "Contributory Social Insurance," ADA papers, Series 4, number 25.
14

Frances Fox Pi~en and Richard A. Cloward, "What
Chance for Black Power?" New Republic, 30 March 1968, p. 21.

r
91
Social programs that are generally perceived as
universal in coverage tend to flourish in public favor
and grow in financial outlay. By grim contrast, efforts
to help minorities, unless they aid wounded war ve~erans,
the blind, or the victims of tornados and earthquakes,
arouse firece opposition; survive, if survive they do,
in perpetually desparate financial straits, and afford
standing temptation for exploitation as succulent
political issues by conservative demagogues.l5
Liberals have examined federal programs for education and found them perversely ineffective for helping the
poor.

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act

was supposed to provide money for the "educationally disadvantaged."

But the actual administration of Title I paid

little attention to directing aid to the neediest children.
Title I aid was often given to districts with only a few
disadvantaged students, and federal officials barely tried
to make sure that these funds were not diverted by local
officials to pay for their own educational priorities.

Some

liberals also began to express doubts as to whether government funding for higher education did not have the same
tendency to assist the self-sufficient at the expense of the
needy.

Though the poor were surely taxed to pay for state

universities and government loan programs, the chances of
their children going to college and benefitting from them
were much smaller than middle-class families. 16
15
Lekachman, "What Works," p. 590; Rep. Martha W.
Griffiths, "The High Cost of Inequality," Nation, 10 December
1973, pp. 623-626.
16

"Poor Children," New Republic, 22 November 1969,
pp. 9-11; "The Disadvantages of Being Poor," Nation 1 December
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A similar liberal assessment about programs for
solving urban problems, especially housing, developed in the
sixties.

Various articles in liberal periodicals raise a

common complaint.

Government programs intended, ostensibly,

to assist the poor, are inevitably distorted by political
forces to help the well-to-do, often at the expense of the
poor.

The whole purpose of the Model Cities program was to

demonstrate the benefits of the intensely concentrated
expenditure of federal funds, but politics dictated dozens of
cities receive much smaller grants, with correspondingly
inconsequential effects.

Government loans and loan guaran-

tees had a pivotal role in facilitating "white flight" from
the cities to the suburbs and the resulting deterioration of
the urban economic base.

When the government steps in to try

to correct the mess it helped create, its programs, through
inadvertance or cyncical design, routinely provide more
tangible benefits to real estate developers and

construction

firms than to Americans in need of decent housing. 17
One can see evidence of a similar liberal revisionism in the assessment of income transfer programs.

Why is

it, one article asks, that unemployment compensation
1969, p. 590; W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, "The
Equity Fiction," New Republic, 13 September 1969, pp. 23-24;
P. Nelson Reid, "Financing Higher Education," New Republic,
12 June 1971, pp. 13-14.
17

"Living Room," New Republic, 19 December 1970,
p. 8; "Suburban Sr.obbery," New Republic, 26 June 1971, p. 8;
Subsidized Housing," New Republic, 20 Julv
1968 , ...nn
10-11·'
.,
...
"New Housing Start?" New Republic~ 13 March 1965~ p. 8.

.
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is politically uncontroversial, while Aid to Families with
Dependent Children is perpetually under attack, its
ciaries stigmatized in the crudest terms?

ben~fi

The former is a

welfare program for the middle class, states the author,
while the latter is a welfare program for the poor, and in
the logic of our welfare state, helping people who need it
most is always the questionable proposition.

This logic,

which dictates that government assistance to the very poor
must generally be an incidental byproduct of programs that
aid a much larger and wealthier group, distorts the functioning of the welfare state, causing the government to expend
vast amounts of economic and political capital to attain
18
very modest goals.
In the wake of the 1980 election, some liberals
have been trying to reformulate their approach to welfare
state policy.

A few have offered the obvious suggestion

that liberals unambiguously promote a more discriminating
welfare state, one that does more for the poor and less, at
least in terms of providing goods and services, for the nonpoor.

These suggestions have been ignored where they have

not been derided.

It will be an extremely delicate task--

it may be an impossible task--for liberals to regenerate
18

Eliot Marshall, "Unemployment Comp is MiddleClass Welfare," New Republic, 19 February 1977, pp. 16-18;
Eveline M. Burns, "The Poor Need Money," Nation, 7 June 1965,
pp. 613-614; Lekacbman, "What Works," p. 590.
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political support for the welfare state on a basis different
from economic self-interest.

19

II
Getting money to the people who need it is one
welfare state problem.

Seeing that money, once rightly

directed, actually conduces to the attainment of the welfare
state goals, is another.

Kindness has become a more ambitious

and complex virtue in our age than it once was.
At the time when Saint Francis impulsively gave his
fine clothes to a beggar, nobody seems to have been very
interested in what happened to the beggar. Was he
rehabilitated? Did he open a small business? Or was
he found the next day, naked again, in an Assisi gutter,
having traded the clothes for a flagon of Orvieto?
These were not the sort of questions that engaged the
medieval mind. The twentieth century has developed a
morE, ambitious definition of what it means to help
somebody.20
The New Deal had approached poverty as a transitional problem.

Men and women prepared to contribute to

American society needed only the guarantee of a decent living
to be self-sufficient.

Efforts to apply this approach in

the postwar boom left liberals feeling that they were
"running out of poor people."

"Unlike the ambitious

19

"Liberals and Inflation," New Republic, 20
January 1979, pp. 5-6, 8-13; Gelman, "Liberal Agenda," p. 82.
20
Quoted in George F. Will, The Pursuit of HappiNess: And Other Sobering Thoughts (New York: Harper and
Row, 1978), p. 196.
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immigrants of the eighteen-nineties or the politically unemployed of the nineteen-thirties, the poor of the fifties
were all too often a demoralized and inarticulate minority
who in many cases had inherited their poverty and passively
accepted it as a permanent condition."

21

Assisting this

kind of poor person was a challenge for which liberals were
not intellectually prepared, and for which the government
was not functionally prepared.

22

This is no liberal consensus as to the potential
for self-sufficiency among today's poor.

One article can

assert that, "If jobs were available, ••• most of those now on
welfare, .•• would be self-supporting."

23

Another article,

published the same year says that 99 per cent of those on
welfare are ''new born infants, deserted mothers, and diseaseridden old people beyond the possibility of employment." 24
It sometimes seems that the liberal view of the poor changes
for polemical reasons.
21

There is a tendency to emphasize

schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, pp. 245-246.

22

naniel A. Satter, "West Side Story: Home is
Where the Welfare Check Comes," New Republic, 2 July 1966, pp.
15-19; Wildavsky, "Government and the People," pp. 26.
23

Melville J. Ulmer, "Waiting for Welfare," New
Republic, 13 November 1971, pp. 10-11.
24

sen. Ernest F. Hollings, "The Reality of American
Hunger," Nation, 26 April 1971, p. 520. See also Burns, "The
Poor Need Money," p. 613; Jencks, "Slums and Schools--!,"
p. 21.
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the poor's incapacities when defending transfer payments and
their potential when job training and education programs are
under attack.

25

For the most part, however, liberal confusion about
the poor seems genuine rather than calculated.

The relatively

simple approach of the New Deal is no longer adequate.
Liberals are unsure what to do for the modern poor, because
they are unsure whether these poor, America's "underclass,"
are impoverished because they lead disordered lives or lead
disordered lives because they are impoverished.

To the

extent liberals have tried to take the most optimistic view
of the poor, they often found themselves trying hardest to
help those least likely to benefit from their efforts.

As

described by Aaron Wildavsky, this inclination has worked
to make a successful poverty program an impossibility:

Any

program that actually helps some people compete in the labor
market or to become community leaders comes under suspicion
for having selected clients who were not the neediest
available. 26
A particularly difficult problem for liberals is
the possibility that some beneficiaries of the welfare state
Will become dependent on it, that welfare will not have the
effect of re-empowering self-sufficient people to care
25

Harry Lipman, "'Workfare' and Welfare,".Nation,
20 August 1977, pp. 142-143; Jencks, "Johnson v. Poverty,"
P. 17; Melville J. Ulmer, "Work and Welfare," New Republic,
3 July 1971, pp. 12-14.
26

Wildavsky, p. 27.
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for themselves, but of transforming capable adults into
unmotivated recipients.

Though conservatives have done most

of the complaining about welfare recipients' sense of s·elfreliance, liberals have acknowledged that there is a real
danger.

Schlesinger said that New Dealers were concerned

that their programs were making some Americans less capable
of providing for themselves, and Richard Cloward, writing
in Nation, says that the modern welfare system promotes the
disintegration of families by "substituting check-writing
machines for male wage earners."

27

One troubling manifestation of the dependency
problem is the implicit tax on the earnings of welfare
recipients--the portion of the dollar they earn that is offset by a loss of welfare benefits.

These "taxes" can be

quite high in individual programs, and a family receiving
several kinds of aid can face a cumulative implicit tax of
well over 100%, a powerful disincentive to getting off welfare.
There is a simple solution to the implicit tax--create
lenient rules about how much people can earn before they begin
to surrender their welfare benefits.
obvious political problem, however.

This solution has an
The consequence of lower-

ing the implicit tax is including millions of new recipients
in the welfare system.
27

The regulations that allow the welfare

schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, p. 275;
Cloward, "The War on Poverty," p. 55.
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family to earn income without losing benefits also make the
family that had been getting by on its earnings alone eligible
for welfare for the first time.

The decision to explicitly

accept this expansion of the welfare system as a consequence
of making the welfare system rational was the core of George
McGovern's 1972 "demogrant" proposal, first outlined by Yale
economist James Tobin in New Republic.

That this idea did

so much to label McGovern an extremist, contributing to his
defeat, has caused many liberals to lose interest in the
28
"dependency trap" created by the implicit tax.
In Wealth and Poverty, George Gilder has taken the
problem of dependency very seriously.

He argues that while

economic growth under capitalism has always required risktaking and exertion, the network of welfare programs discourages economic growth and participation in the economy by
the marginally poor.
The moral hazards of current programs are clear.
Unemployment compensation promotes unemployment. Aid
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) makes more
families dependent and fatherless. Disability insurance
in all its multiple forms encourages the promotion of
small ills into temporary disabilities and partial disabilities into total and permanent ones. Social security
payments may discourage concern for the aged and dissolve
the links between generations. Programs of insurance
28

Robert J. Lampman, "What Does It Do For the Poor?-A New Test for National Policy," in The Great Society, ed.
Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 77-78; James Tobin, "It Can Be Done,"
pp. 17-18; Robert J. Lampman, "What We Know About Poverty,"
Nation, 9 December 1968, pp. 625-626; Griffiths, "Inequality,"
p. 626.
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against low farm prices and high energy costs create a
glut of agricultural commodities and a dearth of fuels.
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) subsidies for government make-work enhance a feeling of
dependence on the state without giving the sometimes
bracing experience of genuine work. All means-tested
programs (designed exclusively for the poor) promote the
value of being "poor" (th~ credential of poverty) and
thus perpetuate poverty.2
Poverty is an evil, says Gilder, but the very fact
that it is so unpalatable points the way out of poverty.
The most serious fraud is committed not by members
of the welfare culture, but by the creators of it, who
conceal for the poor, both adults and children, the most
fundamental realities of their lives: that to live well
and escape poverty they will have to keep their families
together at all costs and work harder than the classes
above them.
In order to succeed, the poor need most of
all the spur of their poverty.30
Assuming continued immigration, "there will be poverty in
America for generations to come," says Gilder.

All previous

generations of immigrants were initially poor, but rose
through hard work, the strength of the nuclear family, and
faith in themselves and the future.

A welfare system that

penalizes work, promotes the dissolution of families, and
encourages the poor to think of themselves as victims, to
concentrate on their liabilities rather than their strenghts,
destroys all of the forces which have led millions of Ameri.
31
cans out of poverty, Gilder argues.
29

George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York:
Basic Books, 1981), p. 111; pp. 109-113.
30
31

Ibid.,

~.

118.

Ibid., pp. 64-74.
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With the best of intentions, we have created a
welfare system that perpetuates
it.

mise~y

rather than helps end

According to Gilder:
Welfare, by far the largest economic influence in the
ghetto, exerts a constant, seductive, erosive pressure
on the marriages and work habits of the poor, and over
the years, in poor communities, it fosters a durable
"welfare culture" ••.• The fundamental fact in the lives
of the poor in most parts of America today is that the
wages of common labor are far below the benefits of
AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, public housing, public
defenders, leisure time, and all the other goods and
services of the welfare state. As long as this situation persists, real family poverty will tend to get
32
worse, particularly in areas congested with the poor.
·

Gilder 1 s conclusions about welfare reform are stark, and
certainly unpalatable to liberals.

Strict enforcement of

welfare eligibility is helpful, but does not really solve the
welfare problem.

Gilder writes:

There is no such thing as a good system of artificial
income maintenance. The crucial goal should be to
restrict the system as much as possiblA~ by making it
unattractive and even a bit demeaning.3~
Liberals who have written on this subject have, for
the most part, dismissed fears such as Gilder 1 s as unrealistic.

They draw on a variety of sources in an effort to show

that government support does not render individuals incapable
of supporting themselves.
32
33

rbid., p. 122.
rbid., p. 117.

One article cites the experience
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of Western European nations, where relatively generous
assistance

sy~ems

co-exist with very low unemployment rates.

Another points to one state's experimental program where
welfare case-workers were given unusually light case loads;
the extra attention given to clients resulted in so many
of them leaving the welfare rolls that the program paid for
itself.

Schlesinger even quotes Winston Churchill's doubts

that welfare "will sap the vitality and self-reliance of
our race.

There will be quite enough grirdstone in human

life to keep us keen."

34

The argument that welfare does not always and
certainly lead to dependence is well taken.

Even Gilder

acknowledges that most people who need welfare need it for
only a short time, and resume supporting themselves as
quickly as possible.

But there is a more basic theoretical

difficulty with the liberal approach to the question.

I

found no evidence of any consideration by liberals of an
important phenomenon, the case of one immigrant group after
another in America from poverty to the middle class in the
absence of the welfare state.

Such a fact is not a pleasant

one for liberals to consider, suggesting that welfare may
not be necessary or even wise in some circumstances.

The

34 Margaret S. Gordon, "Failure of Unemployment
Insurance," Nation, 7 June 1965, p. 612; "Goldwater's Law,"
New Republic, 1 February 1964, pp. 4-5; Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1: The Crisis of the Old
Order: 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 179.
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neglect of this fact argues that liberals do not have a
theory about economic growth; they are interested in redistribution, directly or indirectly, but have taken the
economic growth that lubricates redistribution for granted.

35

To the extent that liberals have considered economic
growth, their thought has concentrated on the political
stimulation of the demand for economic growth.

This demand

is, of course, the focus of Keynsian economics, or at least
those portions of Keynsianism assimilated by liberals.
Liberals have also endorsed the most political aspects of
the War on Poverty, such as community action programs, with
the argument that political action is the best way for
.
36
.
poor t o rece1ve
an a d equa t e 1ncome.

the

The picture that

emerges is of a faceless economic system, a "black box,"
that will generate more goods in response to political
pressure.

But goods and services are not produced by an

economic system, but through the ingenuity and industry of
men and women.

Liberals' lack of interest in the relation-

ship between social policy and productivity is a serious
dereliction of intellectual duty.
35
36

Gilder, pp. 52, 125-126.

Roger H. Davidson, "The Politics of Anti-Poverty,"
Nation, 24 February 1969, pp. 233-237; Cloward and Piven,
"The Weight of the Poor," pp. 510-517; Richard A. Cloward
and Frances Fox Piven, "Birth of a Movement," Nation, 8 May
1967, pp. 584-585.
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III

What we have learned from the experience of the
postwar welfare state, an experience that included a great
deal of controversy about the government's role in alleviating
distress, and a significant expansion of that role in the
1960's?

Before examining liberals' assessments of the actual

practice of the welfare state we should outline the critique
of recent welfare state policies.

One of the propositions

in the case against the modern welfare state is that it has
led to explosive growth of the public sector, and that
government activity at this level cannot be sustained,
economically or politically.

Roger Freeman calculated that

if the government budget grew at the same rate between 1972
and 2000 as it did between 1952 and 1972, 36% of the work
force would be in the public sector, and government would
spend 70% of the Gross National Product, compared to 36% in
1972.

37
A second assertion is that welfare state efforts

were, by and large, a disappointment, that America did not
get its money's worth.

Lance Liebman has summarized the

variations on this theme.

One view is that people had rising

expectations, which ran far ahead of the actual progress of
37

Clecak, Crooked Paths, p. 73. See also Levitan
and Taggert, The Promise of Greatness, pp. 20-34.
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government programs.

A second contention is that the govern-

ment took on some tasks, such as training for the least
employable, which no one really knew how to do, and for which
there may in fact be no successful approach.

Money spent

in these areas inevitably leads to disappointments.

A third

argument is that the public sector is inherently costly and
inefficient, and delegating additional responsibilities to
it only worsens the problem.

Finally, the welfare agenda

required a threshold investment of resources, financial and
political, which the American majority was unwilling to
surrender.

38
The combination of escalating costs and escalating

disappointments had led some to conclude that frustration
inheres in the welfare state.

Milton Friedman contends

simply that the essence of the welfare state is X, a government official, spending money collected from Y, a taxpayer,
for the benefit of Z, a recipient.

Because X is neither

spending his own money nor spending money on himself he has
no incentive to economize or to get full value for his costs:
Public housing is both expensive and shoddy.

Arthur Okun's

gentler analysis of the welfare state is only slightly more
comforting to liberals.

He says that costs and inefficiencies

are inevitable in welfare programs, and that the test of a
38

Lance Liebman, "Social Intervention in a Democracy,"
in Ginzberg and S0low, p. 17. See also Wildavsky, p. 26.
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person's commitment to the welfare state is the ratio of
costs to benefits he is willing to tolerate.

Plausible

though this characterization may be, the coupling of
liberalism with a tolerance for government costs is less
than a public relations coup.

39

Liberal intellectuals have, with few exceptions,
not even tried to construct a blanket defense of the modern
American welfare state.

One finds instead a number of cri-

tical judgments on various aspects of the welfare state.

A

New Republic article criticizes the VISTA program as a nice
idea ("a domestic Peace Corps") that no one in Washington
bothered to think through.

As a consequence, there was often

very little for the volunteers to do.

The rush to enact

legislation in the mid-sixties often precluded policy-making
sobriety.

40

The selection of policy goals was often made for

inexplicable or less than admirable reasons, liberals have
alleged in Nation and New Republic.

Limited resources were

spent on less than urgent needs, or funds were allocated in

39Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 116-117; Arthur
Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington,
D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 88-100.
40

Andrew Kopkind, "VISTA on a Cloudy Day," New
Republic, 19 March 1966, pp. 17-18; Michael Harrington:Towards a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a New
Majority (New York: Macmillan, 1968; Pelican, 1969), pp.
11-12; James I.. Sundquist, "Origins of the War on Poverty,"
in On Fighting Poverty, ed. Sundquist, pp. 28-29.
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in response to political pressure or bureaucratic needs.

41

The literature also shows that liberals have been
concerned and indignant about the administrative costs of
the welfare state.

A sardonic New Republic editorial says

that "poverty has been a growth industry"--for social workers
and social scientists, who prospered during the War on
Poverty.

But there is no discernible improvement in the

lives of the poor as a result of this enrichment of the
poverty industry.

Simplify the programs, dispense with the

arcane studies and pilot projects, the editorial suggests,
and both the poor and the taxpayers will be better off.

42

The flaws of bad planning, bad administration, and
needless expenses in the welfare state that liberals have
acknowledged are not inherent in the welfare state; it is
at least possible to imagine more efficient government
assistance to the poor.

Critics of the welfare state have

argued, however, that it suffers from a deeper political
problem that no administrative reforms can solve.

Once it

begins to attend to the problems of poverty, government in
a modern democracy becomes subject to demands that distort
41

Ivor Kraft, "Head Start to What?" Nation,
5 September 1966, pp. 179-182; "Domestic Pacification,"
New Republic, 1 July 1967, p. 7; "Little by Little, Less and
Less of OEO," New Republic, 10 December 1966, pp. 10-11.
42

"Growth Industry," New Republic, 7 August 1971,
p. 9. See also, James Ridgeway, "Simulating Poverty:
Input
and Output," New Republic, 11 June 1966, pp. 9-10; James
Rideway, "Rebuilding the Slums," New Republic, 7 January 1967,
p. 25.
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policies and politics.
As it turns into a rational instrument of public policy,
the state opens itself to endless claims, beginning
with modest demands of economic, racial and ethnic
groups for minimal inclusion and extending to more elaborate claims for a series of broad economic, political
and social rights for everyone. These tendencies
encourage grandiose rhetoric and heightened expectations on the one sine, disappointment and disillusionment on the other.43
Good intentions cannot long withstand powerful political
forces, and the welfare state is reordered to accomodate
political priorities that have nothing to do with alleviating
poverty.
point.

David Stockman cites "impact aid" as a case in
The federal government began the program by assist-

ing 2% of the nation's school districts, those facing
additional expenses because of military bases and defense
plants in the Korean War.

By the 1970s, impact aid was

being given to 25% of all school districts enrolling half
of the nation's children.

The great majority of these

districts are quite self-sufficient, but there are strong
political pressures to expand the program and none at all
for it to contract.

44

Milton Friedman paraphrases Adam Smith

to characterize the welfare state:

"An individual who

intends only to serve the public interest by fostering government intervention is 'led by an invisible hand to promote'
43
44

Clecak, p. 74.
Stockman, "Social Pork Barrel," p. 15.
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private interests 'which was no part of his intention'"

45

Liberals' reflections on the welfare state have
come to similar, but less sweeping and less harsh conclusions.

Liberal critiques of the welfare state focus on the

way in which the programs originally intended for the poor
have been captured by the affluent and powerful.

Real

estate interests have undermined public housing programs.
New Deal programs to secure home mortgages have continued
and grown, and now benefit the middle class exclusively.
Income transfer programs are starved for funds to help the
poor because of the demands of the self-sufficient.

And

government programs designed to increase the political
leverage of the poor come with so many conditions attached
that the poor are left even more dependent and powerless. 46
Another problem liberals have noted is that
innovation in welfare policies is stifled by the claims of
constituencies profiting from the status quo.

According to

a New Republic article:
For all intents and purposes welfare reform has been
dead for years now. The existing welfare system provides so many benefits to such a broad range of interest
groups--farmers, the construction industry, lawyers,
45F r1e
. dm an, Free to Choose, pp. 5-6.
46

Harry Conn, "Housing: A Vanishing Vision,"
New Republic, 30 July 1951, pp. 12-13; Alfred Steinberg,
"FHA--Profits Before Housing," Nation, 1 January 1949, pp.
11-13; Burns, "The Poor Need Money," p. 614; Piven and
Cloward, "What Chance for Black Power?" p. 21.
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doctors, and most important of all, bureaucrats--that
it probably can never be dismantled. No Congress will
radically alter the welfare system until it is in the
interest of some equally powerful interest group to do
so. Right now the only people who would benefit from
a negative income tax are the poor.47
Efforts to prune old programs that benefit the non-poor and
those to create new ones to help the poor are beset by the
same problem:

the end of the postwar economic boom has

meant that such innovations will have discernible costs,
and American government allocates these less adroitly than
it allocates benefits.

48

While acknowledging the problem of rising entitlements, liberals have maintained that the welfare state is
only one factor contributing to it.

The preoccupation of

American culture with material success, and the ubiquitous
display of that vision through television, have certainly
escalated the demands made on our political economy.

An

internal dynamic of the American polity has always been
groups--factions--pressuring the government for certain
economic concessions.

To regard the recent wave of demands

on the public fisc as a shocking departure from past habits is
. t • 49
a 1 arm1s
47

"Liberals and Inflation," New Republic, 20 January

1979, p. 10.
48

see, "In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic,
p. 5; Kotz, "Politics of Welfare Reform," p. 20.
49

"The Federal Government and Social Rights," Intellect, March 1977, p. 294; "The Real Problem," Nation, 10
August 1964, p. 42; Herbert J. Gans, "The Demands of
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One of the main purposes of the extended commercial
republic was to diffuse class conflict, to encourage people
to think of themselves as members of smaller and more nUmerous
groups than the rich or the poor.

Critics of the American

welfare state assert, however, that it has increased friction
among large groups as well as small.

Those on the left,

in particular, view the efforts of the sixties as attempts
to foist middle-class values on the poor.

A variety of pro-

grams were implemented with the goal of changing the attitudes
and habits of the poor in ways more agreeable to the American
majority.

That the poor resented these efforts, and that

the middle class felt its good intentions were being snubbed,
were predictable consequences.

50

More conservative observers emphasize the way in
which the welfare state had deepened antagonisms between the
poor and those

earning slightly more than the poverty level.

From the vantage point of low and middle income working
people, the welfare state is grossly unfair. Those who
perform the least interesting and lowest paying jobs are
asked to contribute most heavily to those who do not
work at all.51
Consciousness II," Nation, 1 March 1971, p. 276. See also
Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New
York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 233.
50

Elinor Graham, "The Politics of Poverty," in
Gettleman and Mermelstein, pp. 217-224; Tom Hayden, "Welfare
Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman and Mermelstein,
pp. 478-481; Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," in
On Fighting Poverty, ed. Sundquist, pp. 34-35, 38-40.
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Clecak, p. 90.
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The near-poor are particularly aggravated by the sense that
government devotes special attention to the very poor, whose
improvement is especially unlikely, rather than themselves,
who could more plausibly gain from training or education
programs.

52
The divisiveness of community action programs, which

encouraged the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor
in designing and implementing poverty programs, has received
special attention from the welfare state's critics.

The

whole idea was included suddenly and with little reflection
in the Economic Opportunity Act.

To the extent that govern-

ment officials thought about it at all, they hoped that community action would lead the poor to behave "like PTA delegates,
enlisted into the democratic process without really disturbing anybody."

53

When some community action programs became

aggressively political, the Office of Economic Opportunity's
dilemma became acute.

To stifle the programs would be to

tell the poor that their political participation was welcome,
as long as its form and substance were approved by mainstream America.

To support all the manifestations of community

action would certainly infuriate the taxpayers who were funding it. 54
52

wildavsky, pp. 27-28; Clecak, pp. 80-81.
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William C. Selover, "View From Capital Hill:
rassment and Survival," in Sundquist, p. 167.
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Yet liberal opinion has generally been in favor of
community action.

An editorial in Nation emphasized the

importance of community action as a "feedback channel" for
policy-makers.

No one can bring the poor's perspective to

the evaluation of poverty programs, and no evaluation that
excludes their perspective can be adequate.
novel about the notion

th~.t

"There is nothing

the benefiticaries of a federal

program should be consulted about it.

If the poor were

called 'farmers' or 'miners' or 'shippers' no questions would
be raised."

55

A New Republic editorial stressed the impor-

tance of community action programs in the political revitalization of the ghetto.
The hope for the poverty program was not that it
would wipe out poverty over night but that it would begin
to revive the instruments of representative government
which lie in wreck and ruin in the slums •••
What matters most in Watts, on Chicago's west side,
in Harlem, is that the federal poverty program reach
down and begin the tedious job of constructing democratic institutions in the slum blocks so that the~e
stagnant wastelands can have a voice in governing.5
Community action is a necessary check, in this view, against
a paternalistic or exploitive poverty program. 57
55

"A Voice for the Poor," Nation, 14 June 1965,

p. 631.
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"When the Poor are Powerless," New Republic,
4 September 1965, p. 7.
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"The Poor in Their Place," New Republic, 20
November 1965, p. 7.
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Liberal assessments of community action after it
had been in existence for a few years were more qualified.
Liberals felt that they as well as the designers and administrators of the poverty program, had held unreasonable expectations about the transfer of political power.

Savvy

politicians did not retire from the field at the sight of a
few federally funded community action programs.

Powerful

local officials did not attain that status without being
resourceful, especially in terms of letting Congress know
their opinions.

The entire community action program quickly

faced strong legislative pressure; the upshot was that
community action funds were eventually controlled by the
very officials the program was supposed to challenge.
"Community action appealed to the policy makers in part
because it seemed to promise maximum results from a minimum
investment of funds."

58

Experience quickly revealed that

such a program was too good to be true.

59

When community action programs were involved in
political conflicts in which the fault lines were essentially
racial, the limitations of community action programs were
58

Francis Pierce, "Welfare on the Cheap," review of
Maximum FE:asible Misunderstanding, by Daniel P. Moynihan, in
New Republic, 22 February 1969, p. 23.
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Davidson, "The Politics of Anti-Poverty," p. 237;
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particularly obvious.
The war on poverty has been predicated on the notion that
there is such a thing as a community, which can be defined
geographically and mobilized for a collective effort to
help the poor. This theory has no relationship to reality
in the Deep South.60
Their perception of the intractibility of the racial antagonism
caused some liberals to lose their confidence in the application of federal funds to the problems of poverty.

Gradual

reforms may have been incapable of delivering meaningful
changes.

61
A final charge made against the welfare state is

that it necessarily occasions a conflict between the raising
and meeting of public expectations.

The long-time political

health of a welfare state program requires that political
leaders foster modest expectations about it.

They must

encourage people to be patient, given the difficulties of
designing and implementing programs.

It would even be

desirable if a program could remain inconspicuous until it
was clearly successful.

But the experience of the sixties

shows that politics is often the enemy of cautious policy
making.

Opportunities for inaugurating ambitious new pro-

jects, such as that given to Lyndon Johnson in 1965, are
60
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infrequent and short-lived.

To move cautiously during these

rare moments may be the practical equivalent of not moving
at all.

Many factors besides Johnson's grandiosity led to

.
h opes o f
the expans1ve

· ·t y. 62
t h e Great S oc1e

In retrospect, the duty of liberal intellectuals
during this period was to temper expectations, to counteract
the politicians' necessarily inflated rhetoric.

As a rule,

however, liberals were as incautious as everyone else.

The

pages of Nation and New Republic show that liberals clearly
understood that the Great Society's rhetorical commitments
were going to require much deeper financial commitments
than those made in the mid-sixties.

Instead of worrying about

the long-term dangers of these political debts, liberals were
inclined to praise the cleverness that wrested expansive
programs from an unwitting and unwilling public.

Perhaps they

believed that the programs would have become undeniable suecesses before the taxpayers' patience was exhausted.

But

liberals really should not be held blameless for or surprised
by the eventual backlash against the welfare state.

63
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Liberals are uncertain about what goals they want
the welfare state to realize.

The minimum agenda of securing

decent living standards is unsatisfying, but the more ambitious goals are dangerous and confusing.

This confusion about

goals reaches into the liberal discussion of the means for
relaizing the welfare state.

Liberals have not been clear

about how the government should help the poor.

They are not

sure what to think of the groups that will pay for the welfare
state, so they advocate policies that blur the distinction
between contributors and recipients.

Liberals are also

unsure what to think of the poor; their policy advice ranges
from optimistic self-help programs to patient and resigned
income maintenance.
Running through this unfocused approach to policymaking is a tremendous reluctance to challenge or discomfit
the American public.

The welfare state cannot be both inex-

pensive and generous, stern and indulgent.

But liberals have

been reluctant to utter this truth, or the corollary that
real welfare programs are apt to be difficult compromises
that will evince limited measures of all these desired
qualities.

One can understand and even forgive, up to a point,

the disingenuousness of politicians who fail to make these
difficult truths plain.

All the good that a politician would

do presupposes his exercise of the power to do it; statesmanship may impose justifiable restraints on candor.

But the
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democratic pressures on intellectuals are less severe.
Editors and writers do not stand for election, and as a
result enjoy greater leeway to speak of disagreeable but
unavoidable realities.

Because liberal intellectuals have

so consistently made the least of these possibilities, one
must ascribe their failures not to individual shortcomings,
but to liberalsim itself.

Liberal optimism makes it diffi-

cult to see unpleasant facts, and liberal democratism makes
it difficult to say them.

CHAPTER FOUR
LIBERALISM ON THE AMERICAN SPECTRUM
I

The success of Arthur Schlesinger's 1949 book, The
Vital Center, can be seen in the way in which its title
entered the language as an indication of a certain type of
liberalism.

Vital center liberalism was liberalism purged

of all sentimentality regarding the radical left, liberalism
that steadfastly defended experimentation and discussion
against socialist and capitalist dogma.

Schlesinger's his-

tories of the Roosevelt and Jackson administrations were
arguments that non-ideological liberalism was the authentically American approach to politics.
In setting themselves apart from the American left,
liberals like Schlesinger treated Communism as the chief
issue.

The motivating force behind the founding of Americans

for Democratic Action was to rescue the reputation of liberalism from the Progressive Party of Henry Wallace, where the
World War II cooperation between Russia and America was
regarded as based on compatible or reconcilable principles
rather than geo-political necessity.

While Wallace and his

followers blamed U.S. intransigence: for the Cold War, vital
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center liberals interpreted the East-West clashes as proof of
incanpatibility of liberalisn and a sympathy for Communism.

Accord-

ing to a New Republic editorial after the invasion of Hungary:
Ever since the Russian revolution, many sincere liberals
from John Reed to Jean-Paul Sartre, though they might have
admitted that Communism was often brutal and cynical,
usually in the end came back to the same point: its
stand against exploitation was nearer to the Sermon on the
Mount than was Capitalism. Whenever presented with a
choice between the two, many men of good will were inclined to give Communism the benefit of the doubt, ••••
Despite the horror of the labor camps, and the slaughter
trials, the great myth of the 20th century remained
intact ••••
It is this myth that the ¥ussian tanks crushed as
they lurched through Budapest.
Schlesinger denied that any American foreign policy, except for
complete capitulation, would have avoided the Cold War.

In

the first place, the Kremlin regarded the very existence of a
capitalist democracy as an intolerable threat.

Secondly, "The

personal word of the Communist is worthless and cooperation
with him impossible.

The phenomenon is worldwide."

Finally,

pragmatic Americans could never find a way to deal with an
empire completely in the grip of ideology. 2
Schlesinger disagrees with those on the left who
acknowledge the evils of Stalin's reign, but say that these
are accidentally not essentially related to Communism.

Such

people are disposed to believe anything good about Communism,
1 "Myth with Nine Lives," New Republic, 26 November
1956' p. 3.
2schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 99-100; 136;
Schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, pp. 135-136.
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he says.

Even the pact between Russian and Nazi Germany was

forgiven.

People who apologize for the Soviet Union do not

realize that it is inherently totalitarian, given the unlimited sway accorded the Communist Party by Lenin.

As a

totalitarian state, the U.S.S.R. practices a form of tyranny
more complete and horrible than even the most brutal dictatorships of the past. 3
Because of its stern rejection of Communism, vital
center liberalism was able to criticize American leftists
sympathetic to Russia.

Schlesinger's description of real

liberalism makes this clear:
It is mistrustful of utopianism, perfectionism, and
maximalism. It abhors the maudlin sloganism of the popular front of the '30's. It refuses to believe that lofty
aspirations excuses cruel oppression. In particular, it
lacks the patience for those who can pronounce societies
"progressive" which develop huge and terrible systems of
forced labor and deny freedom of expression and movement
to the bulk of their populations.4
The failure of the American left to acknowledge the crimes of
Communism is attacked again and again.

This failure has

placed the left in a state of "moral paralysis," it has aided
the cause of reactionaries, and it has made the left seem indifferent to the reconciliation of liberty and democratic
3schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 149; 70; 53-54.
4schlesinger, Politics of Hope, p. 70.
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organization of the economy. 5
Schlesinger was a forceful critic of Sen. Joseph
McCarthy, but it is worth remembering that Schlesinger's antiCommunism was robust enough to take the possibility of internal
subversion seriously.
There can be no serious question that an underground
Communist apparatus attempted during the late thirties
and during the war to penetrate the United States government,
to influence the formation of poli~y and even to collect
intelligence for the Soviet Union.
Schlesinger even takes the discussion of anti-Communist excesses as an opportunity to remind liberals of the importance of
sober anti-Communism.

"When liberals denounce the Un-Ameri-

can Activities Committee for failing to distinguish between
liberals and Communists, they should remember how long it
took them before they started making that distinction themselves." 7

Given the nature of the Soviet threat, Schlesinger

concludes, "There is surely no alternative to paying exact
and unfaltering attention to the Communists in our midst."
5

schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 130-131; Lewis S.
Feuer, "The Future of International Socialism," review of
Socialism, by Paul M. Sweezey, in New Republic, 31 October
1949, pp. 17-18.
6 schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 128.
7 Ibid., pp. 213-217.
8

Ibid., p. 102.
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This straight-forward liberal anti-Communism made
it possible for liberals to endorse and defend the U.S. policy
in Vietnam in the early sixties.

Hubert Humphrey, for

example, was capable of describing South Vietnam as if it
were the newest TVA project.

Arthur Schlesinger came to

criticize the factual assumptions of the Johnson administration about Vietnam's importance to American interests, but he
acknowledged that the motive that led Johnson into Vietnam-a desire for America to defend democracy throughout the world-was honorable. 9
Schlesinger tried to find a vital center approach to
Vietnam in his 1966 book, The Bitter Heritage.

He advocated

a "middle course" for getting out of Vietnam:

de-escalation,

diminished use of bombing, consideration of a cease-fire
after progress had been made in negotiations.

But as liberal

revulsion over Vietnam grew, the possibility of a centrist
position disappeared.

Schlesinger himself grew steadily

more critical of America's presence in Vietnam.

Two years

after arguing that the U.S. could not withdraw from Vietnam,
Schlesinger said, "Our country has never undertaken anything
more absurd in its history than the Vietnam war." 10 His contrition became complete in 1978 when, in his biography of
9sch1esinger, Crisis of Confidence, pp. 156; 145-146;
152; 156-157.
10 Ibid., p. 40.
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Robert Kennedy, Schlesinger said that the New Left had been
correct in calling for unilateral withdrawal in 1967.

The

certain fall of South Vietnam was less horrible than the
continuing division of American society over the war. 11
As his doubts about Vietnam increased, Schlesinger
tried to limit liberalism's responsibility for the war.

In

his history of the Kennedy presidency, A Thousand Days,
Schlesinger tried to apologize for JFK's role in Vietnam.
Though American troop strength in Vietnam increased from
685 to 16,732 during his presidency, Kennedy felt we were
"over-commited" in South Vietnam, and planned to withdraw
the troops he had sent there, not send more, according to
Schlesinger.

More broadly, liberals should not forget that

while they became connected with Vietnam policy by mistake,
a jingoistic foreign policy, contemptuous of world opinion,
is the natural approach for American conservatives.

In

particular, the enormous influence of the American military
often guarantees that our foreign policy will be bellicose,
expensive, and foolish. 12
11 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage:
Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1966), pp. 99-116; "Hitched to LBJ?" New Republic,
30 September 1967, p. 1; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, p. 772.
12 schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, pp. 708-722; Schlesinger, The Crisis of Confidence, pp. 164-165, 172, 265-266.
See also, "1965: The Prime Ta.sk," Nation, 11 January 1965,
p. 21.
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Those to the left of the vital center saw the connection between Vietnam and liberalism very differently.
According to a 1966 editorial in Nation:
Essentially, the membership of ADA now says of Asia
what non-ADA ••• liberals said about Europe in the late
forties and fifties: that the danger of a Communist
military take-over was vastly exaggerated, and that the
cold war was in large part a make-work and make-profit
enterprise.l3
Vietnam was the vindication for that wing of liberalism that had been purged from the vital center by Schlesinger
and the ADA, according to this argument.

"The course of

events since 1948 has largely confirmed what [Henry Wallace]
had to say about the cold-war policies Truman substituted
for the wartime policies of Roosevelt." 14
What was the liberal view of Communism that was
redeemed by the vital center's responsibility for Vietnam?
Under friendly peaceful competition, the Russian
world and the American world will gradually become more
alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more of the
personal freedoms; and we shall become more and more
absorbed with the problems of socio-economic justice.l5
We would be well-advised, according to this argument, to take
Soviet claims to having a non-discriminatory society devoted
13 "Not So Ancient History," Nation, 9 May 1966, p. 538.
14 "The Man Who Tried to Stop the Cold War," Nation,
6 December 1965, p. 431. See also, John S. Rosenberg, "The
A.D.A. 's Long Shadow," Nation, 23 February 1980, pp. 208-209.
15 "Wallace--A World Leader," New Republic, 23 September 1946, p. 339.
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to equal opportunity seriously--seriously enough to see in
the Soviet Union a challenge to the discrimination and inequality in our society that can only be remedied by more
American equality.

To be sure, the Soviet Union denied

many political and personal liberties, but their people do
not really miss them.

"Perhaps Russians just have a different set of habits about civil liberties." 16
According to "anti-anti-Communist" liberals, equating

Communism with fascism or totalitarianism is unwarranted.
Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have been dictatorships, but the Soviet dictatorship's concern was making Russia
a better country for all its people, while the Nazis were a
small clique bent on oppression.

Unlike right-wing dictator-

ships, Communist Russia, and China, and Cuba "arose from
intolerable social conditions and all tried to correct these
conditions with a measure of social creativity."

Similarly,

the aggressiveness of Communist nations' foreign policy has
been greatly exaggerated.

Geographic and strategic interests

have been far more important to Soviet foreign policy than
ideology, and even Soviet ideology has been more receptive
16 stuart Chase, "Back to Grandfather," Nation, 19 May
1945, p. 566; Henry A. Wallace, "Jobs, Peace, Freedom," New
Republic, 16 December 1946, p. 789.

126
to co-existence than Cold Warriors would have us believe. 17
II
The issue of anti-Communism provided the clearest
boundary between liberalism and the lmerican left, but other
questions more directly related to the welfare state also
mattered.

One critique made by Arthur Schlesinger of the

progressives of the forties was that they had a dogmatic
approach to policy-making, far removed from the pragmatism
that was liberalism's key virtue.
History has discredited the hopes and predictions of
doctrinaire progressivism about as thoroughly as it has
those of conservatism. The progressive "analysis" is
today a series of dry and broken platitudes, tossed out
in ash-heaps (where they are collected and dusted off
by the editors of the liberal weeklies).18
Only a doctrinaire leftist could fail to perceive that democratic capitalism offers political opportunities for the
alleviation of economic ills, rendering a revolutionary
transformation unnecessary, according to Schlesinger. 19
Schlesinger's deeper criticism of the left is that
it is hopelessly sentimental.

"The defining characteristic

17Henry Wallace, "On Testifying in Washington," New
Republic, 26 April 1948, p. 10; "The False Analogy," NatiOn,
26 April 1965, p. 436; I.F. Stone, "Toward World V!ar III,"
Nation, 7 February 1948, p. 146.
18 schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 36.
19 Ibid., pp. 47-48, 153.
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of the progressive, •.•• is the sentimentality of his approach
20
to politics and culture."
The progressive believes that
"tolerance, free inquiry and technology, operating in the
framework of human perfectibility, would in the end create
a heaven on earth, a goal much more wholesome than a heaven
21
The horrors of modern history cannot disabuse
in heaven."
the leftist of his faith in technology and progress.

His

naive optimism about human nature is impervious to the lessons
of the twentieth-century.

The leftist's sentimentality is

most obvious with regard to his view of the Soviet Union, says
Schlesinger.

"However he looks at it ••• the USSR keeps coming

through as a kind of enlarged Brook Farm Community, complete
with folk dancing in native costumes, joyous work in the
fields and progressive kindergartens." 22
Their sentimentality has rendered leftists politically
irrelevant.

Schlesinger contrasts the pragmatists, for whom

liberalism is a "practical program to be put into effect"
with the "Doughface progressives, who use liberalism as an
outlet for private grievances and frustrations."

"On the one

hand are the politicians, the administrators, the doers; on
the other, the sentimentalists, the utopians, the wailers." 23
20 rbid., pp. 36-37.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
22 rbid., pp. 37, 40-41.
23 Ibid., p. 154.
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The leftist is politically irrelevant not only because his
ideas are so tenuously connected to modern reality, but
because he really views politics as a stage for moral posturing, not an arena for action.

"Thus the expiatory role of

resolutions in progressives' meetings.

A telegram of protest

to a foreign chancellery gives the satisfaction of a job well
done and a night's rest well earned." 24
The liberal weeklies Schlesinger derided certainly
included Nation and New Republic.

In the years following

World War II both magazines reflected popular front sentiments.

Henry Wallace was actually the New Republic editor in

1947.

Its pages reflected the effete purism that Schlesinger

criticized.

"No thinking liberal ••• can find more than two

dozen members of the present Congress worthy of future support."25

Nation, too, evinced an excessive concern for

political symbolism.

Its support for the 1946 Full Employ-

ment Act was delivered in these terms:

"The important thing

is the principle established, the expectation aroused, the
pressure generated." 26 While the :t-~ation has remained faithful to the left-wing position, the New Republic quickly
24 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
25Henry Wallace. "The Sell-Out Eightieth Congress,"
New Republic, 4 August 1947, pp. 15-16.
26
I. F. Stone, "The Reserva tionists," Nation, 22
September 1945, p. 275.
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joined the vital center of Schlesinger and the ADA.

By

the sixties, a New Republic article could criticize the
New Left in these pragmatic terms:
The New Left is interested in, not power per se, but
finding a defiant posture to hold in facing a power which
probably can't be overthrown or which one does not really
want to unseat •••• While Acton did say that all power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, it is
not demonstrable that absolute impotence purifies
absolutely, ••• 27
The New Left may have taken some positions similar
to the progressives' of the forties, but centrist liberals
criticized it in different terms.

One contention was that

the New Left was never really serious about politics.

At

least the Old Left thought its gestures mattered; the New
Left seemed to accept, even celebrate, its own irrelevance.
The New Left routinely acceded to its most radical and
frivolous elements, for fear of seeming authoritarian, and
thereby consigned itself to the periphery of American
politics.

The middle-class students who comprised the New

Left were interested in playing at radicalism, rather than
actually changing America for the better, and often focused
on issues completely irrelevant to the poor. 28
27 seabury, "Gideon's Army," p. 25. See also, James
MacGregor Burns, "John F. Kennedy: Candidate on the Eve:
Liberalism Without Tears," New Republic, 31 October 1960,
p. 16.
28
schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, p. 218; James
Ridgeway, "Freak-Out in Chicago: The National Conference of
the New Politics," New Republic, 16 September 1967, p. 12;
James Gilbert, "Lost Chance," review of The Movement, by
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The New Left was as self-righteous as it was frivolous, liberals claimed.

"What distinguishes the New Left is

not only its unwillingness to define what its aims are ·after
the revolution but its belief that such mystification is a
virtue." 29 Such intolerance inevitably lead to the decomposition of the New Left, as even slight doctrinal differences
occasioned the formation of splinter groups.

Their intolerance,

and youthful impatience, led the radicals to give up on
America, and believe in the most sinister view of it and the
most drastic steps to reform it.
tionaries boils down to this:

"The rationale of revolu-

I know I am right; that know-

ledge overides all else; I have been unable to get my views
accepted; I will therefore try to get rid of the system that
30
rejects them."
Arthur Schlesinger made the additional point that
American conservatives were the principal beneficiaries of the
New Left.

His premise is that as American politics becomes

more passionate it becomes less liberal.

In 1968 he wrote:

If the New Left should finally succeed in making American
politics a competition in hysteria and force, does any
New Leftist really suppose that Tom Hayden and Elridge
Irwin Unger, in New Republic, 6 July 1971, pp. 29-30; Christopher Jencks, "Limits of the New Left," New Republic, 21
October 1967, p. 20.
29schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, p. 39.
30
Ibid., p. 220; Jenck.s "New Left," p 20· "Dissent
and Disorder," New Republ1c, 15 May 1~71, p. 8; lrv1fig Howe,
"Historical Memory, Political Vision," New Republic, 9 November
1974, p. 26.
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Cleaver will bring more armed men into the streets than
George Wallace?~l
Reactionaries needed the New Left, and the urban riots, to
lend credence to their hysterical portrait of America; some
of the more perceptive radicals acknowledged this fact and
rejoined the world of the politically mature, Schlesinger
claims.

32

But 1966 was unlike 1948.

Liberals, divided by

Vietnam and beginning to realize the complexity and intractibility of the problems of race and poverty, lacked the intellectual authority to dispatch the New Left as they had the
Old.

The Nation, in fact, found some sympathetic things to

say about the New Left in the sixties.

The Young radicals,

it claimed, had the same passionate concerns as earlier generations of leftists, but were free of the dogmatism that encumbered the Popular Front.

"The New Left looks not only

concerned but honest, open, free of icons, full of courage,
and, above all, alive." 33
The consequence of these attacks on the vital center
is that the left boundary of liberalism is very hazy.
31 s hl
·
c es1nger,

cr1s1s
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p. 44 •

32 rbid., pp. 250-251, 272.
33

Howard Zinn, "The Old Left and the New: Emancipation From Dogma," Nation, 4 April 1966, p. 389. See also,
"Henry s. Kariel, "The Persistence of Power," review of The
End of Liberalism, by Theodore Lowi, in Nation, 15 September
1969, pp. 253-254.
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the historical functions of liberalism has been to take
measures, proposed by the American left for the purpose of
replacing capitalism, and implement them in a way that
merely modifies the existing political economy.

Those

liberals who reacted to the assaults of the sixties by insisting that there were certain ideas and measures liberalism
could not embrace, and aspects of the American political
order that must be defended unqualifiedly, were not called
defenders of the vital center--they were called neo-conservatives.

Liberalism is different from leftism, but is

unwilling to make its differences too clear, lest future
prospects for assimilating policy measures he limited.

There-

fore, liberals who flout these niceties towards the left
34
are apostates.
III

The ambiguities and pitfalls of their relationship
to the left have rendered liberals only too happy to try to
define a clear division between themselves and conservatives.
Arthur Schlesinger has frequently made the argument that the
fundamental difference between the two is their attitude
34 clecak, pp. 61-62, 88; Schlesinger, The Politics
of Upheaval, p. 180; Jewel Bellush, "Old and New Left Reappraisals of the New Deal and Roosevelt's Presidency," Presidential Studies Quarterly 9 (Summer 1979): 263; Steinfels,
Neoconservatives, pp. 44-48.
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towards change.

Liberals welcome change and seek to make

the best of it.

Conservatives fear change, preferring the

settled past to the unknown future.

These opposing atti-

tudes fit nicely into a cyclical pattern of American history.
According to Schlesinger, American politics oscillates
between periods of innovation, when liberalism is ascendant,
and conservative eras where those gains are consolidated and
assimilated.

The sixties saw the release of the energy that

was pent up during the fifties; the nation will eventually
end its period of recuperation from the sixties and re-embrace
liberalism. 35
Other liberal characterizations of conservatism are
equally straightforward, but less respectful.

Conservatism

is described as irresponsible, incapable of distinguishing
"legitimate social protest" from the "gratuitous mischief of
agitators," and therefore inclined to "identify a particular
status quo with the survival of civilization."

Other liberals

accuse conservatism of being exploitative, "playing on the
frustrations and angers of embittered voters."

And there is

finally the assertion, made more or less plainly, that conservatives just aren't too bright.

"This nation will be fortu-

nate indeed on the day when it has a genuine conservative
35 schlesinger, "Liberalsim," p. 12; Schlesinger,
Politics of Hope, pp. x-xi, 67; Schlesinger, "Is Liberalism
Dead?" pp. 73, 79.
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movement which can match the ADA in intelligence and definition of the issues." 36
While liberals see how conservatives could be better,
they do not think it likely that they will become part of a
constructive dialogue on public affairs.

Schlesinger's dis-

missal of the fifties' "New Conservatives" was brusque:
civilized community has moved on to other things." 37

"The

A

decade later, New Republic referred to Barry Goldwater's
followers as "the Absurd Right," while Nation called them
"genocidal lunatics."

The option of taking conservatism

seriously was one that few liberals considered.

"One has to

realize," writes James Nuechterlein, "that many liberals
genuinely cannot understand a political perspective that
departs significantly from liberal assumptions." 38
There was a kind of conservatism that earned some
respect from liberals in the fifties and sixties.
personified by Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio.

It was

Some liberals said

36

schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 174; "How to Be
Conservative," Nation, 12 October 1963, p. 210; Elmer Davis,
radio address, ADA papers, Series 4, number 41.
37

James Richlesy, "The New Conservatives' Last Gasp,"
review of Up From Liberalism, by William F. Buckley, Jr., New
Republic, 19 October 1959, p. 57.
38

"Who's For Barry?" New Republic, 20 July 1963, p.
3; "The Dangers of 'Extremism, "' Nation, 27 July 1964, p. 21;
George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in
America Since 1945 (New York: Bas1c Books, 1976), pp. 138140; Nuechterlein, "Liberal World," p. 20.
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that Taft was the voice of "genuine American conservatism;"
their reason for saying this was their belief that conservatives like Taft, for all their protests about the costs of
the welfare state, would eventually come around to acquiesce
in its programs.

To have these green eye-shade conservatives

keeping the books was not a bad thing for liberalism, but
this liberal characterization of conservatism makes it clear
that the sort of adversary liberals prefer differs from
liberalism only by degree; the real conservative is just a
cautious libera1. 39
Perhaps the most fundamental liberal criticism of
conservatives is that they are apologists for America's
plutocracy.

According to Schlesinger, conservatives must

"renounce the theory that the only freedom worth worrying
about is the freedom to make money, and that the only people
worth listening to are those who have made a great deal of
money." 40 More recently, the emergence of the neo-conservatives has been attributed to the desire of those intellectuals
to defend and justify their affluence and prestige.

Another

article speaks of the new sophistication with which corporations have entered the market place of ideas, providing the
39Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "His Eyes Have Seen
The Glory," Collier's, 22 February 1947, pp. 12-13, 34-40;
"How to Be Conservative," Nation, p. 210; Schlesinger,
Politics of Hope, p. 71; "Get Douglas, Get the Liberals,"
Nation, 9 June 1969, p. 716.
40
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seed money for theoretical subtleties that mask "a crude,
mean-spirited, demagogic attack on the welfare state, a kind
of class struggle by some of the haves against many of ·the
have-nots."

41

Arthur Schlesinger has argued that the rich have
been politically shortsighted in the U.S.

Their loathing for

Franklin Roosevelt was not only "indecent," given the trifling
sacrifices his policies exacted, but it had a "fatuous intensity," scarcely comprehensible in later years.

There seems

to be, Schlesinger argues, an inverse relationship between
business and political acuity.

The classes comprised of those

who became rich through boldness and keen insight are timid
and obtuse when it comes to politics.

The wealthy consistently

fail to see how minor, painless concessions can protect the
system from which they have profited, and obdurately resist
.
even t h e mos t 1nnocuous
re f orms. 42

Those American conservatives--"traditionalists" who
rely heavily on the thought of Edmund Burke, are left in an
untenable position by the shallow politics of America's upper
classes.

The absence of an artitocratic tradition has left

those conservatives groping in vain for the "rich, humane,
and somber sentiments of European conservatism."

Schlesinger

41 Philip Green, "The I'm All Right Jacobites,"
Nation, 14 October 1978, p. 361.; Howe, "Right Menace," p. 16.
42

schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 496; A
Thousand Days, p. 649; Vital Center, pp. 11-18; Crisis of the
Old Order, p. 160.
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argues that America's plutocracy lacks all the political and
moral sensibilities that inform F.uropean conservatism, leaving only narrow materialism as a motivation.

"Property seems

to be the only symbol which American conservatives of the
twentieth century can offer a spititually hungry people-43
property raised to the dry religion of free enterprise."
The other sort of American conservative, the libertarian, who stresses the importance of unfettered markets
and limited government, is criticized by liberals for being
unrealistic about the nature of the American economy.

In

the first place, the modern American economy differs enormously from the free-market ideal praised by conservatives.
Large corporations wield power--economic, political, and
social--that effectively limits the impact of supply and
demand.

These corporations have their own bureaucracies,

and, liberals have argued, they are as stultifying and
impenetrable as the government bureaucracies decried by conservatives.

Conservatives, in sum, have chosen to defend an

uncomfortable fact by referring exclusively to an irrelevant
"d ea.
1.

44

43 schlesinger, Politics of Hope, pp. 74-75; Francis
Biddle, "The Blur of Mediocrity," review of The Conservative
Mind, by Russell Kirk, in New Republic, 24 August 1953, pp.
18-19.
44

"Corporations and People," New Republic, 19 April
1980, pp. 5-6; "Adam Smith Updated," New Republic, 16 March
1959, p. 4; Michael .Miles, "Reagan and the Respectable Right,"
New Republic, 20 April 1968, p. 26; Jerome Nathason, "John
Dewey: American Radical," Nation, 22 October 1949, p. 393.
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The politics of the American businessman are a
further source of embarassment to the conservative, liberals
have argued.

Capitalists have historically been the least

reliable defenders of capitalism.

The political power of

American business is constantly being exerted to gain protection against foreign competition, subsidies and tax concessions, acquiesence in cartel arrangements, and cheap access
to government-owned land and resources.

That the entrepreneurs

and their conservative apologists can expect the public to
overlook this dense history of government activity while
simultaneously believing that the nation is imperiled by
pathetically small sums for the poor, is an incongruity
liberals point to insistently. 45
So conservatives who praise the free market are
unrealistic, according to this liberal argument.

Other

liberals have gone on to argue that even as a theoretical
construct, more or less accurately represented in some facets
of the working economy, the market is seriously deficient.
There are, in the first place, important public needs that
are ill-served by free enterprise.

The private sector cannot

do certain things well, because of a lack of capital, or an
insufficient rate of profit, or the need to commit resources
45 schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 30; "In Justice to
Hayek," New Republic, 21 May 1945, p. 695, "Welfare Cheating,"
Nation, 13 September 1975, pp. 197-198; Fairlie, "Big Government," p. 25.
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for a longer period of time than private investors will
accept.

The politically realistic will accept that needs

such as slum clearance and housing for low-income families
.
t o b e publ 1c
. sec t or proJec
. t s. 46
are go1ng
Liberals believe that the market economy, even
under the best circumstances, is inadequate in another way
conservatives fail to realize.

Defenders of free enterprise

who praise its skill in maximizing satisfaction because
everyone gets to "vote" with dollars fail to realize how the
results of this election are distorted by economic inequality.
Some appetites are satisfied fully and others are scarcely
acknowledged in the market, regardless of their objective or
social importance.

If the government did not intercede to

correct this situation the needs of minimally decent housing
and jobs will be ignored.

Public action alone can supply a

reminder of values forsaken in the market.
The laissez-faire economy is to a large extent characterized by ••• the exploitation of the economic weak by
the economic strong. Under the laissez-faire economy
labor is treated as a commodity rather than as being made
up of precious human beings entitled to all the dignities
and human rights of free men and women.47
46 "Transition to Peace," New Republic, 27 August
1945, p. 240; "I I. Opposition--The Fair Deal Legacy," New
Republic, 2 February 1953, pp. 5-6; Frances Fox Piven and
Richard A. Cloward, "Rent Strike: Disrupting the Slum
System," New Republic, 2 DHcember 1967, p. 12.
47

Statement by Senator Wayne Morse, 22 February
1948, ADA papers, Series 4, number 9. See also, "State of
the Union," New Republic, pp. 9-11; "Keeping Them Poor,"
New Republic, 22 September 1973, p. 12.
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In the liberal view, the market mechanism provides
a vital public function in setting the price and directing
the use of goods and services.

But they depart from conserva-

tives, who, as they see it, are guilty of uncritical loyalty
to the market.

The liberal position is that political wisdom

consists of respecting the market's capabilities and its
limitations.

The government cannot surrender the determina-

tion of the national agenda to purely economic forces, and
once it does establish priorities, it must be prepared to
intervene in the economy when the private sector fails to
supply certain needs.

Given the tendency of the business

community to grasp for ever greater political power, liberals
favor a permanently antagonistic--or at least wary--relation48
ship between government and business.
Liberals have argued further that the conservative
critique of the welfare state is undercut by conservatives'
blind faith in free enterprise.

No matter how persuasive a

particular critique from the right may be, the conservative
alternative iS invariably "leave it to the market," and this
is often no solution at all.

"However ineffectual government

may be today, it seems impossible to deny that most of what
it tries to do needs doing, that the problems it confronts
48schlesinger, "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 71; Charles
Abrams, "Homeless America," Nation, 4 January 1947, p. 16;
Carl Keysen, "Big Business and the Liberals, Then and Now,"
New Republic, 22 November 1954, pp. 118-119; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "His Rendezvous with Destiny," New Republic, 15
April 1946, p. 554.
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are rea 1 , ser1ous,
an d 1ncreas1ng

There simply are no

sane private sector solutions to problems that affect millions
of people and require centrally organized solutions.
To attack current proposals to increase the coverage
and benefits of our social security laws as "statism"
does not tell us what to do about the unemployed, the aged,
the widowed, the sick, and the physically disabled. What
are the alternatives to a greatly expanded government
social security program?50

From the late forties until the mid-1960s liberalism
was intellectually preeminent, and both those on the right and
left had to define their positions with respect to the widely
accepted premises of liberalism.

Now the center is much

weaker, and defines itself in terms of those on its left and
right, often mechanically splitting the differences between
them.

What caused the vitality, and then the devitalization

of the center?

Events over which liberal intellectuals had

no control, such as Vietnam and the civil rights movement,
played a large role in the fortunes of liberalism.

We have

also seen how liberalism's intellectual shortcomings, its confusions about democracy, change, and egalitarianism, have
49Melville J. Ulmer, "Friedman's Currency," New
Republic, 6 November 1976, pp. 8-9.
50 "'Welfare State' Foes,"ADA World, p. 7. See
also, Scott Green, "Far From the Heavenly City," review of
The Federal Bulldozer, by Martin Anderson, in Nation, 25
January 1965, pp. 87-88; "The Acceptable Compromise," New
Republic, 14 March 1970, p. 11; Eugene Goodheart, "The Deradicalized Intellectuals," Nation, 8 February 1971, pp. 177180; "One Nation," New Republic, p. 8.
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hampered it--when liberal ideas came closer to being realized
in the sixties, these flaws became more apparent.
With respect to the specific question of its· place
on the spectrum, liberalism was vital when it saw its differences from conservatives as differences of degree, and
differences from the left as qualitative.

During its best

years liberalism shared the task of defending a free society
with conservatives, a shared goal which made the liberal criticism of conservative economics

m~re

effective; it was the

conservatives who were endangering free society by refusing
to accept even modest reforms.

It was possible in this era

for liberals to speak abruptly to leftists, criticizing the
sentimentality, the perfectionism, their blindness to the
imposing truths of our century.
The shocks of the sixties, including the assault
by the New Left against liberalism, rendered liberals incapable of stating vigorously what they were and were not
about.

Throughout the seventies, liberals' ideas were

generated on the left--affirmative action and feminism being
conspicuous examples.

In the meantime, liberal attacks on

the right grew more heated and less likely to acknowledge a
common purpose or core of values.

It is not surprising that

liberals faced electoral difficulties in this period, for
they seem to have willfully alineated millions of voters who
could not accept the leftist critique of American foreign
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and domestic policy.

And it is not surprising that liberalism

is in intellectual disarray while in flight from its historic
role of tempering, while upholding, the traditional institutions and patterns of a free society.

CHAPTER FIVE
ASSESSING POSTWAR LIBERALISM
Vital Center liberalism was preeminent during the
fifties and early sixties because it was both pertinent to
the major political issues and reassuring.

It provided a

framework for considering the Cold War, civil rights, and
the welfare state that seemed to assure intellectuals considerable latitude within the boundaries of the public's
sensibilities.

The happy and frequent discoveries of the

end of ideology reflected the widespread acceptance of
liberalism.

But the center bas been all but completely

devitalized since Vietnam and the Great Society.

To re-

establish itself as a public philosophy, liberalism will
have to reconstitute itself on a foundation that brings the
American understanding of justice, liberty, and individual
responsibility to bear on the problems of political economics.
I

Liberals are entitled to be discouraged by their
current predicament.

The Great Society ought to have vindi-

cated the liberals' efforts to secure an American welfare
state.

Instead, it marked the beginning of an era of
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of astonishing hostility towards liberalism.

"For twenty-

five years the liberals had struggled ••• to carry out their
ideas, but by the end of the Great Society, and for several
years after, few men even dared to identify themselves as
liberals." 1 The Vietnam War was a leading factor in the
decline of liberalism.

The American working class was

appalled by the peace movement, its shrillness, and its
flaunted counterculture.

Liberals had enjoyed the support

of workers and idealistic young people--the enmity among
their constituencies split liberalism badly. 2

So too did

liberals' reaction to a feeling of responsibility for an
unpopular war.

Vietnam gave liberals accustomed to battling

entrenched interests the novel and distasteful chance to
oppose the liberal establishment.

"It is this confusion in

liberal ranks that explains so much of the radicalizing of
the Left and of the general state of intense passion and
febrile disorientation in the liberal community of the
60's."

3

Quite apart from its administrative difficulties,
the Great Society as a legislative accomplishment posed
1Martin, p. 191.
2

Michael Walzer, Radical Principles: Reflections
of an Unreconstructed Democrat (New York: Basic Books, 1980),
pp. 172-173.
3 Nuechterlein, "The People vs. The Interests,"
p. 70.
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serious difficulties for liberals.
victory was undeniable.

The extent of liberalism's

As William Leuchtenburg wrote:

For those who since the Great Depression had waited in
vain for another era like that of the New Deal, the
first half of the 1960's was a time for rejoicing, and
the Eighty-ningh Congress recalled the halcyon days of
1935. "It is the Congress of accomplished hopes,"
declared Sepaker John W. McCormack. "It is the Congress
of realized dreams."4
But the realization of so many dreams at once depleted the
liberal agenda.

Fearful of being absorbed by history,

liberals tried to develop new goals sooner than they might
have wanted.

And their close identification with the Great

Society made liberals hostages to the success of its
programs. 5
The confluence of the civil rights and anti-poverty
issues almost immediately complicated the Great Society, and
left liberalism in a truly precarious position.

The pro-

found moral passion of the civil rights movement was brought
to bear on the Great Society, insisting that it solve the
complicated and urgent problems of the northern ghetto.
Liberals were not so much averse to this demand as they were
unprepared for it, and the attempt to save the ghetto and
4william E. Luechtenburg, "The Travail of Liberalism," in The Unfinished Century: America Since 1900, ed.
William E. Luechtenburg (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973),
p. 816.
5Martin, pp. 191-192; Wildavsky, "Government and
the People," p. 26.
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its inhabitants took on the frantic, desparate qualities of
a battleground.
Community action programs, Model Cities, busing, affirmative action, job training, housing laws, rent supplements, food stamps, and all manner of services--the
liberals tried many things. Had any one of them succeeded in reducing the poverty and segregation of blacks,
there would have been no liberal failure and no liberal
reappraisal. But none did; the slums continued, even
grew worse.6
George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign may
be taken as the culmination of the efforts to vindicate
liberalism by applying its precepts ever more assiduously to
the problems of post war America.

One can date the reluc-

tance of prominent politicians to call themselves liberals
from McGovern's utter defeat at the polls.

Yet even before

the votes were counted some liberals were criticizing
McGovern's domestic policy proposals as politically reckless
and economically dubious.

These misgivings were the first

signs of a desire to rethink liberalism, a need that would
become more acute throughout the seventies. 7
The Watergate scandals ought to have been a
reprieve for liberals.

Certainly it helped launch or prolong

the careers of many liberal politicians.

But those who call

6Martin, p. 258.
7Melville J. Ulmer, "McGovern's Economics," New
Republic, 24 June 1972, pp. 21-23; "McGovern's New Economics,"
New Republic, 16 September 1972, pp. 8-9.

148
for greater government activity in the service of certain
causes have not been helped by the public's deepened cynicism
about government and its works.

Watergate, following on

Vietnam and the Great Society, contributed to an atmosphere
of mistrust of the federal government.

To contemplate the

apotheosis of Sam Ervin from unyielding segregationist and
states' rights defender to Watergate hero is to wonder whether
Richard Nixon did not get the last laugh on his liberal
8
tormentors.
By the end of the seventies, by the time Proposition 13 and Ronald Reagan were winning huge electoral victories, liberalism seemed to be in utter disarray.
ter's ambiguous

politics~

Jimmy Car-

and liberals' uncertainty about how

to position themselves in relation to him, did nothing for
the clarification of liberalism.

Keynesian economics seemed

irrelevant to the "stagflation"--high unemployment and high
inflation--of the seventies.

The populist impulses lodged in

liberalism made it difficult to oppose a tax revolt carried
out through popular referenda.

The legacy of the sixties

remained to be defended; the problems of how to make only
limited changes in the programs, and how to discover and
publicize their successes seemed perpetual. 9
8Martin, p. 258.
9
"Guns and Margarine," New Republic, 4 February
1978, p. 6; Al Stern, "Liberal Programs Must Match Promise
With Performance," Center Magazine, March/April 1981, p. 49;
"In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic, 13 December
1980, p. 5.
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The pressures of these difficult circumstances
brought about the most serious internal dissension and selfcriticism among liberals since Henry Wallace and his followers were read out of the liberal movement.

Some liberals

looked at their philosophy and found it terribly stale.
The ADA platform of 1947 is pretty much national policy
of 1966--welfare, education, housing, employemnt, civil
rights. Improvements can be made, implementation is
still spotty, ••• but the main points ADA ••• wanted to make
have been made.lO
Some liberals were willing to say out loud that enactment of
the Great Society constituted a fair test of liberalism,
that liberalism had been proven less than completely adequate
by this test, and that liberals' who responded to these
developments by calling for more of the same were not helping
matters. 11
A related criticism of liberalism made by liberals was
that its tenets were not only old, but were defended reflexiively by those determined to avoid contact with any new,
uncomfortable ideas.

Melville Ulmer, writing in the New

Republic in 1976, said that liberals' reactions to the issues
of the seventies were "thoroughly predictable, ••• uniformly
devoid of that creative thought that festering, unsolved
10Andrew Kopkind, "Humphrey's Old Pals: An Account
of the ADA Convention," New Republic, 7 May 1966, p. 19.
11
See, for example, Eugene J. McCarthy "What's To
Be Dt=!cided?" New Republic, 27 July 1968, pp. 12-13.
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problems ought to warrant."

12

Rather than comfortably retain-

ing such questionable legacies as the anti-trust laws, the
tax deductability of home mortgage interest, and Medicare
and Medicaid, liberals should reevaluate how these policies
contribute to a just society.

To refuse to do so "would con-

firm the triumphant right-wing view of liberalism as a purely
reactionary defender of the mid-20th-century status quo." 13
Probably the most damaging internecine attacks concerned the relationship between liberals and blacks and the
poor.

The heightened sensitivity of some liberals to the

needs and dignity of these groups led to harsh criticism of
other liberals, those who continued in the traditional role
of political brokers for the disadvantaged.

The Citizens

Crusade Against Poverty, established by Walter Reuther and
the United Auto Workers, was dismissed as a "coalition of
elitist groups" in which the participation of real poor people
14
was mere "window dressing."
Where the Wagner Act had
conferred real political power on labor unions, the liberals'
anti-poverty efforts amounted to plantation politics, based
12
Melville J. Ulmer, "Jobs, Inflation, and Liberal
Politics," New Republic, 20 March 1976, p. 6.
13 "In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic, 13
December 1980, p. 5.
14 "The Poor Are Human," Nation, 2 May 1966, p. 508.
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on the assumption that liberals knew the needs of the poor
better than the poor did themselves. 15 Liberals who had never
before doubted their own good intentions were shocked by these
accusations, and reacted by acceding to the demands of every
aggrieved constituency.

Before the seventies, liberals'

clients--blacks, poor people, youth, women, Indians--had been
willing to let established liberal leaders be their spokesmen.
In the seventies these groups not only insisted on speaking
for themselves, but on pressing issues "extraneous to liberalism" and unrelated to "the larger issues of poverty and the
slums." 16

Liberals reacted, most conspicuously in the

McGovern campaign, by giving away the store.

"The liberals

of 1972 carried liberalism so far that they quit being
liberals." 17

Not only did they encourage all their client

groups to speak for themselves, but they found it impossible
to resist even the most extreme claims of these groups once
they did speak.

In embracing the "amnesty, acid, and abor-

tion" agenda, liberals alienated their largest single constituency, the blue-collar worker.
15

"By or For the Poor?"

1966, pp. 5-6.

16M ar t•1n, pp. 208-209.

17Ibid., p. 217.

In embracing quotas,
New Republic, 30 April
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affirmative action, and busing, liberals raised troubling
questions about the limits of their willingness to use government coercion in the service of social justice.

18

Some of the harshest criticism of liberals came
from those in the poorly demarcated area between liberalism
and the New Left.

They charge that liberalism has made so

many compromises with the American power structure that it
has become a better tool for preventing social justice than
advancing it.

In this view, the welfare state, such as it

is, has two purposes.

Its programs are supposed to be just

sufficiently anesthetizing to forestall truly fundamental
political change.

And the measure of social control it pro-

vides is not meant to strengthen society's weakest members,
but to extend and systematize the power of the strong.

19

Even those who could be placed closer to the mainstream of American liberalism criticized the Great Society
for placating the middle class and trying to reform rather
18 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
19

Richard Flacks, "Is the Great Eociety Just a
Barbecue?" New Republic, 29 January 1966, p. 19; DHvid
Ben~man and Luther Carpenter, "Dead End of an Ideology,"
Nat1on, 8 November 1975, pp. 459-460; Ronald Radosh, "New
Lease for Liberalism," Nation, 26 August 1968, pp. 149-150.
See also Gettleman and Mermelstein, p. 179; Elinor Graham,
"The Politics of Poverty," in Gettleman and Mermelstein, pp.
216-217; Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change,"
in Gettelman and Mermelstein, p. 492, p. 86; Christopher
Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969), pp. 9-11.
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than assist the poor.

Lyndon Johnson's insistence on attain-

ing consensus was the perfect example of liberalism at its
most timid, these critics say.

The Great Society was not

only an opportunity to challenge the belief that people were
poor as a result of their own shortcomings; the success of
its programs absolutely required the repudiation of this
bromide.

Instead, the War on Poverty became "a war on the
poor, aiming to change them beyond all recognition." 20

Liberalism lost its best opportunity for moral leadership,
according to this argument, by accomodating middle-class
notions about poverty resulting from individual failings, by
the failure to argue that social disorganization caused
poverty and social reorganization alone could solve it. 21
II
The thinking and policies of postwar liberalism have
not been left completely undefended.

In the interests of

making it possible to pursue such policy goals in the future,
some liberals have felt the need to challenge the prevailing
20
21

Jencks, "Johnson vs. Poverty," p. 18.

Ibid. See also Stephen Rousseas, "Consensus
Liberalism: Johnson's Eisenhower Premise," Nation, 23 November 1964, pp. 375-379; Richard F. Hamilton, "Conviction or
Compromise: The Trap of the Great Society," Nation, 22
November 1965, pp. 385; Stephen W. Rousseas, "The Great
Society: An Old New Deal," Nation, 10 May 1965, p. 501; Paul
Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor," Nation,
20 September 1965, p. 197.
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assessment of the Great Society.

"The 'proof' of the Great

Society's shortcomings, which probably has been accepted as
given by a majority of· the public and its policy makers,
remains a primary obstacle to renewed social activism," write
Levitan and Taggert? 2

Thus liberals of this persuasion insist

that the liberal approach to government has had significant,
though little-noticed successes.

The income transfer programr:,

despite their disarray and inequities, saved millions of
Americans from destitution, and were particularly successful
in feeding the hungry. 23 Even those programs with higher,
and vaguer goals, such as the Job Corps, overcame problems
with their clients, funding, and administration, making a
profoundly beneficial difference in the lives of many
trainees. 24
Those who defend Great Society liberalism insist
that its success was greater than the sum of the successes of
its individual programs.

It's true that the most expansive

goals of the Great Society were the ones that left it vulnerable to ridicule and charges of abject failure.

But just

getting the broader goals of social justice on the nation's
22 Levitan and Taggert, p. 5.
23
Nick Kotz, "The Politics of Welfare Reform," New
Republic, 14 May 1977, p. 17; Nick Kotz, "Feeding the Hungry,"
New Republic, 25 November 1978, pp. 20-22.
24
Ralph W. Tyler, "The Federal Role in Education," in
Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 172-173.
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agenda constituted a real advance.

According to Levitan

and Taggert:
The specifics of the Great Society were not as crucial as
its underlying thrust. The social welfare efforts begun
in the 1960's were based on the belief that the future is
not predetermined but can be molded by our energies and
resources, that our nation is not condemned to passive
acceptance of inequality of opportunity, povert~S hunger,
urban blight, high unemployment and other ills.
What is important is that such ambitions clearly became the
nation's business.

That the programs were far from completely

successful means only that the Great Society "turned out about
as any sensible person should have expected." 26
Some liberals also feel that a fair evaluation of
the welfare state is impossible owing to the prevalence of
conservative criteria for such judgments.

They argue that

the widespread belief that the private sector is inherently
free and the public sector inherently coercive is wrong.

The

poor who receive government assistance are not coerced but
liberated by the additional income.

Measures to reduce

economic insecurity, such as unemployment compensation, do
not coerce workers, but enable them to seek out better opportunities.27

Harald Malmgren wrote:

25Levitan and Taggert, p. 12.
26 Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons of the 1960's,"
in Ginzberg and Solow, p. 220. See also Robert J. Lampman,
"What Does it Do for the Poor?--A New Test for National
Policy," in Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 67-68; Levitan and Taggert, p. 8.
27 "Adam Smith Updated," New Republic, 16 March
1959, pp. 3-4.
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More gadgets Tor the affluent may make life nicer for
the affluent, but surely more gadgets for them is less
important socially than more hospitals, better transport,
better schools. Remember, it is the poor who need these
things, and the poor are least able to afford even that
which is available.28
There is a final liberal argument in defense of the
modern welfare state, which holds that conservative critics
of the welfare state have made unwarranted generalizations
from the experience of the Great Society.

Some liberals have

argued that the Great Society was beset by too many unusual
problems to support such generalizations.

It was neither

inevitable nor necessary that the welfare state should have
taken on an agenda so ambitious as the Great Society's.
Whatever the merits of community action and the attempt to
attack many causes of poverty simultaneously, the Great
Society incurred heavy political debts with such approaches.

29

Even worse was the way in which the grandiose rhetoric of the
members of the Johnson administration, particularly Johnson
himself, created expectations that the Great Society inevitably failed to meet.

In launching the War on Poverty the

Johnson administration "wantonly blur[red] the distinction
28
Harald Malmgren, "The Economy: A Case for
Efficient Planning," New Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 43.
29
see MiJton Viorst, review of The Politics of
Neglect, by Bernard J. Frieden and Marshai-r-kaplan, in New
Republic, 20 December 1975, pp. 25-26.
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between campaign promises and legislative commitments ••• There
was no prospect that any government could deliver on such
ambitious promises, certainly not within the time limits that
an impatient public would allow." 30
Even the most heroic policy making could not have
redeemed the ungoverned rhetoric that launched the Great
Society.

But the half-hearted efforts ultimately put forth

made matters far worse.
pattern:

The New Republic described the general

"The President outlines the need in broad strokes,

submits legislation that is far less brave and comprehensive
than his rhetoric, then Congress whittles it down to size or
throws it away." 31 Vietnam and rising inflation emboldened
Congressional conservatives, giving Johnson even less room
to maneuver.

An additional problem was the Johnson admini-

stration's habit of winning initial Congressional approval
for a program by understating long-term costs; this eventually
32
created a large number of "undernourished" programs.
The failure to adequately fund the Great Society
was the most grievous missed opportunity of liberalism, but
30
Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons," pp. 213-213.
See also Steinfels, p. 224.
31
"What's Congress Doing?" New Republic, 7 May
1966, pp. 7-8.
32
216-217.

rbid.; Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons," pp.
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liberals have argued that the American polity has always been
niggardly towards its welfare state.

Income transfer programs

that give too little aid to too few people are derided ·as
extravagant.

Congress would authorize experimental programs,

then not only fail to provide sufficient budgets, but called
these programs to account long before the experiments could
have possibly succeeded.

Having ensured that the programs

could only disappoint, Congressmen have then gone home to
33
deride wasteful bureaucracies.
III
To fairly assess the argument that liberalism's
approach to the welfare state has not been proved a failure,
but has never really been tried, would require knowledge about
what welfare state policies could have been implemented since
1945 and what, realistically, they might have accomplished.
It is unlikely that the question of the time and money required for a fair test of liberalism can ever by anything but
an extension of the debate over whether or how to have a
welfare state.
Whatever merit there may be in the claims that the
welfare state has been a victim of circumstances, liberals

33 Richard Haitch, "The Twenty-Fifth Child," Nation,
19 October 1963, pp. 238-241; :Cudley Post, "Requiem for
Model Cities," New RE:public, 14 April 1973, p. 15.
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cannot complain that history has failed to provide them with
laboratory conditions for building a welfare state.

Liberals

cannot control events, but they can control their own utterances, the subject of this study.

When liberals were more

successful at explaining their ideas in ways acceptable to
the American people, neither world war nor depression brought
liberalism to a crisis comparable to its present one.

To the

extent that the clear expression of political ideas paves the
way for a nation to make sacrifices or accept disappointments
in the pursuit of certain goals, and it is the assumption of
this study that this role is not inconsiderable, liberalism
has suffered from an inability to persuasively articulate its
purposes, or explain the consequences, pleasant and unpleasant,
of their pursuit.
How has liberalism failed to justify its welfare
state program?

Liberals seek a commitment from the American

people to the government to alleviate suffering and guarantee
economic security.
been

unw~lling

The fact that even President Reagan has

or unable to reduce or eliminate many programs

suggests that most Americans are broadly sympathetic to these
goals.

But liberals tolerated a continuing lack of clarity

about the nature of the commitment to the needy.

Liberals

have not settled the question of what sort of claim those who
cannot live on the fruits of their own labor have on the public fisc.

There seems to be no satisfactory middle ground
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between treating public support as a right, a claim sure to
be resented by many middle-class wage earners, or a privilege,
an arrangement that the poor may regard as both tenuous and
degrading.

But the difficulty of the choice does not excuse

the failure to make it.

This is an area where ambiguity is

likely to increase rather than restrain the conflicting claims
of those who contribute to and those who receive from the
welfare state.

Even where liberals seemed to make a force-

ful stand on the issue, with the encouragement of the welfare
rights movement, the rights they were appealing to were the
positive rights already a part of existing welfare legislation.

The question of whether these positive rights had a

34
. t"f"
1 1ca t•10n was s1.de-s t eppe d •
d eeper JUS

Regarding the limits of the commitment they seek
from the American people to aid the poor, the delineation of
what a full and sufficient welfare state would be, liberals
are similarly unclear.

The liberal assertion that we should

do more is often advanced; an answer to the question of how
much more never is.

Arguing for the Full Employment Bill in

1946, the Nation stated that "the important thing is the

principle established, the expectation aroused, the pressure
generated." 35
34
620.
35

It is tactically questionable to assume that

Clecak, pp. 79-80; Nation, 23 May 1966, pp. 602,

r.F. Stone, "The Reservationists," Nation,
22 September 1945, p. 275.
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the partial liberal agenda will forge a mandate for the full
agenda; as the experience of the sixties suggests, the partial
agenda may discredit the full one.

But it is even more reck-

less to fail to outline the full agenda, trusting that pressures
and expectations created by the partial one will somehow cause
that agenda to manifest itself.

Indeed, it is not unfair to

wonder whether there is such a thing as a full liberal agenda,
a complete picture of how the welfare state should finally
look.

There are, for example, many good questions about the

advisability of a guaranteed income plan, such as the negative
income tax.

But liberals seem not to fear that such a plan

might fail, but that it might succeed, thereby creating
political pressure to dismantle or reduce other parts of the
welfare state.

Such fears call into question the sincerity of
36
the liberal concern for the poor.
The most serious failure of liberalism as a system

of ideas is the refusal to disavow the Ponzi scheme aspects
of the welfare state.

Taxing the middle class to benefit the

middle class can secure political support for the welfare
state for a long time, perhaps indefinitely.

But while the

quantity of such political support may be very great, the
quality is of a sort that undercuts the benevolent purposes
of the welfare state.

It is a system that encourages people

36 Margaret S. Gordon, "Failures of Unemployment
Insurance," Nation, 7 June 1965, p. 611.
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to ask what their country can do for them, and to become
resentful of the welfare state as soon as they decide .it is
not enough.
Jobn Frederick Martin has described the "politics
of consumerism" as a political approach to the American
people that regards all their claims and grievances as equally
and fully legitimate.

The politics of consumerism calls on

the government, not to adjudicate among competing claims, or
to defer some and deny others, but to strive ceaselessly to
fulfill them all.

Martin regards the politics of consumerism

as liberalism's first, aberrant, response to the bewildering
circumstances of the 1970s, a response that was exemplified
by Jimmy Carter's first presidential campaign.

But given

liberalism's continuing inability to speak against anyone's
claims on the nation's wealth, except those put forward by the
malefactors of great wealth, it seems more reasonable to
regard liberalism as essentially rather than accidentally
37
related to the politics of consumerism.
In failing to make clear how and to what extent the
welfare state would help the poor, while making it very clear
that nearly everyone should in some manner benefit from the
welfare state, liberalism has left the poor in an unnecessarily precarious political position.
37Martin, p. 262.

Founding the welfare
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state on appeals to self-interest, rather than on honest
acknowledgment of the need for sacrifices in the national
interest, has made it easier to build the welfare state, but
left it a less sturdy structure than it might have been.
That liberals should resent the American middle class for a
acting unapologetically on the basis of self-interest, as in
the passage of Proposition 13, is a tenuous position, given
how little liberals have done to get Americans to think in
any other terms.
It was the contracting economy of the seventies
that fully revealed the disarray in liberal thinking.

There

was no Keynesian remedy for persistent and simultaneous inflation and unemployemnt.

The abrupt end of the postwar economic

expansion made the dalliance with qualitative liberalism seem
effette.

Most importantly, as the fiscal dividend vanished,

it became clear that American liberalism had lost the capacity
to provide useful advice about difficult political questions.
The mistake of supposing postwar prosperity to be without end
and without limits, though very great, was a pardonable misperception, given the extraordinary performance of the
economy during the 1950s and 1960s.

But liberals' readiness

to believe that scarcity had been abolished was not unrelated
to their reluctance to speak disagreeable truths about the
need to transfer wealth from those who are self-sufficient
to those who are not.

If the stark experience of limits
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concentrates the mind, as Samuel Johnson supposed imminent
hanging did, then the cozy illusion that one has broken free
from limits dissipates and corrodes thought.
Loathe to tell the great majority of Americans that
they partake of a national obligation to the poor, the discharge of which will cause some discomfort, liberals have
preferred to respond to a sputtering economy by railing
against the rich and the large corporations.

American

liberalism is too sentimental and too fuzzy to have a great
deal in common with Marxism, but it does partake of the
fundamental Leftist suspicion of the rich and powerful in
a capitalist society.

The problem comes, as Nuechterlein has

pointed out, when liberals seek to find a role for the American common man in this morality play.

The actor is simply

not suited to play the heroic proletarian.

Liberals have,

as a consequence, been placed in the awkward position of being
more at home in harsh economic times, when the middle class
might acutely sense an affinity for the poor and a resentment
of the rich, than during prosperity, when the middle class
reverts to its disappointing narrowness.

Liberalism will be

in need of rethinking until it is able to stop ascribing
virtues to the typical American he does not have, or denying
those that he does have.
Liberalism is in a state of crisis because it is
unclear about the nature of its own message and about the
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audience it seeks to reach.

Whether the welfare state seeks

only to alleviate the harshness of a private enterprise
economy, or to supplant it with a socialized economy cannot
be ascertained from the writings of the most prominent
liberals.

Americans who are neither rich nor poor cannot be

certain whether they are being urged to disposses the one group
group or assist the other.

And Americans sympathetic to the

charitable goals of liberalism are wary of how far the liberal
agenda might extend.

As Chesterton pointed out, a man who

will walk right up to the edge of a cliff on a sunny day will
stay miles away from it on a day thick with fog.

Until

liberals can be much less equivocal about the full implications of their program, they will continue to be denied the
full support that their best impulses deserve.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION
"Liberalism Is a Demanding Faith." ADA World, 29 March 1947,
p. 2.

"Our Kind of Future." ADA World, 15 May 1947, p. 2.
"Congressmen Urge Hearings on ADA Plan to Halt 'Bust.'"
World, 30 May 1947, p. 1

Ada

"Truman Triumph Heralds New Era; Liberal-Labor Forces In Key
Role." ADA World, 10 November 1948, p. 1.
"What Do 'Welfare State' Foes Offer?" ADA World, 21 November
194 9 ' pp • 6 ' 7.
"Domestic Policy."

ADA World, April 1950, pp. 1-A- 2-A.

"Riots." ADA World, September 1967, p. 2.
Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Politics of Stability."
Magazine, February 1968, pp.l-3.
"Crime:

ADA World

Liberals Speak Out." ADA World Magazine, November
1969, pp. 1M-5M.

"Liberal Legislative Action for 1970."
1970, pp. 10-11.

ADA World, February

Statement by Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. Press release
by ADA, 22 February 1948. Americans for Democratic
Action Papers, Series 4, #9, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis.
Address of Wilson W. Wyatt, ADA National Chairman, to ADA
First National Convention. ADA Press Release, 21
February 1948. ADA Papers, Series 4, number 9.
Report to the First National [ADA] Convention, 2/19/48 by
James Loeb, Jr., National Executive Secretary. ADA
Papers, Series 4, number 10, Wisconsin.
"Contributory Social Insurance."
an ADA policy statement.
number 25.
166

Anonymous memo concerning
ADA papers, Series 4,

167

Elmer Davis radio address.

ADA Papers, Series 4, number 41.

Preamble, May 1953, ADA Papers, Series 4, number 65.
Testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. on behalf of ADA before the
Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee
on Government Operations, ADA Papers, Series 4,
number 81.
Address by Walter P. Reuther to the 1956 ADA convention, ADA
Papers, Series 4, number 88.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. "The Tasks of Liberalism in America."
Program of ADA Convention, May 1960. ADA Papers,
Series 4, number 123.
Summary by Robert R. Nathan and Edward D. Hollander on The
Role of Individual Income Taxes in Federal-StateLocal Fiscal Relationships, for the Ways and Means
Committee of the House of Representatives. ADA
Papers, Series, 4, number 127.
II.

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

A.

BOOKS

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics
of Freedom. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Age of Roosevelt. Vol. 1:
The Crisis of the Old Order: 1919-1933. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Age of Roosevelt. Vol. 2:
The Coming of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1959.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Age of Roosevelt. Vol. 3:
The Politics of Upheaval. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1960.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Politics of Hope.
Houghton Mifflin, 1963.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.
in the White House.

Boston:

A Thousand D~,ys: John F. Kennedy
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam
and American Democracy, 1941-1966. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1966.

168

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas,
Powe~ and Violence in America.
Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1969.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Imperial Presidency.
Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

Boston:

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.
B.

ARTICLES

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "His Rendezvous with Destiny."
New Republic, 15 April 1946, pp. 550-554.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "James Monroe, Middle-Grader."
Review of James Monroe, by W.P. Cresson. Saturday
Review, 23 November 1946, p. 17.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "The Legacy of Andrew Jackson."
American Mercury, February 1947, pp. 168-173.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "His Eyes Have Seen the Glory."
Colliers, 22 February 1947, pp. 12-13; 34-40.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Political Culture in the United
States." Nation, 13 March 1948, pp. 306-309.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Which Road for the Democrats?"
Reporter, 20 January 1953, pp. 31-34.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Eisenhower Won't Succeed."
New Republic, 5 April 1954, pp. 8-12.
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "Conservative vs Liberal--A Debate."
New York Times Magazine, 4 March 1956, pp. 11, 58-62.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "The Challenge of Abundance."
Reporter, 3 May 1956, pp. 8-11.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Liberalism."
8 June 1957, pp. 11-12, 37.

Saturday Review,

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Where Does the Liberal Go From
Here?" New York Times Magazine, 4 August 1957, pp. 7,
36-38.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Death Wish of the Democrats,"
New Republic, 15 September 1958, pp. 7-8.

169

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "America in Transition." Review
of The State of the Nation, David Boroff, ed. Saturday
Review, 23 April 1966, pp. 36-37.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Why I am For Kennedy."
Republic, 4 May 1968, pp. 19-23.

New

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "America 1968: The Politics of
Violence." Harper's, August 1968, pp. 19-24 •
•

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Who Needs Grover Cleveland?"
New Republic, 7 July 1979, pp. 14-16.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.
"The Great Carter Mystery."
New Republic, 12 April 1980, pp. 1,18-21.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Is Liberalism Dead?" New York
Times Magazine, March 30, 1981, pp. 42, 70-79.
III.

NATION

Kirchwey, Freda. "End of an Era."
pp. 429-430.

Nation, 21 April 1945,

Stone, I.F. "Farewell to F.D.R."
436-437.
"The Apple Has Only Two Halves."
477.

Nation, 21 April 1945, pp.
Nation, 28 April 1945, p.

Chase, Stuart. "Back to Grandfather."
pp. 564-566.

Nation, 19 May 1945,

Barnes, Leo. "The Anatomy of Full Employment."
May 1945, pp. 593-597.
Stone, I.F. "Will America Go Socialist?'
1945, pp. 124-125.
"Speed the Murray Bill!"

Nation, 26

Nation, 11 August

Nation, 25 August 1945, pp. 169-170.

Stone, I.F. "The Reservationists."
1945, pp. 274-275.

Nation, 22 September

Bates, Ralph. "Rhetoric for Radicals." Review of Reville
for Radicals, by Saul D. Alinsky. Nation, 20 April
1946, pp. 481-482.

170

"The Shape of Things."

Nation, 27 April 1946, p. 493.

"The Shape of Things."

Nation, 3 August 1946, pp. 113-115.

Kirchwey, Freda. "Toward a New Beginning."
ber 1946, pp. 544-545.
"Men and Coal."

Nation, 16 Nov em-

Nation, 30 November 1946, pp. 577-578.

Abrams, Charles. "Homeless America."
pp. 15-16.

Nation, 4 January 1947,

Bendiner, Robert.
"Revolt of the Middle."
1947, pp. 65-66.
"The Economic Outlook."

Nation, 18 January

Nation, 19 July 1947, pp. 59-60.

Marshall, Margaret. "Socialism, Communism, and the West."
Nation, 13 September 1947, pp. 246-250.
Laski, Harold J.
"America--1947."
1947, pp. 641-644.

Nation, 13 December

Stone, I.F. "Toward World War III."
pp. 146-148.
"The Shape of Things."

Nation, 7 February 1948,

Nation, 31 July 1948, p. 113.

Steinberg, Alfred. "FHA--Profits Before Housing."
1 January 1949, pp. 11-13.
Sancton, Thomas.
"Second Chance for the New Deal?"
15 January 1949, pp. 61-63.
"The Shape of Things."

Nation,

Nation, 29 January 1949, p. 114.

Bendiner, Robert.
"What Is a Liberal?"
1949, pp. 349-350.
"Toward Peace."

Nation,

Nation, 26 March

Nation, 16 April 1949, pp. 432-434.

Chase, Stuart. "If Peace Breaks Out."
pp. 653-655.

Nation, 11 June 1949,

Bendiner, Robert. "Schlesinger's Vital Center." Nation,
17 September 1949, pp. 267-269.
"The Shape of Things." Nation, 22 October 1949, p. 385.

171

Nathanson, Jerome.
"John Dewey: American Radical."
22 October 1949, pp. 392-394.
"Pensions Reconsidered, II."
506-507.
"The Shape of Things."

Nation,

Nation, 26 November 1949, pp.

Nation, 3 December 1949, p. 530.

Niebuhr, Reinhold.
"Halfway to What?"
1950, pp. 25-27.

Nation, 14 January

King, Barr. "Leon Keyserling's New Look."
1950, pp. 32-34.

Nation, 14 January

Hutchinson, Keith. "Welfare vs. Warfare."
1950, pp. 53-54.

Nation, 21 January

Lekachman, Robert. "Income and Welfare." Re:view of The Ethics
of Redistribution by Bertrand de Jouvenel. Nation,
14 June 1952, pp. 583-584.
"The Stake In Stevenson's Victory."
pp. 341-343.

Nation, 18 October 1952,

McConnell, Grant. "Big Government Bogy: Who'd Gain by
Smallness?" Nation, 14 November 1953, pp. 386-387.
Rowland, Stanley, Jr. "Suburbia Buys Religion."
28 July 1956, pp. 78-80.
Burke, Kenneth. "Recipe for Prosperity."
1956, pp. 191-193.

Nation,

Nation, 8 September

O'Kearney, John.
"Hungary: Myth and Reality."
2 February 1957, pp. 91-94.

Nation,

Reagan, Michael D. "Private Wealth and Public Poverty."
Review of The Affluent Society, by John Kenneth
Galbraith. Nation, 14 June 1958, pp. 546-547.
Lieberman, Myron.
"Focer Myths Cripple Our Schools."
28 February 1959, pp. 179-183.
Reagan, Michael D. "Power and Frustration."
1960, pp. 211, 213.

Nation,

Nation, 5 March

172

"Wave of the Future."

Nation, 9 April 1960, p. 306.

Linder, Leo J. "Which Bil1.Is Best?"
pp. 465-468.

Nation, 28 May 1960,

Ernst, Henry W. "Federal Aid or Local Taxes?"
4 June 1960, pp. 491-492, 500.
"Welfare-Warfare Politics."

Nation,

Nation, 6 August 1960, p. 61.

Krefetz, Gerald. "Health Care for the Aged (Progress Report)."
Nation, 4 February 1961, pp. 100-101.
"The Meaning of Newbergh."

Nation, 29 July 1961, p. 42.

Bachrach, Peter. "Fulcrums for Reform." Review of The Crossroads of Liberalism, by Charles Forcey. Nation,
9 September 1961, pp. 146-147.
Rollins, William B. , and Lefkowitz, BE,rnard. "Welfare a la
Newbergh." Nation, 16 September 1961, pp. 157-160.
Bressler, Harvey J. "The Poor Are Still With Us."
The Other America, by Michael Harrington.
24 March 1962, pp. 266-267.
McWilliams, Carey. "Time for a New Politics."
May 1952, pp. 460-466.
Cook, Fred J.
606.

Nation, 26 January

Theobald, Robert "Abundance:
Threat or Promise?"
May 1963, pp. 387-412.
Miller, Loren. "Prosperity Through Equality."
September 1963, pp. 157-160, 168.
Haitch, Richard. "The Twenty-Fifth Child."
ber 1963, pp. 238-241.
"How to Be Conservative."

"The Dangers of

Nation, 26

"The Ultras ••• " Nation, 23 June 1962, pp. 565-

Miller, Herman P. "The American Poor."
1963, pp. 65-68.

"Not Enough."

Review of
Nation,

Nation, 11
Nation, 21

Nation, 19 Octo-

Nation, 12 October 1963, p. 210.

Nation, 4 January 1964, pp. 1-2.
1

Extremism.

1

"

Nation, 27 July 1964, p. 21.

173

"The Real Problem."
"A Clear Choice,"

Nation, 10 August 1964, pp. 41-42.
Nation, 7 September 1964, p. 81.

"Keating for Senator."

Nation, 14 September 1964, p. 101.

"Lyndon Baines Johnson."

Nation, 19 October 1964, p. 233.

Ladd, Everett C., Jr. "The Negro's Priorities: Welfare or
Status." Nation, 19 October 1964, pp. 243-246.
"What Happened to the Dream?"
317.

Nation, 9 November 1964, p.

Rousseas, Stephen. "Consensus Liberalism: Johnson's Eisenhower Promise." Nation, 23 November 1964, pp. 375379.
"1965:

The Prime Task."

Nation, 11 January 1965, p. 21.

Greer, Scott. "Far From the Heavenly City." Review of The
Federal Bulldozer by Martin Anderson. Nation, ~
January 1965, pp. 87-88.
"Forgotten in Abundance?"

Nation, 1 February 1965, p. 97.

"The Eclipse of Social Work."

Nation, 1 February 1965, p. 99.

Titmuss, Richard.
"Poverty vs. Inequality: Diagnosis."
Nation, 8 February 1965, pp. 130-133.
"Appalachia as Symbol."
"Malcolm X."

Nation, 22 February 1965, p. 183.

Nation, 8 March 1965, p. 239.

"The False Analogy."

Nation, 26 April 1965, p. 436.

Rousseas, Stephen W.
"The Great Society: An Old New Deal."
Nation, 10 May 1965, pp. 499-501.
Lampmann, Robert J. "Poverty: Our Enemy at Home: The
Historical Approach." Nation, 7 June 1965, pp. 606609.
Miller, Herman P.
"Who Are The Poor?"
pp. 609-610.

Nation, 7 June 1965,

Gordon, Margaret S. "Failures of Unemployment Insurance."
Nation, 7 June 1965, pp. 610-613.

174

Burns, Eveline M.
"The Poor Need Money."
7 June 1965, pp. 613-615.

Nation,

Keyser ling, Leon. "Poverty and the Economy."
June 1965, pp. 615-617.
"A Voice for the Poor."

Nation, . 7

Nation, 14 June 1965, p. 631.

van Dyke, Frank. "Medicare: The Major Defects."
28 June 1965, pp. 697-700.

Nation,

Cloward, Richard A.
"The War on Poverty: Are the Poor Left
Out?" Nation, 2 August 1965, pp. 55-60.
"Is Violence On-American?"

Nation, 6 September 1965, p. 109.

Burns, James MacGregor. "The Shadow Presidency."
6 September 1965, pp. 115-118.
Lekachman, Robert.
"Fashions in Liberalism."
September 1965, pp. 62-66.

Nation,

Nation, 20

Jacobs, Paul. "America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor."
Nation, 20 September 1965, pp. 191-197.
Lasch, Christopher. "New Curriculum For Teach-Ins."
18 October 1965, pp. 239-241.
Ryan,

Nation,

William. "Savage Discovery: The Moynihan Report."
Nation, 22 November 1965, pp. 380-384.

Hamilton, Richard F. "Conviction o:f Compromise: The Trap
of the Great Society." Nation, 22 November 1965,
p. 384-387.
"The Man Who Tried to Stop the Cold War." Nation, 6 December
1965' p. 431.
Cloward, Richard A., and Elman, Richard M. "The First Congress of the Poor." Nation, 7 February 1966, pp.
148-151.
McGee, Reese. "Welfare in Affluence: The Mirage of Rationalism." Nation, 14 February 1966, pp. 174-180.
Cloward, Richard A., and Elman, Richard M. "Poverty, Injustice,
and the Welfare State: Part I: Ombudsman for the
Poor?" Nation, 28 Feburary 1966, pp. 230-235.

175

Warren, Frank A. , I I I. "Liberalism: Opportunity from Impasse."
Nation, 28 February 1966, pp. 238-241.
Linn, Howard.
"The Old Left and the New: Emancipation From
Dogma. Nation, 4 April 1966, pp. 385-389.
"The Poor Are Human."

Nation, 2 May 1966, p. 508.

Cloward, Richard A., and Piven, Frances Fox. "The Weight of
the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty." Nation,
2 May 1966, pp. 510-517.
"Not So Ancient History."

Nation, 9 May 1966, pp. 538-539.

Letters to the editor, Nation, 23 May 1966, pp. 602, 620.
Greenberg, Selig. "Medicare: Promises and Pitfalls."
23 May 1966, pp. 617-620.
"Raid on Medicare."

Nation,

Nation, 11 July 1966, p. 36.

Kroft, Ivor. "Head Start to What?"
pp. 179-182.

Nation, 5 September 1966,

Musgrave, R.A.
"National Taxes and Local Needs."
January 1967, pp. 78-80.

Nation, 16

"'Poor Power.'"

Nation, 20 February 1967, pp. 228-229.

"Off the Land."

Nation, 27 February 1967, p. 261.

Bendiner, Elmer. "America Absurd." Review of Hell's Angels
by Hunter S. Thompson. Nation 3 April 1967, pp. 441442.
Cloward, Richard A., and Piven Frances Fox. "Birth of Movement." Nation, 8 May 1967, pp. 582-588.
Schottland, Charles I. "The Hungry Can't Wait."
May 1967, pp. 649-652.

Nation, 22

Levy, Mark. "Putting the Poor Out of Business."
June 1967, pp. 750-753.

Nation, 12

"The Three Revolutions."

Nation, 14 August 1967, pp. 98-99.

Friedenberg, Edgar K.
"Hooked on Law Enforcement."
16 October 1967, pp. 360-365.

Nation,

Cloward, Richard A., and Piven, Frances Fox. "Corporate
Imperialism for the Poor." Nation, 16 October 1967,
pp. 365-367.

176

Werth, Alexander. "Year of Jubilee: The USSR at Fifty."
Nation, 30 October 1967, pp. 424-430.
Sherrill, Robert G. "The Aging Men of Principle."
26 February 1968, pp. 261-263.

Nation,

Sherrill, Robert G.
"Hubert Humphrey Speaking in Tounges."
Nation, 29 April 1968, pp. 564-569.
f)rukman, Mason.
"Requiem For the Great Society."
13 May 1968, pp. 627-629.

Nation,

Mayfield, Julian.
"The New Mainstream." Review of Soul On
Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver. Nation, 13 May 1968,
pp. 638-640.
Christoffel, Tom. "For Middle-Class Candides." Review of
Toward a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a
New Majority, by Michael Harrington. Nation, 3 June
1968, pp. 736-737.
Radosh, Ronald.
"New Lease for Liberalism." Review of
Towards a New Past, edited by Barton J. Bernstein,
and The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 19001918, by James Weinstein. Nation, 26 August 1968,
pp. 149-150.
"Brutal and Stupid."

Nation, 2 September 1968, pp. 162-164.

Serri, Frank. "Conviction Hoax."
pp. 464-465.

Nation, 4 November 1968,

Cloward, Richard A., and Piven, Frances Fox. "The Poor
Against Themselves." Nation, 25 November 1968, pp.
558-562.
Lampman, Robert J. "What We Know About Poverty."
9 December 1968, pp. 623-626.
"The Welfare Burden."

Nation,

Nation, 20 January 1969, pp. 67-68.

Davidson, Roger H. "The Politics of Anti-Poverty."
24 February 1969, pp. 233-237.
"Get Douglas, Get the Liberals."

Nation,

Nation, 9 June 1969, p. 716.

Duggan, Dennis. "Still Forgotten: The Working Poor."
Nation, 9 June 1969, pp. 724-726.

177

Newfield, Jack.
"More Mood than Movement."
1969, pp. 70-73.

Nation, 28 July

Kariel, Henry S. "The Persistence of Power." Review of The
End of Liberalism, by Theodore Lowi. Nation, 1~
September 1969, pp. 253-254.
"The Disadvantage of Being Poor."
p. 590.
"Outrage and Opportunity."
35-36.

Nation, 1 December 1969,

Nation, 19 January 1970, pp.

Marine, Gene.
"Mao, Malcolm, Fanon, and Lenin." Review of
Picking Up the Gun, by Earl Anthony. Nation, 16
March 1970, pp. 313-314.
Silver, Gerald A., M.D. "Insurance Is Not Enough."
8 June 1970, pp. 680-683.
"No Magic in Vouchers."

Nation,

Nation, 29 June 1970, p. 773.

"The Price of Repression."
131.

Nation, 31 August 1970, pp. 130-

Sherrill, Robert. "Justice in a Torn Naiton: A Talk With
Ramsey Clark." Nation, 7 December 1970, pp. 587591.
Goodheart, Eugene. "The Deradicalized Intellectuals."
Nation, 8 February 1971, pp. 177-180.
"And the Jobless."

Nation, 22 February 1977, pp. 228-229.

Gans, Herbert J.
"The Demands of Consciousness I I."
1 March 1971, pp. 275-277.
Sherrill, Robert.
"The Black Humor of Housing."
29 March 1971, pp. 397-402.

Nation,

Nation,

Hollings, Sen. Ernest F. "The Reality of American Hunger."
Nation, 26 April 1971, pp. 518-521.
Schorr, Alvin L.
"The Case for Federal Welfare."
3 May 1971, pp. 555-557.
Case, John. "Vision of a New Social Order."
February 1972, pp. 200-206.

Nation,

Nation, 14

178

McWilliams, Cary. "Strange Campaign."
1972, pp. 482-485.

Nation, 20 November

Harrington, Michael. "The Myth That Was Real."
27 November 1972, pp. 518-521.

Nation,

Horowitz, Irving Louis. "The Operators Make Their Play."
Nation, 15 January 1973, pp. 72-75.
Etzioni, Amitai, and Ottaway Marina. "The Next Domestic
Disaster." Nation, 29 January 1973, pp. 138-142.
"Jane Roe and Mary Doe."

Nation, 5 February 1973, p. 165.

Fried, Joseph P. "The Latest Panacea."
pp. 304-308.

Nation, 5 March 1973,

Friedman, Leonard M. "The Courts and Social Policy."
9 April 1973, pp. 467-469.
Butts, R. Freeman.
"Assualts on a Great Idea."
30 April 1973, pp. 553-560.
Coons, John E. "In a Manner Restrained."
1973, pp. 556.

Nation,

Nation,

Nation, 30 April

Wolfe, Alan.
"The Ideology of Counterrevolution."
2 July 1973, pp. 13-17.

Naton,

Griffiths, Rep. Martin W.
"The High Cost of Inequality."
Nation, 10 December 1973, pp. 623-626.
Lekachman, Robert. "What Works, What Doesn't"
May 1974, pp. 589-591.

Nation, 11

Harrington, Michael. "Say What You Mean--Socialism."
25 May 1974, pp. 648-651.
Emerson, Thomas I. "On Keeping a Revolution."
March 1975, pp. 369-372.
Pessen, Edward. "The Arrogant Veto."
pp. 133-137.
"'Welfare Cheating.'"

Nation,

Nation, 29

Nation, 30 August 1975,

Nation, 13 September 1975, pp. 197-198.

Bensman, David, and Carpenter, Luther. "Dead End of an
Ideology." Nation, 8 November 1975, pp. 456-461.

179

Entman, Robert M.
"What the Neo-Conservatives Prescribe for
Us." Nation, 10 January 1976, pp. 21-23.
Conyers, Rep. John Jr.
"The Real Problem is Poverty."_
24 January 1976, pp. 83-85.
Tabacoff, David. "The Food Stamp Program."
1976, pp. 402-404.

Nation,

Nation, 3 April

Marzani, Carl. "Cold War: Zealots and Revisionists."
15 January 1977, pp. 38-39.
Silver, Isidore.
"What Flows from Neo-Conservatism."
9 July 1977, pp. 44-51.
"A Very Modest Proposal."

Nation,
Nation,

Nation, 20 August 1977, pp. 131-132.

Lipman, Henry. "'Workfare' and Welfare."
1977, pp. 141-144.

Nation, 20 August

Currie, Elliot.
"A Piece of Complicated Gimmickery."
17 September 1977, pp. 230-233.

Nation,

Steffens, Dorothy R.
"The Promise of Humphrey-Hawkins."
Nation, 21 January 1978, pp. 50-52.
Hartman, Chester. "Housing Rundown." Review of America's
Housing Challenge, by Roger Starr, Nation, 28 January 1978, pp. 87-89.
Rosenberg, John. "' If FDR WEre Alive Today ••• '"
15 April 1978, pp. 420-421.
McWilliams, Carey. "California Earthquake."
June 1978, pp. 714-715.
Connolly, Peter.
"The Voice of Raw Greed."
1978, pp. 77-78.

Nation, 17
Nation, 22 July

Green, Philip.
"The 'I'm All Right' Jacobites."
14 October 1978, pp. 361, 378-380.
Gans, Curtis B. "Conservatism By Default."
October 1978, pp. 372-374.

Nation,

Nation,

Nation, 14

Green, Mark, and Zwenig, Frances. "The Legislative Veto is
Bad Law." Nation, 28 October 1978, pp. 434-436.

180

Green, Philip. "America Amok."
pp. 337-340.

Nation, 31 March 1979,

Green, Philip. "Two Cheers for the State."
1979, pp. 398-401.

Nation, 14 April

Rosenberg, JohnS. "The A.D.A.'s Long Shadow."
23 February 1980, pp. 208-210.

Nation,

Raskin, Marcus G. "Progressive Liberalism for the '80's."
Nation, 17 May 1980, pp. 577, 587-591.
Doctorow, E.L. "The Rise of Ronald Reagan."
July 1980, pp. 65, 82-84.
"The Reagan Danger."
429.

Nation, 19

Nation, 1 November 1980, pp. 425, 427-

"Symposium: What Is To Be Done?"
p. 531-536.

Nation, November 22 1980,

Hayden, Tom.
"The Future Politics of Liberalism."
February 21, 1981, pp. 193, 208-212.
IV

Nation,

NEW REPUBLIC

"Mr. Hicks and the Liberals."
pp. 544-545.
"In Justice to Mr. Hayek."

New Republic, 23 April 1945,

New P.epublic, 21 May 1945, p. 695.

Mayberry, George.
"Ex-Communist Manifesto." Review of The
Yogi and the Commissor by Arthur Koestler. New-Republic, 4 June 1945, pp. 794-795.
Davis, Michael M. "Health Insurance in Politics."
Republic, 30 July 1945, pp. 129-130.
Soule, George. "The Full-Employment Bill."
6 August 1945, pp. 154-156.
"The Peril of Victory."
203-204.
"Ten Million New Homes."
p. 237.
"Transition to Peace."
239-240.

New

New Republic,

New Republic, 20 August 1945, pp.
New Republic, 27 August 1945,
New Republic, 27 August 1945, pp.

181
"The Meaning of Jobs for All."
1945, pp. 395-396.
"Plotting a New Depresion."
pp. 819-820.

New Republic, 24 September

New Republic, 17 December 1945,

Reuther, Walter P. "GM v. The Rest of Us."
14 January 1946, pp. 41-42.
"Letter to the Middle Class."
pp. 67-68.

New Republic,

New Republic, 21 January 1946,

Layton, Horace R.
"Awake to What?" Review of Reveille for
Radicals, by Saul D. Alinsky. New Republic, 21
January 1946, pp. 97-98.
Kingsley, J. Donald. "Retort to Reaction." Review of Road to
Reaction, by Herman Finer. New Republic, 28 January
1946, p. 130.
"Good News is No News."

New Republic, 4 February 1946, p. 144.

"The Year of Decision."
229-231.

New Republic, 11 February 1946, pp.

"Is It Full Employment?"
p. 240.
"Truman's Blunder."

New Republic, 18 February 1946,

New Republic, 3 June 1946, pp. 787-788.

"The Senate Votes for Inflation."
p. 884.

New Republic, 24 June 1946,

Goldman, Eric F., and Paull, Mary. "Liberals on Liberalism."
New Republic, 22 .Yuly 1946, pp. 70-73.
"Wallace--A World Leader."
pp. 339-340.

New Republic, 23 September 1946,

Laski, Harold J.
"Civil Liberties in the Soviet Union."
Republic, 21 October 1946, pp. 507-508.
Laski, Harold J.
"What Democracy Means in Russia."
Republic, 28 October 1946, pp. 551-552.

New

New

"We Were Licked!" New Republic, 18 November 1946, pp. 656-657.
Wallace, Henry A. "Jobs, Peace, Freedom."
December 1946, pp. 785-789.

New Republic, 16

182

Wallace, Henry A.
"The Enemy Is Not Each Other."
27 January 1947, pp. 22-23.
T.R.B.

"Washington Wire."

New Republic

New Republic, 28 April, 194?:, p. 11.

Wallace, Henry, "Keeping 60 Million Jobs."
July 1947, pp. 12-13.

New Republic, 28

Wallace, Henry. "The Sell-Out 80th Congress."
August 1947, pp. 15-16.

New Re:Eublic, 4

Wallace, Henry.
"Trust Busters and Planners."
8 September 1947, pp. 14-15.

New Re:Eublic,

"On Testifying in Washington."
Wallace, Henry.
26 April 1948, p. 10.
"Damn the Torpedos!"
5-6.

New ReEublic,

New Re:Eublic, 15 November 1948, pp. 1,

!'State of the Union: A Program for Liberal America."
ReEublic, 10 January 1949, pp. 1-23.
"The Wallace Budget."

New

New Re:Eublic, 28 February 1949, pp. 9-10.

Shelton, Willard. "Portrait of a Conservative."
4 April 1949, pp. 18-20.
"Federal Aid to Education."
11-12.

New Republic,

New Re:Eublic, 18 J·1.11y 1949, pp.

Bauer, Catherine. "The Middle Class Needs Houses Too."
Republic, 29 August 1949, pp. 17-20.

New

Feuer, Lewis S.
"The Future of International Socialism."
Review of Socialism, by Paul M. Sweezey. New Re:Eublic, 31 October 1949, pp. 17-18.
MacDonald, Dwight.
"Back to Metternich." Review of Conservatism Revisted, by Peter Viereck. New ReEublic, 14
November 1949, pp. 34-35.
Krikorian, Y.H. "The Ethics of Naturalism."
17 October 1949, pp. 32-36.

New Republic,

Corson, John J. "Social Security Needs Modernizing."
ReEublic, 8 May 1950, pp. 10-12.
Conn, Harry. "Housing: A Vanishing Vision."
30 July 1951, pp. 12-13.

New

New Re:Eublic,

183

Fyvel, T.R. "Thoughts on the Welfare State."
28 January 1952, pp. 11-13.

New Republic,

"Consecrated Tory--Robert A. Taft: The Philosophy of Negation."
New Republic, 24 March 1952, pp. 12-14.
"Consecrated Tory--Robert A. Taft: The Poor Are Always With
Us." New Republic, 5 May 1952, pp. 15-17.
"Opposition--The Fair Deal Legacy."
1953, pp. 5-7.
"II.

New Republic, 26 January

Opposition--The Fair Deal Legacy."
February 1953, pp. 5-6.

New Republic, 2

Begeman, Jean. "The Plan for Social Insecurity."
27 April 1953, pp. 14-15.

New Republic,

Biddle, Francis. "The Blur of Mediocrity." Review of The
Conservative Mind, by Russell Kirk. New Republic,
24 August 1953, pp. 17-19.
Davis, Michael M. "Health: The President Accepts the Obligation." New Republic, 8 February 1954, p. 16.
Conference on Economic Progress. "Toward Full Employment and
Production." New Republic, 9 August 1954, pp. 9-12.
Key son, Carl.
"Big Business and the Liberals, Then and Now."
New Republic, 23 November 1954, pp. 118-120.
Fuller, Edgar. "Schools: Commendable Reversal."
17 January 1955, p. 14.

New Republic,

Niebuhr, Reinhold.
"Liberalism:
Illusions and Realities."
New Republic, 4 July 1955, pp. 11-13.
Meyer, Donald. "Billy Graham--and Success."
22 August 1955, pp. 8-10.

New Republic,

Bestor, Arthur. "John Dewey and American Liberalism."
Republic, 29 August 1955, pp. 18-19.

New

Reagan, Michael s. "1956--Issues That Won't Be Found."
Republic, 21 May 1956, pp. 12-14.

New

Stevenson, Adlai E. "The Mission of Liberalism."
24 September 1956, pp. 10-11.

New Republic,

184

"Myth with Nine Lives."
3-4.
"The Best We Can Do."
"No Room."

New Republic, 26 November 1956, pp.
New F.epublic, 28 January 1957, pp. 3-5.

New Republic, 9 September 1957, pp. 3-4.

Lewis, Anthony.
"Our Ailing Regula tory Agencies."
lic, 19 May 1958, pp. 13-15.
Keyserling, Leon.
"Eggheads and Politics."
27 October 1958, pp. 13-17.

New F.epub-

New Republic,

"Galbraith and Schlesinger Reply to Leon Keyserling."
Republic, 10 November 1958, pp. 14-15.
"Adam Smith Updated."

New

New Republic, 16 March 1959, pp. 3-4.

"The Luxury of Illness."

New Republic, 13 July 1959, pp. 3-5.

Reichley, James. "The New Conservatives' Last Gasp." Review
of Up From Liberalism, by William F. Buckley, Jr.
New Republic, 19 October 1959, p. 27.
"Running For What?"

New Republic, 4 January 1960, pp. 3-4.

Sarnoff, Irving.
"Bad Boys, Bad Times."
January 1960, pp. 12-14.
"Subsidies for Schools."
4-5.

New Republic, 18

New Republic, 8 February 1960, pp.

"Medical Care for the Aged."

New Republic, 7 March 1960, p. 5.

Miller, Helen Hill. "What America Can Afford: A Review of the
National Needs in the 60's." New Republic, 7 March
1960, pp. 15-23.
Burns, James MacGregor. "John F. Kennedy: Candidate on the Eve:
Liberalism Without Tears." New Republic, 31 October
1960, pp. 14-16.
"Tax F.eform."

New Republic, 9 January 1961, pp. 11-12.

Kast, Michael J. "Tax Reform for the Sixties."
16 January 1961, pp. 11-16.
"Helping Depressed Areas."
pp. 5-6.

New Republic,

New Republic, 23 January 1961,

185
Jencks, Christopher. 11 Paying for Better Education." Review
of Taxes for the Schools, by Roger A. Freeman. New
Republic, 30 January 1961, pp. 17-19.
Hertzel, Leo J. "More Money, More Learning?"
6 March 1961, pp. 10-12.

New Republic,

Harrison, Gilbert A. "Carry Me Back: Some Notes on Barry
Goldwater." New Republic, 27 March 1961, pp. 13-19.
Dale, Edwin L., Jr. "Confession of a One-Time Conservative."
New Republic, 29 May 1961, pp. 9-10.
Jencks, Christopher. "Slums and Schools-- I."
10 September 1962, pp. 19-22.

New P.epublic,

Jencks, Christopher. "Slums and Schools--!!."
17 September 1962, pp. 13-16.
"The Conservative Failure."
pp. 3-4.
"Who's for Barry?"

New Republic,

New Republic, 20 October 1962,

New Republic, 20 July 1963, pp. 3-4.

"War on Poverty."

New Republic, 28 December 1963, pp. 3-4.

"Goldwater's Law."

New Republic, 1 February 1964, pp. 4-5.

Jencks, Christopher. "Paying for Education--!!."
lic, 1 February 1964, pp. 13-16.
T.R.B.

"The War on Poverty."

New Repub-

New Republic, 14 March 1964, p.

p. 2.

Kempton, Murray. "'You Know More About This Than I Do.'"
New Republic, 28 March 1964, pp. 12-14.
Jencks, Christopher. "Johnson on Poverty."
28 March 1964, pp. 15-18.
"Poverty In the House."

New Republic,

New Republic, 13 June 1964, pp. 6-7.

Walinsky, Adam. "Keeping the Poor in Their Place: Notes on
the Importance of Being One-Up." New Republic, 4
July 1964, pp. 15-18.
Dale, Edwin Z., Jr. "The Great Unemployment Fallacy."
Republic, 5 September 1964, pp. 10-12.

New

186
Tobin, James.
"Barry's Economic Crusade."
24 October 1964, pp. 13-16.
"The New Republic After Half A Century."
7 November 1964, pp. 15-16.

New Republic,
New Republic,

Malmgren, Harold. "The Economy: A Case for Efficient Planning." New Republic, 7 November 1964, pp. 41-47.
Dale, Edwin T. , . Jr. "Subsidizing the States."
28 November 1964, pp. 11-12.

New Republic,

Jencks, Christopher. "Why Bail Out the States?"
Republic, 12 December 1964, pp. 8-10.
Alderman, Michael H. "Why We Need Medicare."
26 December 1964, pp. 17-20.

New

New Republic,

Bernstein, Merton C. "What Future for Social Security?"
New Republic, 9 January 1965, pp. 9-11.
Jencks, Christopehr. "LBJ's School Program: A Revolution in
American Education?" New Republic, 6 February
1965, pp. 17-20.
Anderson, Patrick. "Job Corps--What Boys Will It Take?"
New Republic, 20 February 1965, pp. 15-16.
"New Housing Start?"

New Republic, 13 March 1965, p. 8.

"T.R.B. from Washington."

New Republic, 20 March 1965, p. 2.

Dale, Edwin L., Jr.
"The Big Gun on Poverty."
7 August 1965, pp. 13-15.

New Republic,

Drew, Elizabeth Brenner. "New Housing at Rents Families Can
Afford?" New Republic, 21 August 1965, pp. 9-10.
Kopkind, Andrew. "Bureaucracy's Long Arm: Too Heady A
Start in Mississippi?" New Republic, 21 August
1965, pp. 19-22.
"When the Poor Are Powerless."
1965, p. 7.

New Republic, 4 September

Ridgeway, James. "Why the Poverty War Seems a Muddle."
New Republic, 9 October 1965, pp. 7-8.
Wright, J. Skelly. "Crime in the Streets and the New
McCarthyism." New Republic, 9 October 1965, pp.
10-11.

187
"Moynihan Report."

New Republic, 11 September 1965, pp. 8-9.

"The Poor in Their Place."
pp. 3-4.

New Republic, 20 November 1965,

Flacks, Richard. "Is the Great Society Just a Barbecue?"
New Republic, 29 January 1966, pp. 18-23.
Harrington, Michael. "The Mystical Militants."
19 February 1966, pp. 20-22.
Kopkind, Andrew. "VISTA, on a Cloudy Day."
19 March 1966, pp. 17-18.

New Republic,

New Republic,

Seabury, Paul. "Gideon's Army and Moynihan's Pros."
Republic, 19 March 1966, pp. 23-25.
"'The More Glorious War.'"
7-9.

New

New Re:public, 26 March 1966, pp.

Dale, Edwin L., Jr. "The Case Against a Tax Increase."
New Republic, 2 April 1966, pp. 11-13.
Walinsky, Louis J. "Keynes Isn't Enough: The Goal Beyond
Full Employment.", New Republic, 16 April 196(3,
pp. 14-16.
Jencks, Christopher. "Accommodating Whites: A New Look at
Mississippi." New Republic, 16 April 1966, p.
19-22.
Keyserling, Leon H. "Taxes for Whom for What?"
23 April 1966, p. 18.
''By

or for the Poor?"

New Republic,

New Republic., 30 April 1966, pp. 5-6.

"What's Congress Doing?"

New Republic, 7 May 1966, pp. 7-8.

Kopkind, Andrew. "Humphrey's Old Pals: An Account of the
ADA Convention." New Republic, 7 May 1966, pp. 1922.
"Is Integration Irrevelant?"

New Republic, 4 June 1966, p. 7.

Sanford, David. "Care for the Not-So-Poor."
4 June 1966, p. 8.

New Republic,

Ridgeway, James. "Simulating Poverty: Input and Output."
New Republic, 11 June 1966, pp. 9-10.

188

"'Black Power.'"

New Republic, 18 June 1966, pp. 506.

"Medical Care in New York."
8-9.
"No Fire This Time:
ference."

New Republic, 18 June 1966, pp.

Andrew Kopkind on the Civil Rights ConNew Republic, 18 June 1966, pp. 15-16.

Kopkind, Andrew. "Poor Politics."
pp. 15-17.

New Republic, 25 June 1966,

Satter, David A. "West Side Story: Home Is Where the Welfare
Check Comes." New Republic, 2 July 1966, pp. 15-19.
Letter to the Editor, New Republic, 16 July 1966, pp. 37-38,
from Robert T. Bouer, Director Bureau of Social
Science Research.
"Violence in the City."
"Tax Those Profits."

New Republic, 30 July 1966, pp. 5-6.

New Repbulic, 24 September 1966, pp. 5-6.

"Small Business Loans."
9-10.

New Republic, 24 September 1966, pp.

Moscovitch, Edward. "Finding Jobs for the Poor."
lic, 5 November 1966, pp. 16-19.
"Little by Little, Less and Less of OEO,"
December 1966, pp. 10-11.

New Repub-

New Republic, 10

Piven, Francis Fox, and Cloward, Richard A. "Desegregated
Housing: Who Pays for the Reformers' Ideal?" New
Republic, 17 December 1966, pp. 17-22.
Ridgeway, James. "Rebuilding the Slums."
January 1967, pp. 22-25.
"No Staying Power?"
"The Hard Choice."

New Republic, 7

New Republic, 21 January 1967, pp. 7-8.
New Republic, 4 February 1967, pp. 7-8.

Theobald, Robert. "The Goal of Full Employemnt."
lic, 11 March 1967, pp. 15-18.

New Repub-

Keyserling, Leon H. "Guaranteed Annual Incomes."
Republic, 18 May 1967, pp. 20-23.

New

Tobin, James. "It Can Be Done! Conquering Poverty in the US
by 1976." New Republic, 3 June 1967, pp. 14-18.

189

"Domestic Pacification."
"Medicare's Birthday."
"Civil War Two?'.'

New Republic, 1 July 1967, p. 7.
New Republic, 8 July 1967, pp. 5-6.

New Republic, 19 August 1967, pp. 7-8.

Ridgeway, James. "Freak-Out in Chciago: The National Conference of New Politics. 11 New Republic, 16
September 1967, pp. 9-12.
11

Hitched to LBJ?"
5-7.

New Republic, 30 September 1967, pp. 1,

Jencks, Christopher. 11 Limits of the New Left."
21 October 1967, pp. 19-21.

New Republic,

Piven, Francis Fox, and Cloward, Richard A.
"Rent Strike:
Disrupting the Slum System." New Republic, 2 December 1967, pp. 11-15.
Piven, Francis Fox, and Cloward, Richard A.
"What Chance for
Black Power?" New Republic, 30 March 1968, pp. 1923.
Miles, Michael. "Reagan and the Respectable Right."
Republic, 20 April 1968, pp. 25-28.

New

Serrin, William. "Who Cares About Rebuilding the City?"
New Republic, 4 May 1968, pp. 10-11.
"Pilgrimage of the Poor."
11

Poverty Cuts."

New Republic, 11 May 1968, pp. 5-6.

New Republic, 13 July 1968, p. 8.

Miles, Michael. 11 Candidates and Cities."
July 1968, pp. 19-21.
"Subsidized Housing."

New Republic, 13

New Republic, 20 July 1968, pp. 10-11.

"Calling All Delegates."
3-6.

New Republic, 27 July 1968, pp. 1,

McCarthy, Eugene J.
"What's To Be Decided? 11
27 July 1968, pp. 12-13.

New Republic,

Strout, Richard Lee. "Paying for the Right to Life."
Republic, 23 November 1968, pp. 15-16.
"Senator Byrd's 'Facts' About Welfare Payments."
Republic, 14 December 1968, pp. 9-10.

New

New

190

Dale, Edwin, L. Jr., "The Inflation Goof."
4 January 1965, pp. 16-17.

New Republic,

Pierce, Francis. "Welfare on the Cheap." Review of Maximum
Feasible Misunderstanding, by Daniel P. Moynihan.
New Republic, 22 February 1969, pp. 23-24.
Harrington, Michael. "Who Are the True Redeemers?" Review of
The Agony of the American Left, by Christopher
Lasch. New Republic, 12 April 1969, pp. 25-27.
Tobin, James and Ross, Leonard. "A National Youth Endowment."
New Republic, 3 May 1969, pp. 18-21.
McCarthy, Colman.
"The Job on the Job Corps."
5 July 1969, pp. 19-21.

New Republic,

Bickel, Alexander M. "Close of the Warren Era."
12 July 1969, pp. 13-16.
"Nixon's Affluence."

New Republic,

New Republic, 30 August 1969, pp. 7-8.

Hansen, W. Lee, and Weisbrod, Burton A." The Equality Fiction." New Republic, 13 September 1969, pp. 23-24.
Osborne, John.
"The Welfare Story--Plot and Sub-plot."
Republic, 8 November 1969, pp. 15-17.
"Poor Children."

New Republic, 22 November 1969, pp. 9-11.

Anderson, Fred. "Paying More, Getting Less."
17 January 1970, pp. 15-18.

New Republic,

Anderson, Fred. "We Can Do It Better, Cheaper."
24 January 1970, pp. 13-16.
Anderson, Fred. "Paying for Health."
ary 1970, pp. 17-19.
Ulmer, Melville. "Economic Showdown."
February 1970, pp. 11-12.
"The Acceptable Compromise."
pp. 11.
"Poor Education."

New

New Republic,

New Republic, 7 FebruNew Republic, 28

New Republic, 14 March 1970,

New Republic, 21 March 1970, pp. 9-10.

Schecter, Mal. "Alive but Not Well."
11 July 1970, pp. 15-17.

New Republic,

191

"Living Room."

New Republic, 19 December 1970, p. 8.

Michelson, Peter. "Tom Wolfe Overboard." Review of Radical
Chic & Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers, by Tom·Wolfe.
New Republic, 19 December 1970, pp. 17-19.
Clarke, Gerald. "JFK--Bitter Memories of a Cold Day."
New Republic, 16 January 1971, pp. 13-15.
Ulmer, Melville J. "Better Than Revenue Sharing."
Republic, 13 February 1971, pp. 16-19.
"TRB."

"Out of Joint."

"Dissent and Disorder."

New

New Republic, 1 May 1971, p. 6.
New Republic, 15 May 1971, pp. 7-8.

Osborne, John. "Reagan's Welfare Deal."
May 1971, pp. 11-13.
"Revenue Sharing That Works."
pp. 7-8.

New Republic, 15

New Republic, 29 May 1971,

Reid, P. Nelson. "Financing Higher Education in Ohio."
Republic, 12 June 1971, pp. 13-14.
"Suburban Snobbery."

New Republic, 26 June 1971, pp. 7-9.

Ulmer, Melville, Jr. "Work and Welfare."
July 1971, pp. 12-14.

New Republic, 3

"Ending Poverty,"

New Republic, 7 August 1971, pp. 8...:9.

"Growth Industry."

New Republic, 7 August 1971, p. 9.

"Public Employment."
"Feeding the Poor."
ll.

New

New Republic, 25 September 1971, p. 12.
New Republic, 30 October 1971, pp. lO-

Ulmer, Melville J. "Waiting for Welfare."
13 November 1971, pp. 10-11.
"Paying for Good Schools."
pp. 5-6.

New Republic,

New Republic, 11 December 1971,

Hartnett, Ken. "The US as Slumlord."
December 1971, pp. 11-13.

New Republic, 11

Henry, Louis H. "Caring for Our Aged Poor."
22 May, 1971, pp. 17-22.

New Republic,

192
Jencks, Christopher. "Education Vouchers."
4 July 1970, pp. 19-21.
"Revising Social Security."

New Republic,

New Republic, 24 June 1972, p. 9.

Ulmer, Melville J.
"McGovern's Economics." New Republic, 24
June 1972, pp. 21-23.
Tobin, James.
"McGovern's Economics."
1972, pp. 30-32.
"McGovern's New Economics."
pp. 8-9.

New Republic, 22 July

New Republic, 16 September 1972,

Wieck, Paul R.
"The Very Last Hurrah."
18 November 1972, pp. 18-20.

New Republic,

Ulmer, Melville J.
"Does Schooling Matter." Review of
Inequality, by Christopher Jencks, et al. New
Republic, 18 November 1972, pp. 27-30.
"Abortion."

New Republic, 10 February 1973, p. 9.

Ribicoff, Abe. "He Left at Half Time." Review of The Politics
of a Guaranteed Income, by Daniel P. Moynihan. New
Republic, 17 February 1973, pp. 22-26.
"One Nation, Indivisible."
pp. 7-8.

New Republic, 17 March 1973,

Post, Dudley. "Requiem for Model Cities." New Republic, 14
April 1973, pp. 13-15.
"Keeping Them Poor."
11-12.
"Health Checkup."

New Republic, 22 September 1973, pp.

New Republic, 19 January 1974, pp. 7-8.

Peabody, Malcolm E., Jr.
"Housing Allowances."
9 March 1974, pp. 20-23.

New Republic,

Gilbert, James. "Last Chance." Review of The Movement, by
Irwin Unger. New Republic, 6 July 1974, pp. 29-30.
Arrow, Kenneth J.
"Taxation and Democratic Values."
Republic, 2 November 1974, pp. 23-25.
Howe, Irving. "Historical Memory, Political Vision."
Republic, 9 November 1974, pp. 25-28.

New
New

193

Davis, Lanny J. "Liberal Dilemma." Review of The Real
America, by Ben Wattenberg. New Repubilc, 9 November 1974, pp. 41-42.
Stern, Paul. "The New Medicine."
1975, pp. 15-17.

New Republic, 19 April

Viorst, Milton. Review of The Politics of Neglect, by Bernard
J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan. New Republic,
20 December 1975, pp. 25-26.
Fairlie, Henry. "In Defense of Big Government. 11
13 March 1976, pp. 24-27.

New Republic,

Ulmer, Melville, J.
"Jobs, Inflation, and Liberal Politics. 11
New Republic, 20 March 1976, pp. 6-8.
"A Job For Everyone."
"Wary of Welfare."

New Republic, 27 March 1976, pp. 3-4.

New Republic, 5 June 1976, pp. 3-5.

Ulmer, Melville J.
"Friedman's Currency."
6 November 1976, pp. 8-9.

New Republic,

Marshall, Eliot. "Unemployment Comp is Middle-Class Welfare."
New Republic, 19 February 1977, pp. 16-18.
Tonelson, Alan. "Bring Back Hell Fire."
February 1977, pp. 18-19.

New Republic, 26

Kotz, Nick.
"The Politics of Welfare Reform."
14 May 1977, pp. 16-21.
"The Unborn and the Born Again."
pp. 5-6.
"The Mugging of New York."
5-6' 10.
"A Second Chance."

New Republic,

New Republic, 2 July 1977,

New Republic, 30 July 1977, pp.

New Republic, 20 August 1977, p. 7-8.

Chapman, Stephen. "The Rich Get Rich, and The Poor Get
Lawyers." New Republic, 24 September 1977, pp. 910' 14.
"Guaranteed Jobs for Economists."· New Republic, 17 December
1977, pp. 5-6.
"'Before the Fact is the Dream.'"· New Republic, 28 January
1978, pp. 7-9.

194

"Guns and Margarine." New Republic, 4 February 1978, pp. 5-6.
"Social Security Redux."
"Me First."

New Republic, 15 April 1978, pp. 5-6.

New Republic, 17 June 1978, pp. 5-6.

Howe, Irving. "The Right Menace."
1978, pp. 12-22.

New Republic, 9 September

Fairlie, Henry. Review of Robert Kennedy and His Times, by
Arthur W. Schlesinger, Jr. New Republic, 9 September
1978, pp. 30-34.
Kotz, Nick.
"Feeding the Hungry."
1978, pp. 20-22.
Chapman, Stepehn. "Poor Laws."
pp. 6-10.

New Republic, 25 November

New Republic, 2 December 1978,

"Liberals and Inflation," The New Republic, January 20, 1979,
pp. 5-13.
Tinder, Glenn. "Defending the Welfare State." New Republic,
10 March 1979, pp. 21-23.
Kondracke, Morton. "The German Challenge To American Conservatives." New Republic, 29 September 1979, pp.
16-21.
Colamosca, Anne. "Capitalism and Housework."
29 March 1980, pp. 18-20.
"Corporations and People."
pp. 5-6, 8.

New Republic, 19 April 1980,

"In Defense of Good Intentions."
ber 1980, pp. 5-6.
V.

New Republic,

The New Republic, 13 Decem-

OTHER SOURCES

Annunziata, Frank. "The Revolt Against the Welfare State:
Goldwater Conservatism and the Election of 1964."
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 10 (Spring 1980):
254-265.

195
Bell, Daniel. "On Meritocracy and Equality,"
Interest 29 (Fall 1972): 24-68.

The Public

Bell, Daniel. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.
New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Bellush, Jewel.
"Old and New Left Rf:appraisals of the
New Deal and Roosevelt's Presidency." -Presidential Studies Quarterly 9 (Summer 1979): 243-266.
Blum, Walter J., and Kalven, Harry, Jr.
Progressive Taxation. Chicago:
Chicago Press, 1953.

The Uneasy Case for
University of

Brock, Clifton. Americans for Democratic Action:
Its Role
in National Politics. Washington, D.C.: Public
Affairs Press, 1962.
Clecak, Peter. Crooked Paths: Reflections on Socialism,
Conservatism and the Welfare State. New York:
Harper and Row, 1977.
Coser, Lewis, A., and Howe, Irving, eds. The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left. New York:
Quadrangle, 1974.
Dolbeare, Kenneth M. and Dolbeare, Patricia. American
Ideologies: The Competing Political Beliefs of the
1970s. Chicago: Markham, 1971.
Erkich, Arthur A., Jr. The Decline of American Liberalism.
New York: Atheneum, 1967.
Fowler, Robert Booth. Believing Skeptics: American Political
Intellectuals, 1645-1954. Westpoint, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom.
sity of Chicago Press, 1962.

Chicago:

Univer-

Friedman, Milton, and Friedman, Rose • . Free to Choose.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society, 2nd edition.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
Gans, Herbert J.
1968.

More Equality.

New York:

Random House,

196

Gelman, David, with others. "Wanted: A Liberal Agenda."
Newsweek, March 30, 1981, pp. 78-82.
Gettleman, Marion E. and Mermelstein, David, eds. The Great
Society Reader: The Failure of American Liberalism.
New York: Random House, 1967.
Gilder, Geroge. Wealth and Poverty.
Books, 1981.

New York:

Basic

Ginzberg, Eli and Solow, Robert M., ed. The Great Society:
Lessons for the Future. New York: Basic Books,
1974.
Girvetz, Harry K. The Evolution of Liberalism.
Introduction
by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. London: Collier, 1963.
Goldman, Eric F. Rendezvous With Destiny, New York:
A. Knopf, 1952.
Goldwin, Robert A. Left, Right and Center.
McNally, 1967.

Chicago:

Alfred
Rand

Graham, Otis L., Jr., "A Historical Perspective on the Future
of Liberalism." Center Magazine, March/ April 1981,
pp. 58-63.
Hamby, Alonzo L., ed. The New Deal: Analysis and Interpretation. New York: Weybright and Tally, 1969.
Hamby, Alonzo L. Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and
American Liberalism. New Yc:rk: Columbia University
Press, 1973.
Harrington, Michael. Toward a Democratic Left: A Radical
Program for a New Majority. MacMillan, 1968;
Pelican, 1969.
Harrington, Michael.
Press, 1970.

Socialism.

New York:

Saturday Review

Harrington, Michael. "The Virtues and Limitations of
Liberal Democracy." CenterMagazine, March/Arpil 1981,
pp. 50-53.
Hayek, F.A. The, Constitution of Liberty.
sity of Chicago Press, 1960.

Chicago:

Univer-

197

de Jouvenel, Bertrand. The Ethics of Redistribution.
Cambridge: C~~.mbridge University Press, 1952.
Kaufman, Arnold S. The Radical Liberal: New Man in
American Politics. Foreword by Hans J. Morgenthau.
New York: Atherton Press, 1968.
Kristol, Irving. On the Democratic Idea in America.
York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Kristol, Irving. Two Cheers for
Basic Books, 1978.

c~~.pitalism.

New

New Yc:rk:

Lasch, Christopher. The Agony of the American Left.
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

New

Levitan, Sar A. and Taggert Robert. The Promise of Greatness.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.
Luechtenberg, William E., ed. The Unfinished Century:
America Since 1900. Boston: Little Brown, 1973.
McCarthy, Eugene J. A Liberal Answer to the Conservative
Challenge, New York: Praeger, 1964.
Martin, John Frederick. Civil Rights and the Crisis of
Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
Markowitz, Norman D. The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 19411948. New York: The Free Press, 1973.
Morris, Charles R. The Cost of Good Intentions: New York
City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-1975. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1980.
Nash, George H. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in
America Since 1945. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Nuechterlein, James A. "The People vs The Interests."
Comnientary, March 1975, pp. 66-73.
Nuechterlein, James A. "Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,.and
the Discontents of Postwar Liberalism." Review of
Politics 39 (January 1977): 3-40.

198

Nuechterlein, James.
Reagan Era."
pp. 20-23.

The Liberal World Confronts the
American Spectator, February 1982,
11

Okun, Arthur. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradoff.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
Seligman, Daniel. "The Search For a Liberal Agenda."
Fortune, August 24, 1981, pp. 60-66.
Steinfels, Peter. The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are
Changing America's Politics. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979.
Stern Al.
"Liberal Programs Must Match Promsie With
Performance." Center Magazine, March/April 1981,
pp. 45-49.
Stockman, David. "The Social Pork Barrel."
39 (Spring 1975): 3-30.

Public Interest

Sundquist, James L., ed. On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives
From Experience. New York: Basic Books, 1969.
Walzer, Michael. Radical Princi les: Reflections of an Unreconstructed Democrat. New York: Basic Books, 980.
Wildavsky, Aaron. "Government and the People."
August 1973, pp. 25-32.
Wilson, James Q. "Liberalism and Purpose."
1972, pp. 74-76.

Commentary,

Commentary, May

Wolff, Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism.
Beacon Press, 1968.

Boston:

Young, James P. The Politics of Affluence: Ideology in the
United States Since World War II. San Fransicso:
Chandler, 1968.

199

APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by William J. Voegeli, Jr., has
been read and approved by the following committee:
Dr. Thomas Engeman, Director
Associate Professor, Political Science, Loyola
Dr. Ralph Rossum
Associate Professor, Political Science, Loyola
Dr. John Williams
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by
the Committee with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

'Date

